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Preface 
The information and risk society poses a new challenge for the law in all its 
fragments. Modern media communication and technologies increase people’s 
prosperity while stating new risks with not uncommonly devastating crisis-
potential: The banking crisis, the safety net for the euro zone and the nuclear 
incident in Fukushima are only the latest forms of those specific modern common 
dangers which the law is facing – in many cases due to it’s domestically limited 
validity - not or not sufficiently prepared. 
 
The frequently transboundary and supranatural relevance of these new risks lead to 
a inevitable international cooperation concerning the efforts of a legal risk 
limitation; in respect of the different constitutional and cultural circumstances, 
however, this is a difficult exercise. Initial to all common efforts of dealing with 
this challenge there is the international and intercultural dialog, even if the 
implications and the eventually implemented solutions drift apart at national level 
in the end. In order to promote the international dialog within the jurisprudence 
there was a conference in October 2010 held by the faculty of law of the Georg-
August-Universität, supported by the chair of GAU, together with the faculty of 
law of the Seoul National University discussing main issues of law in a modern 
information and risk society. With this volume the results of this convention shall 
be made accessible to everybody interested. Thereby it illustrates not only the 
variety of new issues and aspects, but also reveals that this can only be the 




Göttingen/Seoul, May 2011              The Editors
 
 
Greeting from the Faculty of  Law of   
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen 
Gunnar Duttge 
My dear colleagues of the respectable and extremely renowned law faculty of the 
Seoul National University, 
my dear colleagues from Göttingen, 
ladies and gentlemen, dear guests, 
 
it is my great pleasure to cordially welcome all of you – and a very warm welcome 
goes to our guests from Seoul who travelled so far to be with us today. I may 
express this warm welcome in my position as a medical and criminal law professor 
as well as on behalf of my colleague Prof. Langenfeld, dean of the local law school, 
who apologizes for not being here due to other commitments. However, she sends 
her warmest regards.  
Last evening, vice president Prof. Münch already greeted and welcomed you in 
the name of the chairmanship of Georgia Augusta. Göttingen’s law faculty and its 
members are no less cheerful. Some of these members are currently present or will 
join us in the course of the next hours or by tomorrow. 
The immediate reason of our meeting is an invitation by Göttingen’s faculty of 
law which joins in the larger context of Georgia Augusta’s endeavors to strengthen 
the existing international cooperation and to promote as well as extend 
internationalization of the sciences.  
In times of globalization across all areas of life, having been initiated long ago, 
it should be natural and taken for granted that one’s own thoughts in the course of 
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Law and its scientific adaptation don’t end at the national borders. Therefore we 
need to pursue with great interest the solutions and debates about similar, often 
identical legal questions of other legal systems. Thereby we are offered the 
opportunity to critically analyze and confront our own legal system. For criminal 
law, however, the amazingly well established relationship with our colleagues from 
South Korea is no news. For decades now, and for hopefully many more, 
professors as well as doctoral students have vivaciously exchanged ideas. 
Globalization, nevertheless, reaches all areas of law. It certainly embraces civil and 
constitutional law and all other interdisciplinary fields, one of which is medical and 
bio law, a traditional field in Göttingen which has seen an upward trend in recent 
years. The local center of medical law has strong ties with Ewha University’s 
Institute for Biomedical Law & Ethics in Korea. 
With regards to recent developments in Göttingen’s relationship to Seoul 
National University and its law faculty, the meetings and lecture events on the 
occasion of the opening of a branch of Göttingen University in Seoul are especially 
worth mentioning. 
Just last year we were fortunate to welcome here in Göttingen the president of 
the Seoul National University, who, during his visit to Göttingen’s Center for 
Medical Law, voiced a strong interest in further communication and exchange of 
ideas, particularly between both law schools. With this background, we can take it 
up from here and with this conference further strengthen existing relations. 
Besides our vast unified interest in getting to know each other for institutional 
reasons, we join today chiefly because of our shared pursuit of the exchange of 
scientific ideas and for the purpose of deepening our knowledge of recent queries 
of Law in today’s forged ahead risk and information society. 
As you all know, Law is facing new societal challenges which can no longer be 
coped with through conventional measures. One example is society’s growing 
heterogeneity regarding its constitution and concomitant problems of integration, 
another one the exorbitant increase in significance of the media and new forms of 
communication in all public areas. An especially demanding societal challenge is 
the – in former times unimaginable – dimension of interconnectedness and all the 
consequences thereof, such as informational protection of privacy, on one hand, 
and on the other hand the amendment of responsibilities regarding the legal 
sanctioning of harm done, through a struggle with incomprehensible complications 
of causalities. These catchwords are only a few of many. They stand for all the new 
problems and questions which affect the interdisciplinary fields of legal sciences. 
The array of relevant topics is broad and hardly lucid, yet we – and I mean all 
of us as we are gathered here today – seemingly managed to perfectly single out the 
most essential questions for this conference which we will go on to discuss in 
detail later throughout the day. 
I am exceptionally thrilled about everything we are going to hear and further 
deliberate over today and tomorrow. I wish to already thank everyone very much 
who helped facilitate this conference, and make it possible in the first place, by 
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contribution within the framework of our discussions. I wish to especially thank 
my dear colleague Prof. Kuk Cho, who on short notice accepted my offer and 
within no time set the course for today’s conference on track as well as established 
contacts. It would not have been possible to get together here in Göttingen today 
without your committed support, dear Prof. Kuk Cho. Thanks again! 
Now, I would like not to further prolong the commencement of the scientific 
part of this conference and therefore wish, on behalf of the dean of Göttingen’s 
faculty of law, for the conference to run smoothly.  
One of the most popular German poems includes the following beautiful and 
apt motto:  “Inherent to every new beginning is a special magic”. 
 
 
SECTION 1:  




Liberal Democracy in State of  Emergency:  
Seen By Standing on the Shoulders of  Carl Schmitt
∗  
Hong Sik Cho (   ) 
I. The Current Global Financial Crisis and Korea’s Response  
Even though the global financial crisis was deemed to be as severe emergency as 
the worldwide depression of the 1930s, the Korean government has not yet taken 
extralegal measures. Since basic constitutional norms presuppose a background of 
social and political stability, at times of emergency, whether it being “military 
exigencies in the theater of war” or “less grave, but unusual and urgent conditions” 
such as current financial crisis, the basic constitutional norms are subject to 
suspension. The Constitution of Korea, in Article 76, provides that in time of a 
grave financial or economic crisis, the President may take the minimum financial 
and economic action or issue orders that have the effect of an Act when, and only 
when there is an urgent need to take measures for the maintenance of national 
security or public peace and order, and there is no time to await the convocation of 
the National Assembly. Despite the broad presidential powers prescribed by the 
Constitution, I would say that the Korean government has responded to the 
financial crisis with much constitutional care and fully aware of the temptation of 
over-reactions.  
However, aside from the extralegal measures, the Korean government did take 
every means without departing from established principles. Among the measures 
taken by the Korean government has increased expenditure on research and 
development, introducing numerous legislative bills, taking various administrative 
                                                     
∗ This is a revised version of the paper published at National Taiwan University Law Review vol. 4, no. 3, 
55-84 (Dec., 2009). 
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options, providing sufficient liquidity and executing budget earlier than scheduled. 
These means taken by the Korean government seemingly are within the scope of 
its administrative discretion. However, the Korean Assembly was criticized for 
impeding governmental efforts by not timely resolving the legislative bills. In 
particular, because of the deadlock surrounding the controversial media bills, the 
Korean Assembly could not focus on bills which affect the daily lives of people 
such as a bill aimed at reviving small-scale shops. In spite of apparent lack of sense 
of responsibility on the side of the political leaders, the Korean economy is 
gradually recovering from its downturn.  
Such being the case, the governmental reaction to the crisis has not been 
subject to judicial review. There are a handful of the Constitutional Court cases 
dealing with the “IMF bailout crisis”, a financial crisis the Korean people deem far 
severer than the current crisis. Even though much more swift and radical measures 
were taken by the Korean government, none took on the extralegal form, and none 
were declared unconstitutional by either the Supreme Court or the Constitutional 
Court. Given the lack of extralegal actions taken by the government and relevant 
precedents, I would like to address general issues related to emergency power from 
theoretical perspectives.  
 
II. Why Carl Schmitt in the State of Crisis? 
Carl Schmitt, a jurist with an enormous influence on German political and legal 
thought, is known not only for his charge that liberalism is nothing but one 
ideology seeking to impose upon the whole its own partial conception of the good 
life, but also for association with the Nazis. Surprisingly, the English-speaking 
world including the United States in the aftermath of September 11 has recently 
had “a renaissance of interest” in his work. Schmitt’s critique captures better than 
contemporary critics the problematic nature of liberalism at least in some aspects, 
and I would like to examine Schmitt’s well known insights and highlight some 
lessons for times of crisis by offering my own response to what I regard to be 
Schmitt’s points.  
According to Schmitt, the stupidity of parliaments provides the occasions for 
executives to exercise the sovereign power that always resides in the executive. 
Schmitt’s antiliberalism seems to get more relevant in times of crisis as reflected in 
the post-911 attention of constitutional theorists. As Sanford Levinson points out, 
former US President Bush’s response to the September 11 attaches presents 
constitutional theorists with the kind of problem Schmitt seems to have addressed. 
In this sense, we can take note of lessons from Schmitt.  
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III. Schmitt’s Diagnosis of Liberal Democracy’s Weakness  
Schmitt’s authoritarian theory of law and politics provides that Constitutional 
democracy is self-contradictory and illusionary, which is revealed in case of crisis. 
According to Schmitt, to overcome crisis the constitutional principle should give 
way to unconstrained political sovereignty so that the sovereign can follow the 
collective will of the people without any constraint. Further, Schmitt criticizes 
liberalism asserting that the liberalism is illusionary because neutrality, the rule of 
law, and constitutional democracy rest on contradictory premises. He also argues 
that the liberalism is hypocritical because liberals hide their particular purposes and 
selfish economic goals by invoking non-existent universality. To Schmitt, 
constitutional democracy is a mere amalgam of two contradictory components, 
namely, the liberal component of constitutionalism and the political component of 
democracy. While Schmitt regards a genuine democracy as the sovereign authority 
of the collective unity of the people, constitutionalism does not concretize any 
political substance. The purported neutrality of the latter, in Schmitt’s view, is used 
as an instrument of the liberal bourgeoisie to defend its private and economic 
interests. Schmitt states that the individualism inherent in individual human rights 
can be reduced to the selfish goals of the bourgeois while the separation of powers 
prevented each constitutional institution from exercising sovereign authority in 
Schmittian sense. As such, in constitutional democracy, a pure democracy where 
people express and accomplish their collective will cannot exist.  However, it is 
both practically and conceptually possible to establish a government with two 
components together. In particular, liberalism is not devoid of political substance 
in the sense that discrimination and bias, specifically in Kantian liberalism, is the 
first and foremost enemy of a liberal community where people respect each other’s 
dignity and freedom on the basis of equality.  
Having told this, while Schmitt raises some disturbing questions, his 
provocative thesis, I think, may help us to recognize a disturbing aspect of 
liberalism as evidenced in the current global financial crisis. The first step to 
scrutinize Schmitt’s critiques is to grasp what he means by “the political.” Contrary 
to the liberals’ emphasis on universality of all human beings, Schmitt argues that 
“in the domain of the political, people do not face each other as abstraction but as 
politically interested and politically determined persons, as citizens, governors or 
governed, politically allied or opponents.” For example, even if the modern 
democracy established universal human equality, it does not necessarily mean the 
disappearance of substantive inequalities, because inequality would likely shift in 
the economic sphere so that this area would “take on a new, disproportionately 
decisive importance.” Schmitt warned that “under the conditions of superficial 
political equality, another sphere in which substantial inequalities prevail will 
dominate politics.” I think this provides a significant insight for understanding “the 
current dominance of economics over politics.”  
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Schmitt’s reflection sends a wake-up call for those who believe in rational 
individualism. Rational individualism puts too much emphasis upon rationality and 
ignores that it is through political discourse in public sphere that democratic 
citizens rather than rational consumers can introduce questions of values into 
deliberation. A value is constituted through political action, an action through 
which political agents create a common value by committing themselves to that 
value. Without a plurality of competing forces, politics is displaced by mere trade 
between selfish interest groups or rational calculation by technocrats. The current 
global financial crisis is a dramatic example of the dangerous consequences that 
too much emphasis on rationality can brings up. The problem was not a failure of 
rational analysis but, according to President Obama’s diagnosis, was “a collective 
failure of responsibility in Washington, on Wall Street and across America.” More 
likely, Schmitt would argue that the problem here is the concept of rationality 
itself. The myopic rationality rewarded “those who try to game the system”, 
instead of “those who compete honestly and vigorously within the system.”  
I think that Schmitt successfully shows the dangers that the dominance of the 
rational individualism bring to the democracy. Liberal democracy, as a regime, is 
much more than a mere form of government given that it concerns the conceptual 
ordering of social relations. A defining factor of liberal democracy is pluralism, 
meaning the dissolution of one and only idea of the good life. Pluralism not only 
secures individual equal liberty for all, but also legitimates conflict and division. 
However, rational individualism overlooks that the essence of pluralism consists in 
recognizing that there must be a wide variety of perspectives concerning values 
and thereby sees objectivity as belonging to the things themselves. My concern is 
that too much emphasis on rationality would make rationalism dominate modern 
democracy. This may be a real threat to democracy because it may negate the 
inevitable conflict of values and aim at a universal rational consensus. But then, I 
do not advocate an unconstrained extreme pluralism because such value relativism 
does not recognize that certain differences are constructed as relations of 
subordination.  
Is there any other way to make whole our liberal democracy project than to 
resort to rationality? Once the pluralism is accepted, there seem to be three options 
in specifying the terms under which people with different conceptions of the good 
can live together in political association. First is to find procedures to deal with the 
differences. However, the creation of a mere modus vivendi that regulates the 
conflict among different views is not enough because it will weaken the state to 
such an extent that it reduces to a referee with a purely instrumental function and 
thus making the unity a mere convergence of interests, not a proper form of unity 
of a plural society.  
The second option would be to emphasize priority of the right over the good. 
As Rawls points out this is to establish political justice that all “reasonable” citizens 
would support despite their deep doctrinal disagreement on other matters. 
However, Rawl’s conception of justice, similar to social contract metaphor, appeals 
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to an individual’s idea of rational advantage. In addition, as Schmitt points out, too 
much emphasis on universal morality would place oneself in the field of ethics 
instead of the field politics because being blind to dynamic interactions among 
members, one would deny the need to constitute collective identities.   
The third option is to shed a new light on politics. Some of liberal theories of a 
well-ordered society presuppose that political actors are only driven by what they 
see as their rational self-advantage and thus the realm of politics is finally reduced 
to a neutral field of competing interest. However, is it possible that a rational 
political consensus, a definite solution to the issue of justice, fills a gap between 
justice and political decision that will constitute concrete content of democracy 
forever? In particular, the claim of neutrality does not stand in times of crisis. This 
is because there cannot be neutrality in “the political.” The essential part of the 
concept of the political is such that people constitute their values through political 
articulation, which in turn constructs the identity of the people. Such an identity 
can only exist through a very struggle about the multiple and competing 
identifications of the people. Thus, the best way to keep liberal democracy alive 
might be to get people to make value articulations. The recognition of dynamic 
aspect of politics, that is, variability is the condition of existence of democratic 
politics. Merely seeking a final rational resolution of conflicts puts the democratic 
project at risk. Instead, in a democratic polity, conflicts and confrontations, far 
from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited 
by pluralism.   
IV. Schmitt’s Prescription in Times of Crisis as against the Rule 
of Law: Emergency Power Without Check  
The question of crisis for legal scholars is how to cope with a shock to a political 
system that is so great that normal rules seem no longer applicable. Exceptional 
measures for exceptional times are usually deemed to have the effect of 
undermining both separation of powers and individual rights. However, Schmitt 
claims that the ability of a ruler to suspend the rule of law is the ultimate act of 
sovereignty. To Schmitt, “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.” I 
will call this statement as Schmitt’s sovereign thesis. In state of exception where 
the entire legal order is at stake, a sovereign decision is not constrained by any 
normative principles. The extraordinary powers afforded to the President in times 
of crisis, coupled with the power to recognize such a crisis essentially by executive 
fiat, has led to a shocking proliferation of executive orders declaring a “state of 
emergency.” For example, in Weimar Germany, executives gained great powers 
through declarations of states of emergency which then was not confined to the 
area which had originally triggered its application. In Schmitt’s idea, the sovereign 
may set aside constitutional rules to act directly to cope with the threat based on its 
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ultimate responsibility for the continuing existence of the state. As a result, the 
Weimar Constitution had broken under emergency government.  
Is there a way for Schmitt’s sovereign thesis to reconcile with the concept of 
the rule of law? A few options are possible. Firstly, one can claim that the 
sovereign thesis has its own immanent restraint because sovereign will not keep its 
power unless it successfully secures homogeneity in substance with the demo. 
However, there is no controlling mechanism against the sovereign’s arbitrary 
exercise of power in Schmitt’s theory because even though a sovereign is 
dethroned, another sovereign of the same nature will accede to the throne.  
The second option can be found in that while under some of the 
contemporary constitutional theories the Constitution entitles the President to 
disregard different constitutional construction suggested by the courts, the 
President’s arbitrary exercise of power is subject to restriction because Congress 
could impeach him. However, I think this is too optimistic in the sense that there 
is no conceptual resource with which to challenge a decision by the President 
despite expected impeachment. As a matter of concept, Schmitt’s sovereign thesis 
contradicts with the rule of law because the true Schmitt’s position would occur 
when the President takes actions that he believes to be essential to the state’s 
survival when the Constitution properly construed does not allow it.  
Thirdly, the sovereign thesis itself can be construed constitutional. However, it 
is naïve to regard the Constitution as speaking clearly to the resolution. While the 
rule of law suggests the primacy of abstract normative principles over concrete 
political decisions, Schmitt states that normative principles cannot have an effect 
on human society unless they are interpreted by particular agents and applied to 
particular circumstances. Further, one may think to substitute courts as sovereign. 
However, this would not guarantee the rule of law at work because judges also may 
make arbitrary decisions. In addition, the state of emergency cannot be defined in 
advance and therefore the unanticipated nature of the emergency calls for the 
Schmittian sovereign. Given the undefinability of emergency all the law can do is 
to designate who has the power to act to address the emergency.  
In sum, there is no way to conceptually reconcile between the sovereign thesis 
and the rule of law. Therefore, I conclude that to resolve the dilemma, one must 
find a practical way to tame the Schmittian sovereign. Hence, the question now is 
how to survive even exceptional situations without abandoning its liberal 
constitution.  
First, we can consider to rely on “high politics.” According to Legal 
Realist/Critical Legal Studies, the interpretation of legal terms is determined by 
politics not only in states of exception but also in the normal state of affairs. As 
long as we are able to develop politics that is ‘high’, meaning politics involving 
fundamental political vision about the proper way to organize and steer society, the 
impossibility of constitutionalism should not trouble us.  
Secondly, the precedents set through such high politics can finally build a 
normative structure which can ultimately constrain the sovereign over time. I 
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already noted in the above that the purported legal control will be ineffective 
because, even if emergency is constitutionalized, the interpretation given to such 
open-ended terms will be determined by politics. However, as cases are 
accumulated over time, the web of cases will fix the contour to such a large extent 
that the declaration of an emergency is regulated in a legally meaningful way as 
well. Therefore, one cannot overemphasize the need to retain the possibility to 
subject the sovereign’s decision to ex post facto review. If no judicial review is 
available, then legal exceptionalism will arise even when law is most determinate. 
One might be concerned that normalizing emergencies such as in the second 
option may result in permanent emergency. However, it seems to me better to 
normalize emergencies rather than to keep them outside normal governance. In 
short, bending of the constitutional framework would be preferred over its 
breaking.  
I would like to finish this chapter with a Korean case. Former President Kim 
Young-sam directed his ruling party to enact a law to prosecute former presidents 
Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo for their respective roles in 1979 coup d’etat 
and 1980 bloody crackdown on Korean citizens in Kwangju. The legislation raised 
issues about its retroactivity and whether it is a violation of the Korean 
Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws because the law authorizes 
prosecution of a past act for which the statute of limitation has already run. The 
Constitutional Court rendered its decision regarding the foregoing in 1996 and the 
Act was not struck down. My point here is not about the constitutionality of the 
Act, but about the fact that both the coup d’etat and the enactment of the law were 
reviewed in a judicial manner by the Court.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
Liberal democracy has its own deficiencies. In emergency situations someone, the 
president, the court or whoever the case may be, has to take decisive action to 
cope with the emergency. As discussed above, there is inherent risk that any such 
exercise of sovereign power may lead to its abuse. However, it is impossible to put 
in place a rule to address such abuse in advance because of the unpredictability of 
emergencies. For example, it is impossible for one to address all the possible 
eventualities in a given contract because of the difficulty in predicting the differing 
possibilities. Therefore, to a certain extent, one has to rely on both parties’ good 
faith and fair dealing to resolve situations not specifically addressed in contract. 
This example reminds me of Wittgenstein’s insightful statement: “no course of 
action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made 
out to accord with the rule.” (LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 69 (3d ed., 2001)). If one would accept Wittgenstein’s view, one 
would find that indeterminacy can be seen as inherent in the concept of rule of law 
itself. (For example, Yasuo Hasebe, The Rule of Law and Its Predicament, 17 RATIO 
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JURIS 489 (2004). Wittgenstein, however, provides an exit out of this paradox: 
“there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.” (WITTGENSTEIN, 
supra at 84). Quite often, indeed, one can grasp the meaning of a rule right away 
without recourse to any interpretation. In this case, the meaning of a rule is 
determined by conventions widely established in society. In short, Wittgenstein’s 
point is that interpretation is required only when established linguistic rules and 
conventions underdetermine the meaning of an expression (For example, ANDREI 
MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY, ch. 2 “Meaning and 
Interpretation” (Hart Publishing 2d ed. 2005)). I think that Wittgenstein’s view 
implicates a lot for the question this essay seeks to answer. The key to resolving 
the problem of indeterminacy in rule of law in states of emergency would be to 
build up conventions, whether legislative or judicial, necessary to control 
sovereign’s exercise of emergency power. 
On the other hand, if one would take a functionalist definition of the rule of 
law, one would draw the same conclusion. For example, Friedrich A. Hayek 
understands the rule of law such that it “make[s] it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and 
to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.” (FRIEDRICH A. 
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944)). If the goal is to reach the state of 
Hayekian legal system, I would say that politics as constrained by appropriate 
political practices could accomplish the goal as well. 
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Risk Management by the Government and the 
Constitution 
Werner Heun 
I. Introduction: Security – Danger – Risk 
At first sight risk management by the government is an unfamiliar concept in 
German constitutional law. Much more common are the concepts of security and 
its opposition: danger. The three notions security, danger and risk are closely 
interrelated and risk management has been a governmental function for a long 
time, although it has not been sufficiently conceptualized as such. Speaking about 
these different but interrelated concepts in German constitutional theory and law 
in the English language has to take into account the slightly different meanings and 
associations of the English and German expressions. At least in legal language for 
example the German word “Gefahr” means imminent danger in English.  
Before turning to the subject of risk management itself it seems useful to 
clarify the three notions and their relation to each other in a short historical 
overview. 
1. The oldest concept in political and constitutional theory is security.1 The 
Roman securitas, where all modern European notions are derived from, originally 
means plainly the absence of grief or trouble. It soon gained a political sense as an 
                                                     
1 Historical overviews Werner Conze, Sicherheit, Schutz, in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 5, 
1984, p. 831-862; Andrea Schrimm-Heins, Gewissheit und Sicherheit. Geschichte und 
Bedeutungswandel der Begriffe certitudo und securitas, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 34 (1991), p. 
123-213; 35 (1992), p. 115-213; Michael Makropoulos, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 9, 
1995, col. 745-750. 
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expression of the Pax Romana but meaning only a subjective feeling. During the 
Middle Ages securitas became an objective status and then a positive political 
concept. It is however the rise of the modern state that elevates securitas publica to 
the foremost goal of the state.2 In addition this general purpose of government is 
divided into two different aspects: internal and external security which are guided 
by different rules and maxims.3 Thomas Hobbes integrates safety into a coherent 
political theory by defining it as “not mere survival in any condition but a happy 
life so far as that is possible”.4 John Locke qualifies security as central element of 
the integral goal of “peace, safety and publick good of the people”5 which are the 
concretization of life, liberty and property as the end of government.6 In the 18th 
Century public safety was extended to a comprehensive concept that encompassed 
the happiness of the people.7 As a countermovement security was reduced to its 
core as public safety in a narrow sense as well as the rule of law.8 At the end of the 
19th century a process of extension set in again. The idea of social security became 
a dominant goal of government9 even before the invention of the notion by F.D. 
Roosevelt in the 1930s10  and increasingly ever since.  
2. Security is always threatened by danger. In the English language danger in 
general means that harm or damage is impending. As a juridical concept danger 
(Gefahr) is a product of 19th century police law in Germany11 and in a literal 
translation means “a situation or condition, in which in case of an unimpeded 
course of events a condition or a conduct will with sufficient probability lead to an 
injury of public safety”.12 This traditional definition was developed by Prussian 
administrative courts during the Empire and is still applied today. Public safety in 
this context is also legally defined as the whole public legal order, individual life, 
health and freedom as well as the institutions of government and public goods like 
                                                     
2 See also Josef Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit, 1983, p. 3ss. 
3 Conze, Sicherheit (Fn. 1), p. 842s. 
4 Thomas Hobbes, De cive (1647), ch. 13, 4. (English ed. by R. Tuck/M. Silverthorne, 1998) p. 143; 
idem, Leviathan (1651), II, 30. 
5 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), II, ch. 9, § 123ss., 131. 
6 Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, Volkssouveränität, 1977, p. 143;Walter Euchner, Naturrecht und Politik bei 
John Locke, 1969 (repr. 1979), p. 198ss. 
7 See e.g. Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von dem Gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen 
und insonderheit dem gemeinen Wesen (4. ed. 1736), II, ch. 1, § 222s., in: C. Wolff, Gesammelte 
Werke 1. Abt. vol. 5, p. 165s. 
8 Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für 
die Praxis (1793), A 232-270, in: Werke (ed. W. Weischedel), vol. 6, p. 127-172 (143-164); Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792); 
in: Werke (ed. A. Flitner/K. Giel). vol. 1, 1960, p. 56-233. 
9 See Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem, 2. ed. 1973, 
p. 91ss; Gerhard A. Ritter, Der Sozialstaat, 2. ed. 1991; for the legal concept of the social state in 
Germany see Hans Zacher, Das soziale Staatsziel, in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. II, 3. ed. 2004, § 
28, p. 659-784.  
10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech 30. Sept. 1934, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (ed. S.I. Rosenman), vol. 3, 1938, p. 413-425 (421). 
11Seminal decision: Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht 10. June 1880, in: Preuß. Verwaltungsblatt 
1879/80, p. 401ss.  
12 See e.g. § 2 I a Nds. SOG; Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, Polizei- und Ordnungsrecht, 11. ed. 2007, p. 62ss. 
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public utilities. As a consequence any violation of a law that protects public – not 
only private – interests is qualified as an “injury of public safety”.13 The police and 
the general administration are authorized to take the necessary measures if the 
danger is imminent. Imminence is defined by sufficient probability according to 
general experience of life, so that the injury is considered almost certain from the 
perspective of the acting officer.14 The assumed certainty of the realization of the 
danger is the crucial difference to risk. The prevention of dangers by the 
government has therefore to be distinguished from risk management. 
3. The concept of risk is only a recent development in German jurisprudence. 
Since especially nuclear plants may lead to catastrophic damages for public safety, 
although only with a very low probability, the traditional concept of the prevention 
of imminent danger according to the rules of police law was considered insufficient 
and therefore supplemented by a new concept of risk prevention. In this context 
risk is legally defined as a product of the extent of the expected damage and the 
probability of its occurrence. The defining difference to imminent danger is – 
solely – the by far lower probability.15 This legal concept is more or less restricted 
to the law of technical safety. Even the notion of a “risk society” pertains mainly to 
these technical risks.16 Its main applications are the law of nuclear plants as well as 
genetic technology and now more recently nanotechnology.17 The concept is the 
basis for legal prevention measures which should forestall the occurrence of 
imminent dangers in advance. The precautionary principle authorizes government 
to take such preventive measures.18  
Risk and its management is a problem of a wider scope that exceeds by far the 
narrow limits of the so far described concept of technical risks.19 A much broader 
perspective is needed since technical risk is only a very partial aspect of risk. Risk 
in this broad sense has two elements.20 It presupposes firstly uncertainty about the 
                                                     
13 Knemeyer, Ordnungsrecht (Fn. 12), p. 72s. 
14 B. Drews/G. Wacke/K. Vogel/W. Martens, Gefahrenabwehr, 9. ed. 1986, p. 224; R. Poscher, 
Gefahrenabwehr, 1999, p. 114-128. 
15 Original definition: BMFT (ed.), Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke 1979, Hauptband, p. 10-
16; Jörn Ipsen, Die Bewältigung der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Entwicklungen durch das 
Verwaltungsrecht, VVDStRL 48 (1990) p. 177-206. (186s.); Andreas Reich, Gefahr – Risiko – 
Restrisiko, 1989, p. 85-132; Udo di Fabio, Risikoentscheidungen im Rechtssaat, 1994, S. 73s.; Liv 
Jaeckel, Gefahrenabwehrrecht und Risikodogmatik, 2010, p. 49-167; critical Arno Scherzberg, Risiko als 
Rechtsproblem, Verwaltungsarchiv 84 (1993), p. 484-513, (497ss). 
16 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft, 1986, p. 25-112; see also Gotthard Bechmann, Risiko als 
Schlüsselkategorie der Gesellschaftstheorie, KritV 1991, p. 212-240, also in: idem (ed.), Risiko und 
Gesellschaft, 1993, p. 237-276. 
17 Cf. Jaeckel, Gefahrenabwehrrecht (Fn. 15), p. 16-48. 
18 For Germany, see Ulrich K. Preuß, Risikovorsorge als Staatsaufgabe, in: D. Grimm (ed.), 
Staatsaufgaben, 1993, p. 523-551; Wolfgang Köck, Risikovorsorge als Staatsaufgabe, AöR 121 (1996), p. 
1-23; generally on a comparative basis Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear. Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, 2005, p. 15ss. 
19 Risk management in Germany is understood only in this narrow sense, see e.g. Eibe Riedel (ed.), 
Risikomanagement im öffentlichen Recht, 1997. 
20 See generally Nicholas Rescher, Risk. A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation 
and Management, 1983, p. 5ss; John Adams, Risk, 1995; Otthein Rammstedt, Risiko, Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 8, 1992, col. 1045-1050; different approach by Herfried Münkler, 
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future and secondly the possibility of harm and loss on one side as well as mostly – 
if not always – the possibility of gain or other positive developments on the other 
side. As a general observation bad contingencies cannot exist in the absence of 
favourable ones.21 Natural disasters seem prima facie to present a counterexample 
but only if one neglects the fact that people went the risk of being hit by such a 
disaster by settling on the coast (in case of floods), in an area that is endangered by 
earth quakes or living near a volcano.  
The formation of such a broad concept of risk can be traced back to the Italian 
Renaissance when in the 15th century sea insurances were established.22 Origins of 
insurances can even be found in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome23 and 
certain forms of trading in prehistoric societies may be conceptualized as early 
insurance methods.24 
The originality of the Renaissance concept of risk is the specific combination 
of a contingent future with rationality. The defining moment is that risk can be 
calculated. The basis of risk calculation was the discovery of mathematical 
probabilities. The first systematic studies were done by Girolamo Cardano in the 
16th century, who found out the exact mathematical probability of rolling a 
particular sum with two dice.25 This first approach was further developed to the 
concept of expected value, also called mathematical expectation, over the next 
hundred years namely by Christiaan Huygens, who determined the expected 
outcome of a game that was the weighted average of all possible outcomes.26  
In the 18th century another mathematician of the Bernoulli family came to the 
conclusion that the price one was willing to pay in the marketplace was not the 
expected value but rather the expected utility and that individuals derive a 
                                                     
Strategien der Sicherung: Welten der Sicherheit und Kulturen des Risikos. Theoretische Perspektiven, 
in: idem (ed), Sicherheit und Risiko, 2010, p. 11-33. 
21 David A. Moss, When All Else Fails. Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager, 2002, p. 22. 
22 See Panayotis Perdikas, Die Entstehung der Versicherung im Mittelalter, Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Versicherungswissenschaft 55 (1966), p. 425-509; Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk, Die venezianische 
Seeversicherung im 15. Jahrhundert, 1986; Karl H. Van D’Elden, The Development of the Insurance 
Concept and Insurance Law in the Middle Ages, in: H.J. Johnson (ed.), The Medieval Tradition of 
Natural Law, 1987, p. 191-199 (196s.); see also Douglass C. North, Institutions, Journal of Economic 
Perpectives 5 (1991), p. 97-112 (106s.). 
23 C.F. Trennery, The Origin and Early History of Insurance, 1926, p. 4ss.; on the medieval 
understanding within the framework of the teachings on usury see Birger P. Priddat, Zufall, Schicksal, 
Irrtum, 1993, p. 25ss.  
24 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society with special Reference to Law, Journal of Law 
and Economics 23 (1980), p. 1-53. 
25 See Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, 1996, p. 47-53; L.E. 
Maistrov, Probability Theory, A Historical Sketch, 1974, p. 18-25. 
26 See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A philosophical Study of Early Ideas about 
Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, 1975, p. 92-101, who considers the time of around 
1660 as the “birthtime of probability” (p. 11); see also Maistrov, Theory (Fn. 25), p. 48-55; for the 
complicated and intertwined relationship between mathematical probability, statistical data and 
insurance see also Lorraine J. Daston, The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and 
Insurance 1650-1830, in: L. Krüger et al. (eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution, Vol. 1: Ideas in History, 
1987, p. 237-260. 
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progressively smaller amount of utility from each additional currency unit.27 This 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth leads to the psychological and economical 
phenomenon of risk aversion.28 Therefore, individuals will place a higher value on 
losses than on equally sized gains. That favors insurances in general, since people 
will pay more than the expected value of hazard.29 
This attitude of individuals to risk is also strongly characterized by the fact that 
risk acceptance is generally higher if it is taken voluntarily than if the risk is 
(involuntarily) imposed by a third party.30 However, this distinction should not be 
made the basis of a categorical difference between danger and risk, as has been 
proposed by Niklas Luhmann, who defines danger as imposed and risk as based 
on human decision.31 
II. Methods of Risk Management 
Since the world is full of risks man has always tried to deal with risk. Essentially 
there are three different methods to modify and moderate risks.32 
1. The most common and at first preferable method is risk reduction. People 
try to minimize risks by eliminating or substantially reducing the expected risk. 
This perspective dominates especially public law. The prevention of imminent 
danger is the model for risk reduction. Safety regulations are a prime example for 
this strategy. Criminal Law is probably the oldest method of risk reduction by 
regulation.33 Quite often however, risks and losses are unavoidable. In this case, 
risk management by risk reduction fails to a great extent. Still, there are other 
methods which are overlooked quite often. 
2. It might be feasible in many cases to reallocate risks. There are two methods 
of risk reallocation which supplement each other. It is possible to simply shift risks 
or the risk can be spread.34 A classical example for shifting risks are liability rules. 
                                                     
27 David Bernoulli, Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis, in: Commentarii academiae scientiarum 
imperialis Petropolitanae, 6 (1738), p. 175-192; English translation, Econometrica 22 (1954), 23-36; 
for the modern version of expected utility theory in economics founded by John von Neumann/Oskar 
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), 3. ed. 1953, see Milton 
Friedman/Leonard J. Savage, The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility, Journal 
of Political Economy 60 (1952), p. 463-474; but see also already the classical exposition by Alfred 
Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8. ed. 1920 (reset 1949), p. 460s. 
28 See e.g. Milton Friedman/ Leonard J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, Journal 
of Political Economy 56 (1948), 279-304; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion (1965), in: 
idem, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, 1971, p. 90-120; critical Matthew Rabin/Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies. Risk Aversion, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2001), p. 219-232. 
29 See below Fn. 53. 
30 Seminal article: Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, Science 165 (1969), p. 
1232ss. 
31 Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, 1991, p. 30s. 
32 See for this differentiation Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 17ss. 
33 See Pat O’Malley, The Government of Risks, in: The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society, 
2007, p. 292-308 (295-298); Henning Schmidt-Semisch, Kriminalität als Risiko. Schadenmanagement 
zwischen Strafrecht und Versicherung, 2002, p. 19ss, 109ss. 
34 Terminology of Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 17ss. 
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For instance the liability may be shifted from seller to buyer.35 This can be 
determined by contract between private market participants or by law enacted by 
the government. The underlying purpose of such a regulation might be moral 
arguments of responsibility as well as ultimately to induce the more powerful to 
reduce the risk. Another method of shifting risks that has gained prominence in 
the last financial market crisis are futures and derivatives. They shift and diversify 
risk in time and to less risk averse investors.36 
3. Finally it is possible to spread risks. This is especially feasible if risks are at 
least statistically unavoidable. In this case the risk is usually well known and can be 
diversified by all kinds of insurances as well as by portfolio diversification.37 Stocks 
are another form of spreading risks and profits. The defining element is that this 
method reduces individual risk but not aggregate or total risk.38 The strategy of 
spreading risk between different persons is the principle of all insurances since the 
already mentioned Renaissance sea insurances. Today insurances are a universal 
and common form of risk management that is familiar to everyone from car and 
fire insurances to health insurances. Mostly, this form of risk-spreading is reserved 
to the market and its participants who offer all kinds of insurances, even against an 
invasion from Mars. But the government also often provides for insurances 
starting with the social insurance system by Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s39 or 
the social security regulations in the New Deal in the United States.40  
III. Problems of Risk Management by the Private Sector 
In a free democratic state as well as in a market economy, risk management falls 
into the responsibility of the individual and the market. This is true for all three 
mentioned methods equally. Everyone by himself tries to reduce risks as far as 
possible. One takes care of one’s own health, is interested in safe driving and 
avoids financial risks if possible and feasible. Shifting risks is also an essential part 
of private contracts and insurances are mostly offered by the market.41 But there 
are limits for private risk management due to several problems that are specifically 
risk related.  
                                                     
35 See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, Journal of Legal Studies 13 
(1984), p. 357-374. 
36 See Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, Southern 
California Law Review 73 (2000), p. 471-521. 
37 The classical study is Harry M. Markovitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of 
Investments, 1959; this method can be used by each individual for him- or herself, while insurances 
spread risks interpersonally. 
38 See Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 29ss. 
39 As an introduction see Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des Sozialrechts in Deutschland, 2003, p. 52ss. 
40 See Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 180ss. 
41 The rationale for individual economic actors to sell and buy risks is not only risk diversification but 
also the fact that different people have different attitudes toward risk, some being more risk averse 
than others; other reasons are differential risk assessment and portfolio diversification. See Moss, All 
(Fn. 21), p. 34s. 
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1. Some risk related market failures are well-known since the 19th century and 
are based on the fact of asymmetric information.42 The problem of adverse 
selection was explicitly identified as term and phenomenon in the field of life 
insurances.43 Adverse selection occurs when individuals know more than their 
insurers about their own level of risk. While a person with a terminal disease only 
he himself knows of may buy a high life insurance, a person with good risks may 
leave the insurance and save money investing otherwise. This may be countered by 
health examination and screening but this can be difficult, expensive or impossible 
in certain respects.44  
Even more famous in recent discussions is the problem of moral hazard in 
other contexts. It has been discovered in the area of fire insurance, where insured 
clients might engage in arson, fraud or interested carelessness.45 Moral hazard may 
be defined by the incentive to try to increase the overall riskiness of an activity, 
that is still controlled by someone while the burden of risks is assigned or shifted 
to someone else. This is foremost an insurance problem but concerns also any 
form of (forced) bail-out. Although identified already in the 1860s, its first 
formalized and systematic treatment in economics occurred only a hundred years 
later.46 There are also other information problems that are not based on 
asymmetric information but nevertheless cause market failures. This is especially 
the case if neither party or nobody at all can obtain sufficient information about 
the risk in question and it is not calculable in any way. This concerns catastrophes 
and disasters which are not predictable and cause extremely high costs. In this case 
no one will insure the risk in the market because the information does not exist or 
is too expensive to acquire.  
2. A relatively new field of research that has been neglected by economics for a 
long time are so-called perception problems which undermine the economic 
assumptions of rationality and consistency. The groundwork was laid in the early 
1920s by Frank Knight who introduced the pivotal distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. While risk involves measurable probabilities, uncertainty concerns 
uncalculable and perhaps even unknown probabilities.47 The distinction was 
considered irrelevant for quite a long time by economists, since it was argued that 
precise probabilities were not necessary for an expected utility approach. It was 
                                                     
42 See for the problem of asymmetric information in general George A. Akerlof, The Markets for 
Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market System, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970), p. 
488ss. 
43 Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 36. 
44 See Michael Rothschild/Joseph Stieglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on 
the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (1976), p. 629-649; for 
the problem of genetic testing in this context see David J. Christiansen, Genetic Testing: Risk 
Classification and Adverse Selection, Journal of Insurance Regulation 15 (1996), p. 75-79. 
45 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, Texas Law Review 75 (1996), p. 237-292 
(248s.); see also for even earlier observations Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 38. 
46 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American Economic 
Review 53 (1963), p. 941-973, also in: idem, Essays (Fn. 28), p. 177-211. 
47 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), repr. 1971, p. 197ss., esp. 233, see also 19s. 
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assumed that it was sufficient to base probabilities on subjective estimates which 
could be treated as objective facts.48 Subjective expected utility theory could even 
discard if people were completely unaware of objective existing probabilities. This 
theory was shattered though by the discovery of the Ellsberg-paradox that showed 
that the actual decision even of learned economists violated the consistency 
assumption of this subjective theory.49 Since then all kinds of irrational behaviour 
concerning perception in decision-making have been discovered.50 Especially 
estimation techniques by individuals are biased in several respects. Already the 
Ellsberg-paradox showed that people try to avoid ambiguous or unknown 
probabilities even at the price of inconsistency. They are not only risk but also 
ambiguity averse.51  
Furthermore, individuals use mostly heuristic techniques in order to estimate 
probabilities, which produce systematic biases.52 Four problems are especially 
striking and common. Firstly as a consequence of general risk aversion people 
behave differently when confronted with the same risk: They take less risks when 
choices are framed in terms of gains and more risks when choices are framed in 
terms of losses, since losses seem more harmful.53 Secondly people tend to 
overweight the most available and memorable information regarding the relevant 
problem. While in some cases availability is useful as a clue for frequency quite 
often it leads people to rely on memorable but not representative information. The 
car accident on the road temporarily raises the subjective probability of car 
                                                     
48 Friedman/Savage, Hypothesis (Fn. 27), p. 463-474; Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 
1954 based on Frank R. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, 1931, see for this approach 
recently Jack Hirschleifer/John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, 1992, p. 7ss. 
who deny consequently any difference between risk and uncertainty. 
49 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 
(1961), p. 643-669; William Fellner, Distortion of Subjective Probabilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (1961), p. 670-689. 
50 See for an empirical view Paul J. H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purpose, 
Evidence and Limitations, Journal of Economic Literature 20 (1982), p. 529-563, esp. 541-552, 
general critique Jens Beckert, What is Sociological about Economic Sociology? Uncertainty and the 
Embeddedness of Economic Action, Theory and Society 25 (1996), p. 802-840.  
51 Ellsberg, Risk (Fn. 49), p. 659-669. 
52 Seminal article Amos Tversky/Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty, Heuristics and Biases, 
Science 185 (1974), p. 1124-1131; good short overview Daniel Kahneman/Mark W. Riepe, Aspects of 
Investor Psychology: Beliefs, Preferences and Biases Investment Advisors Should Know About, 
Journal of Portfolio Management 24 (1998), 52-65; for the following see the collections of essays: 
Daniel Kahneman/Paul Slovic/Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
1982; and the sequel Daniel Kahneman/Amos Tversky (eds.), Choices, Values, and Frames, 2000; Paul 
Slovic (ed.), The Perception of Risk, 2000; Thomas Gilovich/Dale Griffin/Daniel Kahneman (eds.), 
Heuristics and Biases, 2002; see also the influential concept of bounded rationality by Herbert A. 
Simon, Models of Man. Social and Rational, 1957, p. 196-201; idem, Administrative Behavior, 3. ed. 
1976, p. 80ss. 
53 Amos Tversky/Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science 
211 (1981), p. 453-458, also in: Judgment (Fn. 52) p. 3-20; on loss aversion itself (people value losses 
more than equal sized gains) see Amos Tversky/Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 263-291, also in: Choices (Fn. 52), p. 17-43, and by 
the same authors, Advances in Prospect Theory, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992), p. 297-
323, also in: Choices (Fn. 52), p. 44-65.  
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accidents in general.54 Thirdly research has also observed an overconfidence and an 
optimistic bias concerning the estimation of personal risks.55 So the vast majority 
of drivers believe that they face lower than average odds of getting into accidents.56 
Similar observations have been made for work accidents or the personal risk of 
unemployment.57 Finally extreme probabilities are usually greatly misjudged. Highly 
unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between 
high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated.58 Extremely low-
probability but high-consequences events like natural disasters59 are therefore 
either not insured at all or heavily overinsured. Furthermore in hindsight past 
events seem inevitable and therefore people tend to believe that this inevitability 
was apparent in foresight.60 A private market exchange therefore in many cases will 
not be economically optimal.61 In addition people are focused on different risks, 
select risks and disagree about desired prospects. Therefore risk perception and 
management is very much influenced by cultural attitudes and predilections. Risk 
management decisions therefore often are a political choice.62  
3. Another category of market failures is a consequence of governmental 
reactions to certain risks and the specific inability of private actors to commit 
definitively for the future, which are therefore occasionally termed commitment 
problems.63 The losses caused by major natural or other kinds of disasters that 
affect a substantial number of citizens force (democratic) government regularly to 
assist and compensate the victims. At the same time the knowledge that 
government will act correspondingly will discourage people from purchasing 
insurance against such risks. This constitutes “a dilemma of government 
responsiveness”.64 
                                                     
54 Tversky/Kahneman, Judgment (Fn. 52), p. 1127; see in general several essays in: Kahneman et al., 
Judgment (Fn. 52), p. 23ss.; Gilovich et al. Heuristics (Fn. 52), p. 19ss. 
55 See the several articles in Kahneman et al. Judgment (Fn. 52), p. 287ss.; as well as the articles in: 
Gilovich et al. Heuristics (Fn. 52), p. 313ss.; shortly Kahneman/Riepe, Aspects (Fn. 52) p. 53s. 
56 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers, Acta Psychologica 
47 (1981), p. 143-148. 
57 Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, Science 246 (1989), p. 1232s.; idem, Why 
it Won’t Happen to Me: Perception of Risk Factors and Susceptibility, Health Psychology 3 (1984), p. 
431-457; see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, Journal of Economic 
Literature 31 (1993), p. 1912-1946; idem, Fatal Tradeoffs, 1992, p. 34-50, 51-74. 
58 Kahneman/Tversky, Prospect Theory (Fn. 53), p. 283. 
59 See Paul Slovic/Howard Kunreuther/Gilbert/ F. White, Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment 
to Natural Hazards, in: Slovic, Perception (Fn. 52), p. 1-32, see also the four articles by Paul 
Slovic/Baruch Fischhoff/Sarah Lichtenstein, ibid., p. 32-50, 104-120, 121-136, 137-153. 
60 Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight – Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1 (1975), p. 
288-299. 
61 See generally Kenneth Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, Economic Inquiry 20 
(1982), p. 1-9. 
62 See Mary Douglas/Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 1982, who define risk as a product of 
knowledge and consent about the most desired prospects (p. 5). 
63 See Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 45ss. 
64 Dani Rodrik/Richard Zeckhauser, The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness, Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 7 (1988), p. 601-620; see also Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy, American Economic Review 85 (1995), p. 46-57. 
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It is an implicit market failure that individuals in one generation cannot trade 
with those of another (not yet born). There is no binding commitment of future 
generations by current market participants.65 This concerns especially so-called 
systematic risks that are defined by the fact that they cannot be diversified at any 
moment in time. A risk that affects just about everyone at the same time cannot be 
spread at all.66 Therefore, a massive nuclear war is not insurable in the private 
sector and neither the risk of macroeconomic booms and busts. Systematic risk 
cannot be spread at the point in time it is happening but might be diversifiable 
across time although not by private market participants. That is why in these cases 
the government steps in.  
Another commitment problem is created by regulation. It is the law in all 
modern economies that anybody may go bankrupt and file for protection in 
bankruptcy. Therefore, nobody can commit not to default on its future obligations. 
In most market transactions, this problem is manageable but may be a specific 
problem for the individual investment in private pension funds since even low 
probability of failure stopped people from joining such funds for their complete 
lifetime savings. It is therefore one of the essential justifications of public social 
security systems.67 The right to default is an additional reason for another 
commitment problem that is called the inalienability of human capital. In modern 
free market economies, human capital is inalienable because individuals cannot 
credibly commit to turn over their future income to others since they neither may 
waive their right to go bankrupt nor sell their working power into slavery. Human 
capital is therefore a non-tradeable asset and risks regarding human capital are not 
diversifiable because they cannot be sold or bought. The diversification of human 
capital risks requires therefore government intervention through social security 
systems.68  
4. A further source of risk management problems by the private sector are 
externalities. Externalities as such are not restricted to risk problems but a general 
cause of market failures.69 To a great extent, externalities can be also related to 
specific risks. In terms of risk, externalities may be seen as a quasi-automatic shift 
of risks to the general public. In this respect pollution creates risks for 
communities and the car traffic by anybody heightens the risk of injury and losses 
                                                     
65 Joseph E. Stieglitz, On the Relevance or Irrelevance of Public Financial Policy: Indexation, Price 
Rigidities and Optimal Monetary Policies, in: Rüdiger Dornbusch/Mario Henrique Simonsen (eds.), 
Inflation, Debt, and Indexation, 1983, p. 183-222 (186); see also P.A. Diamond, A Framework for 
Social Security Analysis, Journal of Public Economics 8 (1977), p. 275-298 (279-281). 
66 Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 46s.; systematic risk must be differentiated from systemic risk where a 
complete system is affected by a failure of one single unit: like the banking system may affected by 
the bankruptcy of one large bank, see Martin Hellwig, Risiken im Finanzsektor, Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Beiheft 7 (1998), p. 123-151. 
67 Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 47; see also Diamond, Framework (Fn. 65), p. 289ss. 
68 Robert C. Merton, On the Role of Social Security as a Means for Efficient Risk Sharing in an 
Economy Where Human Capital is Not Tradeable, NBER Working Paper 743 (Sept. 1981). 
69 As an introduction see classical Arthur C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare, 1912, p. 162-165; idem, The 
Economics of Welfare (1920), 4. ed. 1932, p. 131-135, 172-212. 
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for other drivers and pedestrians. Making car insurance mandatory means to force 
drivers to assume responsibility for the risk incurred by using a car70 which is made 
transparent by the specific form of car insurance in Germany.  
A special source of risks comes into play where individual behavior is to a 
certain extent rational, but on the collective level  leads to irrational results by 
increasing risks and losses. This is especially true for economic downturns, where a 
sinking demand reduces supply, which reduces demand again and so forth.71 In 
case of a financial panic, fear of losses may become contagious and following bank 
runs may destroy even sound banks.72 If nervous depositors withdraw their money 
abortively, they inflict costs on other depositors, banks and investors and increase 
the overall level of risk. This process may even result in a systemic risk for the 
whole financial system as could be observed in the last financial crisis.73  
The premature and hasty withdrawal of bank deposits can be also 
conceptualized as externalities imposed on the other depositors. The main aspect 
though is the collective mania and the circle of feedbacks that aggravates the crisis 
and heightens the risks.74 It is almost unmanageable by the private sector itself and 
requires government action.  
IV. The Role of Government as Ultimate Risk Manager 
The role of government in a political system depends on the preferred economic 
system. All Western political systems have opted essentially for a market system. In 
such a system the government has specific functions in order to compensate for 
market failures.75 These functions are based on several specific capabilities of 
government, which private market participants do not dispose of. The main assets 
of government are the powers to compel by law and to enforce its decisions with 
legitimate force as well as its economic powers to tax, to print money and as their 
consequence the special credit power governments enjoy. Governments are able to 
mobilise capital to such an extent that even the most rich and powerful private 
subjects are not capable to achieve. In addition the government has an extensive 
bureaucratic apparatus that combines specialized knowledge with a high capacity to 
solve problems of any kind.76 These capabilites of government in general are the 
foundation of its role as an ultimate risk manager.77 Its classical function of risk 
                                                     
70 Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 48. 
71 See Werner Heun, Staatshaushalt und Staatsleitung, 1989, p. 124s. 
72 The risk of bank runs is the justification for central banks as lender of last resort, see Werner Heun, 
Die Zentralbank der USA – das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis 9 
(1998), p. 241-281 (248s.). 
73 See Werner Heun, Der Staat und die Finanzkrise, Juristenzeitung 2010, p. 53-62. 
74 Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 49 who also observes that in this case an insurance may not only spread risk 
but even reduce the aggregate risk.  
75 Classical general overview Richard Musgrave/Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice, 4. ed. 1984, p. 7ss.; see also Karl Homann/Andreas Suchanek, Ökonomik, 2000, p. 207ss.  
76 See Renate Mayntz, Soziologie der Verwaltung, 4. ed. 1987, p. 82ss. 
77 See also Moss, All (Fn. 21), p. 49ss. 
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reduction and prevention by law and its enforcement is mainly part of its 
traditional police powers and pervades many different governmental activities.78 
The reduction of collective risks is the natural obligation of government. The 
government has also a major role in shifting and spreading risks. Its regulatory 
powers can compel current citizens and future generations to participate in 
insurance programs or establish governmental insurances.79 The government can 
fight adverse selection by compelling broad participation and preventing any 
opting out by good risk participants. Social security systems and obligatory car 
insurances are a prime example. The government functions to a certain extent as 
an insurance against major risks like war and natural or man made catastrophes as 
a consequence of its economic powers and its almost inexhaustible asset base as 
well as the fact that it can tax into the future. Taxes are sometimes justified by the 
idea that the state acts as an insurance.80 The lending facilities of central banks as 
banks of last resort as well as their power to supply the economy with money also 
act as a kind of insurance. As a consequence of its investigative and enforcement 
capabilities, the government may control and monitor moral hazard. The 
underestimation of risk because of perception problems can be countered by 
providing information and by compelling people to buy the necessary insurance 
like a car or fire insurance. The obligatory social insurance against unemployment 
is another example. Furthermore, the government can internalize externalities that 
cause risks by liability rules as well as taxes. It may shift risks by liability rules in 
order to make the more competent or more wealthy responsible for risk reduction. 
In this perspective of risk management the traditional differentiation between 
public and private law is almost irrelevant. Liability rules, insurance regulations and 
even safety rules may be enacted in either form. Only the enforcement by 
administrative agencies or the government requires a regulation by public law.  
Government is not only a necessary complement and counter force to markets 
but also an important source of failures, however.81 Regulation by law and its 
enforcement create costs that may surpass the costs of risk.82 Perception problems 
may also affect the bureaucracy. Democratic responsiveness of political actors may 
transfer the perception problems of the general population into the sphere of 
government as can be seen in the case of overestimated nuclear risks. The political 
process often tends to a wrong focus on worst-case scenarios. The perception of 
risks by the people and the ensuing risk management depends very much on the 
fragile trust in experts and public authorities.83 Risk reduction by government is 
                                                     
78 See Peter-Tobias Stoll, Sicherheit als Aufgabe von Staat und Gesellschaft, 2003, p. 13-263; for the 
general problem of risk regulation in the U.S.A. see Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, 1993. 
79 For this see Homann/Suchanek, Ökonomik (Fn. 75), p. 212ss; Mark R. Greene, The Government as 
an Insurer, Journal of Insurance 43 (1976), p. 393-407. 
80 This is maintained by the Assekuranz (insurance) theory of taxes, see Friedrich Karl Mann, 
Steuerpolitische Ideale, 1937 (repr. 1978), p. 106-111. 
81 See Horst Hanusch (Ed.), Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, 1983; Martin Jänicke, 
Staatsversagen, 1984, p. 50ss. 
82 See Richard J. Zeckhauser/W. Kip Viscusi, Risk within Reason, Science 248 (1990), p. 559-564. 
83 See Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy, in: idem, Perception (Fn. 52), p. 316-326. 
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often inefficient.84 Liability rules may distort market mechanisms and insurance 
schemes may promote moral hazard. All these government failures do not make 
governmental risk management superfluous or generally harmful. On the contrary, 
a comprehensive risk management by government is an indispensable element of 
any market system, but one has also always to consider the possibilities of 
government failure. 
V. Constitutional Directions for Governmental Risk 
Management 
At this point it is only possible to give a broad overview and a few sketches of the 
constitutional framework of risk management by the government in Germany. 
1. The fundamental rights of the Basic Law constitute a legal bias85 for risk 
bearing and risk management by the individual citizens themselves and by private 
corporations. They may reduce or reallocate risks especially by private contracts. 
Risk shifting by contract and risk spreading by all kinds of private insurances is 
therefore ubiquitous. The government may reduce or reallocate risks by interfering 
into market processes but each governmental intervention has to be justified by 
legitimate and plausible reasons and to observe the constitutional requirements as 
foremost the proportionality principle.86  Risk reduction and the purposes of risk 
reallocation are such reasons that justify encroachments into the guaranteed 
liberties. 
2. The Basic Law does not oblige the government to shift or spread risks at all. 
One may construe one exception for the case of social security which is authorized 
by several constitutional provisions and also underlined by the general social state 
principle that entails only a certain guarantee of the institution as such and limits 
modifications of the social security system but contains no detailed directives.87 
Constitutional obligations, mostly derived from fundamental rights,88 require at 
best risk reduction. This corresponds to the focus on risk reduction since the 19th 
century as exemplified in police law. The Constitution itself neglects risk shifting 
and spreading in general while the ordinary law entails a substantial amount of risk 
reallocation regulations, liability rules as well as insurance legislation. 
3. The Constitution therefore provides practically no explicit but only indirect 
obligations. Even public safety as such and the protection against imminent 
dangers and risks are not explicitly guaranteed by the Basic Law, although their 
                                                     
84 See Richard J. Zeckhauser/W. Kip Viscusi, The Risk Management Dilemma, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 445 (1996), p. 144-155. 
85 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928), 5. ed. 1970, p. 126, 158, 164. 
86 Short overview in English by Werner Heun, The Constitution of Germany, 2010, p. 192ss. 
87 For details see Rolf Gröschner, in: H. Dreier (ed.), GG-Kommentar, vol. 2, 2. ed. 2006, Art. 20 
(Sozialstaat), Rn. 44; Hans Michael Heinig, Der Sozialstaat im Dienst der Freiheit, 2008, 10ss., 457ss. 
88 Short overview Heun, Constitution (Fn. 86), p. 199s.; for details see Georg Hermes, Das Grundrecht 
auf Schutz von Leben und Gesundheit, 1987; Johannes Dietlein, Die Lehre von den grundrechtlichen 
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provision and safeguard is the essential function of government in the modern 
state.89 This function was taken for granted and considered too difficult to 
guarantee so that it was omitted.90 The Constitutional Court only in the seventies 
started to construe a constitutional right to safety (Grundrecht auf Sicherheit) 
although it does not use this phrase.91 The governmental duty to protect life and 
physical integrity is derived from the fundamental right of human dignity in 
combination with the right to life. However, a duty to protect property against 
risks has not been derived from Art. 14 B.L. yet.92 
While the Constitution does not oblige the government to manage risk it 
authorizes the government to different forms of risk management and gives broad 
discretion to decide whether and how to deal with risks. This is mainly true even 
for the obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens against 
encroachment by (private) third parties since it does not require the government to 
protect its citizens with definite measures. It obliges to act at all but not how to act. 
But the individual rights of other individuals as well as general constitutional 
principles justify far reaching encroachments by governmental regulation. In 
summary the Basic Law gives broad authorization without obligation. It also 
authorizes to regulate and establish a social insurance system (Art. 74 No 12 B.L.) 
and the social state principle correspondingly justifies encroachments into the 
citizens’ individual rights in this respect. This principle protects the established 
social insurance system against complete abolition but not against fundamental 
modification although individual entitlements are also protected to a certain extent 
by the property clause of Art. 14 B.L. against withdrawal.93 Mostly the protection 
against encroachments is even weaker. The general authorization to enact civil laws 
allows for risk shifting by liability rules, either restricting or creating liability for 
private subjects. The authorization neither obliges the government nor protects the 
individual. The Constitution also does not substantially limit the reallocation of 
risks by taxes or insurances but neither obliges the government in this respect.  
The overview of the constitutional framework reveals a great discrepancy 
between the actual role of government in risk management, that is hardly to 
overestimate, and the reflection of this role in the Constitution. The scarcity of 
provisions and indeterminacy of the risk management by constitutional directives 
is not astounding though, if one considers the wide variety of the problems of risk 
management. There is an almost unlimited discretion for government to reduce 
                                                     
89 The study by Stoll, Sicherheit (Fn. 78) focuses almost only on risk reduction, but at least mentions 
public accident insurance, p. 31ss. 
90 A few original State constitutions in the USA mention public safety, see e.g. the Virginia Bill of 
Rights of 1776, § 3. 
91 The term is has been coined by Isensee, Grundrecht (Fn. 2), p. 27ss.; see also Gerhard Robbers, 
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constitutional guarantee that is not restricted to the already problematic right to safety, see esp. 
Markus Möstl, Die staatliche Garantie für die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung, 2002, p. 24-28, 37-
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93 See Joachim Wieland, in: H. Dreier (ed.), GG-Kommentar, vol. 1, 2. ed. 2004, Art. 14 Rn. 61ss. 
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risks, to regulate risks, to shift risks by liability rules and taxation, to spread risks by 
establishing state insurances or creating obligations to join certain privately 
organized insurances. The constitutional determination of the whole field of risk is 
comparatively weak. This legal situation is justified by the extreme complexity of 
risk management as well as the fact that the Constitutional Court has no specific 
capability to assess risks or to give directives for risk management. The feeble 
determination of governmental risk management by the Constitution is therefore 
necessary and not a fact that is to deplore.  
 
 
Information as the Basis of  Parliamentary 
Responsibility for European Integration  
Frank Schorkopf 
Sixty years after the promulgation of the German constitution, which was 
underlined by “a visionary openness towards Europe” from the very beginning, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court reassessed the historic process of European 
integration on June 30, 2009.1 The Court reviewed the compatibility of the legal 
foundations of the European Union with the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The 
Treaty of Lisbon is compatible with the Basic Law, the Court’s Second Senate 
ruled, as long as it is applied within the framework outlined by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the German implementation law is 
inconsistent with the Basic Law.  
I will not speak about this landmark judgment that has been complemented a 
few weeks ago by another remarkable judgment. Although it infuriated large parts 
of European political elites, sparked discussion among legal scholars, ongoing, and 
includes many arguments worth being discussed,2 it is only the background for our 
general topic. However, the ruling has pointed to a major problem of European as 
well as international political cooperation, i.e. the parliamentary responsibility for 
governmental and legislative acts determined by European or international law. 
Within this context I will focus on information – our common denominator within 
this conference – as a prerequisite for parliamentary responsibility. 
                                                     
1 BVerfGE 123, 267 ff. – Lisbon. 
2 See the contributions by Möllers/Halbestam, Schönberger, Tomuschat, Niedobitek, Kliver and 
Schorkopf in German Law Journal, Special Issue, 10 (2009), pp 1201 (www.germanlawjournal.com); 
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I. International Law Making: Keeping Parliaments in Play 
The connection between the availability of information and parliamentary 
responsibility is best illustrated by the classical problem of Treaty ratification. This 
classical problem stems from public international law, where national parliaments 
have been and still are being confronted with fully negotiated treaties. A few 
months ago we saw the Russian und the US President signing a new disarmament 
agreement in Prague. The ceremony illustrated that international treaties are not 
only negotiated but also signed by the executives before they are transferred to the 
legislator. Parliaments are asked by governments to ratify the treaty. It does not 
need further explanation that these international legal acts cannot be amended in 
substance at that stage without utmost diplomatic skills and at high political cost.  
I speak about the so called ratification situation (Ratifikationslage) in which 
parliaments may only choose between digital categories of “yes” and “no”. Some 
national jurisdictions have ameliorated the situation by involving members of 
parliament in the negotiation process. This concession made by the executive has 
the major aim to spread information about the negotiations, its expected outcome 
and the whole political situation within parliament. It is an unusual step because 
the realm of governmental negotiations is normally kept free from potential 
troublemakers.  
Another strategy, applied by the US Congress, is the parliamentary adoption of 
a mandate for the negotiation. The mandate defines a corridor of possible 
solutions, which Parliament is willing to accept, as long as the executive produces a 
final result that is situated within the political parameters (fast-track-procedure). In 
the European Union the problem is different. Of course, the major sources of 
European primary law, the Treaties of Paris, Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice 
and Lisbon, are treaties governed by public international law. They fall within the 
scope of the classical problem already mentioned. 
European integration, however, adds a second dimension to the problem of 
disseminating information on international legal activities to parliaments. The 
European Union is empowered to adopt secondary rules on the basis of its treaty 
architecture. You all know about the hundreds of regulations on agriculture, 
custom and trade and competition matters, and about the thousands of directives 
dealing with the internal market affairs, consumer and environmental protection. 
The European legal order has its own mechanisms of identifying, discussing and 
solving social problems and its own machinery of governance. This machinery 
produces European law under full autonomy from the national legal orders. The 
executives are participating due to their membership in the Council. Until recently 
national parliaments had been fully excluded from European law-making – their 
institutional position being substituted by the European Parliament. 
This institutional exclusion is confronted with a strong substantial 
involvement. National parliaments are obliged to transfer European directives into 
national legal order and they typically have no substantial leeway within this task. 
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Moreover, national parliaments are confronted with a comprehensive regulatory 
body that challenges national competence in addressing social problems. In other 
words, parliaments have to form an opinion in most issues of European 
integration regardless of the fact how the competences between the EU and the 
Member States are allocated.  
II. Article 23 Basic Law 
In order to form such an opinion, for the purpose either of preparing national 
legislation or addressing a social problem politically, parliaments need information. 
In the early days of European integration this subject has almost had no relevance.  
European integration was perceived as a mixture of classic intergovernmental 
cooperation and European foreign affairs in which the prerogative of the executive 
prevailed. It was not until 1992 when the German Bundestag, and the State 
chamber, the Bundesrat, vehemently demanded a more deeper involvement in the 
European decision making process. Especially the German federal states (Länder) 
made disturbing experiences with European law making when the German Federal 
Government in 1989 accepted the directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of 
certain provisions concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. The 
directive covered core competences of the Länder (Hausgut) and adopted a political 
stance that wasn’t compatible with »the law of the land« at that time. Even worse, 
the Federal Government was acting in Brussels behind closed doors in a field of 
competence that belongs to the inner-sanctum of the Länder. 
A consequence was the amendment of the Grundgesetz in 1993 introducing a 
new provision for the governance of European integration.3 Art. 23 GG addressed 
not only the constitutional preconditions for the continuing participation in the 
»development of the European Union« but restructured the internal cooperation of 
Bundesregierung, Bundestag and Bundesrat in European matters.  
I will not direct your attention to details of this constitutional provision except 
one section that is relevant for our academic interest in information as basic 
resource for parliamentary responsibility. The Bundestag received the constitutional 
right to state its position before the German Government participates in legislative 
acts of the EU (Art. 23(3) GG). This right, of course, can only be exercised 
properly if Parliament is in possession of all relevant information beyond what is 
known to everybody from reading newspapers thoroughly. Hence, according to 
the Basic Law, the government shall keep the Bundestag »informed, 
comprehensively and at the earliest possible time« (Art. 23(2) GG).  
Details of the duty to inform are regulated by a law (Gesetz über die 
Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der 
                                                     
3 For details of the legislative process and the preliminary developments see Schorkopf, in: 
Dolzer/Waldhoff/Kahl/Graßhoff (eds.), Bonner Kommentar, 2011, Article 23 paras 1. 
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Europäischen Union).4 This law states that the Federal Government shall brief the 
Bundestag on an ongoing basis, normally in writing, on all projects relating to the 
European Union which could be of interest to Germany. Specifically, the Federal 
Government shall for this purpose provide the Bundestag with the material in its 
possession concerning drafted regulations and directives.  
The briefing includes the decision making process within the cabinet, the 
statements by the European Parliament, by the European Commission and by 
other Member States as well as any decisions already made. The Federal 
Government shall provide the Bundestag with the documents at the earliest possible 
moment, if necessary verbally, and by the shortest possible route. The duty to 
disseminate information on European integration matters covers almost all 
measures – the law enlists altogether fourteen positions reaching from initiatives to 
communication, green and white book to reports. They exclude only measures in 
the field of foreign and security policy. Information, there is no doubt, is the 
source for legislative participation in the European integration.  
In the past the Government was cautious to deliver comprehensive 
information in due course in all cases under any circumstances. Because 
“Parliament” is a category of constitutional law, meaning the legislative body in the 
machinery of government. Looking through the spectacles of politics “Parliament” 
does also mean opposition.  Any piece of information transferred to Parliament 
has to be given to all political groups irrespective of their position as governmental 
party or member of the opposition. This problem of parliamentary democracy has 
not vanished but lost its impetus. The Bundestag became aware across its political 
spectrum that in many cases the institution as such was moved to the back seat. 
III. Responsibility for Integration  
From 1993 the Bundestag has constantly tightened the rules aiming to be provided 
with information on European matters. Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional 
Court assessed parts of the so called Extending Act, intended to ratify the Lisbon 
Treaty, as unconstitutional. By reviewing the Extending Act the Court had to deal 
with the machinery of government (Staatsorganisation). It came to the conclusion 
that the Bundestag needs further opportunities to draw consequences from the 
experiences gathered from ongoing integration process. The Court introduced in 
this respect a new concept of responsibility for integration (Integrationsverantwortung) 
into constitutional law.  
The responsibility for integration deals with the classical problem I mentioned 
earlier. Treaties under international law can create a dynamic system of rules by 
authorising the contractual bodies to enact secondary law or by legitimising 
                                                     
4 Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, BGBl. 1993 I, 311 - as amended by law of 22 September 
2009, BGBl. I, 3026. 
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political decisions interpreting and advancing the treaty provisions. Keeping the 
parliament involved in the evolutionary process the lack in predictability of such 
treaty-based developments should be compensated. If the legitimization of 
supranational secondary acts cannot be constructed directly, at least the institution 
with the greatest base of legitimacy should be involved indirectly to a maximum.  
The responsibility for integration takes up the thought of democratic 
responsiveness. The delegates are elected directly by the people and are answerable 
to the people in the political process and in elections.  
The Lisbon Case introduced the responsibility for integration into Germany’s 
foreign relations law that is focussed on Europe. Every constitutional body, 
including the Federal Constitutional Court, has the responsibility to assume its own 
institutionally specific responsibility in the integration process. The Court 
explained: “It is aimed to ensure, regarding the transfer of sovereign powers and 
the elaboration of the European decision-making procedures, that in an overall 
view, the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as that of the 
European Union comply with democratic principles under the Basic Law.”  
In the centre of the Court’s reasoning is the Bundestag. The Court declared the 
implementation law to the Treaty of Lisbon incompatible with the Basic Law 
because the envisioned parliamentary participation did not provide a sufficient 
level of responsibility. The legislative bodies can only actualize their competences 
with a law or a constituent decision. The legislative organs must decide whether 
the level of democratic authentication is sufficient or whether the primary law 
must be changed accordingly, or whether it is not possible at all to act on a 
European level.  
The responsibility for integration lies with the constitutional bodies, which 
must pursue it in line with their competence in supra-national affairs. The Bundestag 
is substantially strengthened by additional reservations in decision-making. And it 
looks as if the Lisbon Case has strengthened the position of the Bundestag at the 
expense of the Federal Government. It will certainly be noticed with concern in 
the Chancellery and in particular in the Foreign Office, that the prerogative of the 
executive in foreign affairs, therefore also the cooperation at European Union level 
has lost ground relative to its traditional position. After the Lisbon Case the 
Bundestag will be able to give the Federal Government directives concerning the 
voting behaviour of the German representative in the Council.  
Basically the Federal Constitutional Court drew only the conclusions from a 
development that changed the standard way of policy-making and legislation. 
Initially, the Basic Law expected supranational and international decision-making 
as limited exceptions in comparison to national acts and regulations – nowadays 
cross-border regulation has become an alternative measure of shaping policy. The 
stronger involvement of the Bundestag in European legislation compensates for the 
decreasing possibility of parliamentary fine-tuning. The political responsibility 
remains constitutionally with the directly elected Parliament that must stand up to 
its citizen and to the public for its actions.  
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Taking into regard the paramount position of the government, the fear is 
unfounded that foreign power will become a matter of concerted actions of 
parliament and government. It is uncertain whether this path will result in different 
decisions or in a higher acceptance of European actions. The outcome depends on 
whether the members of the Bundestag will venture and demand what is 
constitutionally possible. The parliamentary system of government – with its 
structural combination of government and parliamentary majority – has the ability 
to counteract parliamentary self-confidence and independence.  
What did Parliament do after the Lisbon judgment? The Bundestag has adopted 
a new accompanying law at once. In September 2009 it enacted – almost without 
governmental support, as was mentioned with some pride – a new Act on 
Responsibility for Integration (Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz).5 The law implemented 
the Court’s findings in detail. Legal and political responsibility of Parliament is not 
restricted to a single act of approval but extends to its further execution. Silence on 
the part of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat is therefore not sufficient for exercising 
this responsibility. Nevertheless, the precondition to assume Parliament’s 
responsibility is rapid and comprehensive information on European affairs. 
IV. National Parliaments in EU Machinery of Government 
A second major new instrument, that is constructed by EU law itself,  is the 
involvement of national parliaments in the control of how European competences 
are executed. The national parliaments »contribute actively to the good functioning 
of the Union« (Art. 12 TEU).  
Draft legislative acts of the European Union must be made available to the 
national parliaments eight weeks before they are placed on the Councilʼs agenda 
(Art. 4 of Protocol no. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU). In the 
context of what is known as the early warning system provided for by so called 
Subsidiarity Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty, any national parliament or any chamber 
of a national parliament may, within this eight-week period, state in a reasoned 
opinion why it considers that the drafts in question do not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity (Art. 6 Subsidiarity Prot.).6  
Such reasoned opinions, however, only establish an obligation to review the 
drafts where they represent a certain proportion of all the votes allocated to the 
national parliaments. Furthermore, any national parliament (or a chamber) thereof 
                                                     
5 Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des 
Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, BGBl. 2009 I, 3022 - as amended by law of 
1 December 2009, BGBl. I, 3822. 
6 von Danwitz, Der Mehrwert des gemeinsamen Handelns, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 
October 2008, 8; Uerpmann-Wittzack, Frühwarnsystem und Subsidiaritätsklage im deutschen 
Verfassungssystem, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 2009, 461;  Schütze, Subsidiarity after 
Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?, The Cambridge Law Journal 68 (2009), 525. 
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may bring an action to have declared an act void via their Member States if they 
deem a legislative act incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity. 
This procedure gained some attention in autumn 2010. The Bundestag decided 
to trigger the early warning mechanism for the first time. The Commission put 
forward a proposal for harmonising the deposit protection. The planned law would 
diminish the level of protection as provided by the German scheme in force. The 
political groups in the Bundestag were not able to organise the required number of 
critical voices and terminated the procedure.7 
Moreover, the national parliaments are involved in the political monitoring of 
the European Bureau of Investigation (Europol) and the European Judicial 
Cooperation Body (Eurojust) (Art. 12 lit c TEU; Art. 88.2(2), Art. 85.1(3) TFEU). 
They are also entitled in what is known as the bridging procedure, a treaty 
amendment procedure generally introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, to make 
known their opposition to the treaty amendment proposed by the Commission 
within six months after their being notified of it (Art. 48.7(3) TEU Lisbon; 
Art. 81.3(3) TFEU). Opposition by a single national parliament is sufficient for 
making the proposed treaty amendment fail. 
V. Evaluating Information 
The central problem of information as basis for parliamentary responsibility is its 
classification. Not in the sense that the information given by the Federal 
Government to the Bundestag should be kept more or less secret. The problem is 
the mere quantity of the pieces of data that are transferred day by day to the 
members of Parliament. 
The Government sends all pieces of information available at the executive 
branch and Parliament has to find its way through the piles of paper. A clerk 
reported that the daily received documents average to the length of one meter. 
This general rule is the result of bad experiences in the past when the executive 
decided what documents were relevant for the legislature. It also reflects the 
uneasiness with a political process on another institutional level of public power. 
You never know for sure if a certain green paper or a specific communication is a 
key document. 
The heavy workload from Brussels is added to the classical obligations of a 
national parliament. The law-making did not diminish because the Bundestag has to 
keep pace with European integration. On the contrary, parliaments of EU Member 
States have to fulfil the duty to implement European directives within a general 
climate of accelerated law making in the age of information society. To put it in 
other words: the Bundestag – as well as other national parliaments – is structurally 
                                                     
7 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/3239; Financial Times Deutschland, 22 October 2010, 
http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:eu-kommission-ruege-wegen-spareinlagen-
scheitert/50185476.html. 
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over-burdened. A constitutional lawyer might – at this point of my argument – 
draw our attention to the fact that parliaments are able to organise their work 
independently. Parliaments do not need to ask the government or anybody else to 
establish new committees, to heir additional staff or to reshape the procedures of 
decision making. Beeing the master of the budget they are even entitled to allocate 
the necessary financial means. 
The German Bundestag has acted respectively. The House introduced a 
Committee on the European Union (Art. 45 GG) that can be authorised to 
exercise the rights of the Bundestag under Art. 23 vis-à-vis the Federal Government. 
But the plenary has not decided in this direction yet. The traditional committees on 
the one hand seek to maintain their political position, on the other hand they are 
required to engage as many bodies as possible in order to divide workload and to 
provide the legislative process with well-informed political characters. In the past, I 
was told, the European Committee was more or less the reservoir of Europeanised 
talkative backbenchers. I think the self-perception of institutionalised European 
politics has already changed.       
The Bundestag also established a bureau at Brussels staffed with clerks from the 
parliamentary administration in order to collect information at the source, to 
deliberate, to administer the European political landscape.8 For many public 
commentators this step was irritating because it made obvious that the formal 
mechanism of disseminating information from Brussels to the capitals of Member 
States is not sufficient in political day-to-day business. The time factor might play 
an important role, as you need insight into the thinking of the Commission and the 
European Parliament before a document is drafted. The information mechanisms 
are all based on paper information and therefore tend to be behind time, causing 
problems as in the evaluation of information, to mention only one. 
What is or should be important to a national parliament is a political question 
depending on the current state of affairs and depending on a respective decision by 
members of parliament. These members are located at home, back in Berlin, Paris, 
Warsaw or London, involved in national politics and responding to the demands 
of predominantly national media. The classification of information is carried out 
by clerks i.e. civil servants that have to be neutral. Their functioning as agents 
rather than as personal assistants leads to a rising tide of documents coming on top 
of the pieces already distributed by the government. 
 
                                                     
8 For further information about the establishment of the bureau see Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestag 
und Europa, p. 26, available at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10090000.pdf. 




Information as the Basis of parliamentary responsibility for European integration 
has been disregarded for decades. Since the foundation of the European Union in 
1993 the problem has been spotted and solutions have been undertaken.  
An abundance of constitutional law has been created, namely the Grundgesetz 
amendment of 1993 that introduced Art. 23 and its Extending Acts, but this has 
primarily increased the amount of paper transferred to the German Bundestag. The 
problem of classifying information according to its relevance for the national 
political space is unsolved. To my mind this problem is built in the structure of the 
European political process and it shall be compensated not by strengthening the 
national but by strengthening the European Parliament. The latter is been regarded 
as the proper representative of EU citizens. However, as long as this institution is 
not rooted in the public sphere the same way national parliaments are, and is not 
addressed by citizens as political body responsible for the common good, we have 








I. Ambivalence of Knowledge 
“Knowledge is Power”1 – “Knowledge liberates”2: Following this credo, present 
day modern society still today points one on a journey towards a “way out of self-
inflicted sheepishness”3 with incessant optimism. Nothing less shall apply to an 
individual than applies to the “enlightened” public as an indication of their 
dependable “progress”4: New discoveries, lately increasingly regarding our own 
species (only think about the research and exploration of DNA or recently of the 
brain), inventions, and new technical innovations, which make life easier (e.g. drugs 
in the context of medicine) or broaden the natural-given scope of action (e.g. in-
vitro-fertilization); following utopias of an “unblemished” world (especially in the 
area of regenerative medicine) and regarding relentless work towards these utopias 
as a matter of course. 
Correspondingly, modern society sees merely positive potential in the 
persistent and life-long strive for more information and the widening of one’s own 
                                                     
∗ This is a revised version of the paper published in the Journal Datenschutz und Datensicherheit vol. 34, 
no. 1, 34-38 (Jan. 2010). 
1 The phrase of Bacon in his Novum Organum (1620) is well known: „Scientia et potentia humana in 
idem coincidunt, quia ignoratio causae destituit effectum“. 
2 This modification of Bacon’s phrase is inputed to Joseph Meyer, bookseller and publisher from 
Leipzig, Krois/Möckel (issuer), Ernst Cassirer. Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, vol. 9, 1995, 
p. 420 Anm. 582; applicable criticism: Steinmüller, Informationstechnologie und Gesellschaft, 1993, p. 
234 et seq. with annotation p. 417 (p. 760): „For the West German intellectual… , it is characterising, 
that he knows almost everything, but therefrom nothing is resulting for his acting“. 
3 Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, 1783, in: Weischedel (issuer), Werke in zehn 
Bänden, 5.edition. 1983, vol. 9, p. 53. 
4 To „Fortschritt im Recht“ cf. mybasic pre-consideration in: Schweighofer and others (issuer), 
Effizienz von e-Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik, 2005, p. 
546 et seqq. 
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horizon of wisdom, which therefore shall lead one to better understanding and 
“right” decisions, enabling the individual to “self determine” their destiny. 
Today, this described worldview sustainably molds the work of modern 
medicine, which – at least in Western Europe and the Anglo-American cultural 
environment – has dissociated itself from their former paternal conduct and 
meanwhile no longer deems the transfer of responsibility to the patient as a loss 
but rather and increasingly as a relief. 
With the establishment of the concept of “informed consent”, today’s patient is 
ipso jure regarded as a character of equal rank and jointly responsible for 
therapeutic procedures. Therefore, and for the purpose of effectual insight into 
this responsibility, the patient is to be conveyed the “nature, meaning, and scope” 
of the imminent intervention, with special consideration to the associated risks5. 
This is already common practice when it comes to the distribution of 
medication: The information leaflet included in medicine packets by the 
manufacturer must inform the consumer in a “generally comprehensible” manner 
and “legible writing” about the subject and indication group of the drug, known 
contraindications, possible precautionary measures to be taken when using it, 
interactions with other drugs, possible side effects and contingent necessary 
countermeasures, as well as explicitly recommend to “consult a doctor or 
pharmacist” (§ 11 I AMG) in case further information is needed. 
The result of all this effort is well known: The medical layman rather keeps 
away from the insurmountable obstacle of comprehending the leaflet’s information 
and finds it to be an unreasonable demand to seriously analyze the unbearably vital 
messages. A logical reason for this behavioral maxim lies certainly within the innate 
human drive not to have hope and optimism be taken away quite so quickly. 
Optimism, at times, is of clinical relevance (“Placebo effect”)6 and generally a 
factor not to be underestimated in the doctor-patient relationship, itself rooted in 
mutual trust. There, however, is also by no means unwarranted fear that one’s own 
freedom of decision-making is not only strengthened but maybe paralyzed by 
information about negative perspectives7: Knowledge might make one more 
competent, yet simultaneously less free, and occasionally even incapable of acting! 
Not infrequently, the individual therefore prefers to concentrate on the one 
aspect which is important to him and willfully ignores the farther reaching 
complexity; consequently, he rather engages in the risk of (inevitably partly blind) 
trust than acquaint himself with the details.8  
                                                     
5 To the particular relevance of  „Risikoaufklärung“ detailed Deutsch/Spickhoff, Medizinrecht, edition 
6, 2008, marginal no. 273. 
6 Meanwhile even judicially affirmed, cf. LG München MedR 2008, 563, 567; Enck/Zipfel/ 
Kloster­halfen, Bundesgesundheitsblatt 2009, 635 et seqq.; Oeltjenbruns/Schäfer, Anaesthesist 2008, 447 et 
seqq. 
7 Information is from the informationtheory´s point of view always and necessarily perspectivistic, to 
this detailed Steinmüller (n 2), p. 200 et seq. 
8 To the fundamental divergency  of reliance and familiarity detailed Luhmann, Vertrauen. Ein 
Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität, 3. edition, 1989, p. 17 et seqq. 
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Thus, “waiving of information” and “informational escape”, as the central 
hypothesis points out, may not be one-sidedly understood as a deficit but instead – 
when closer examined on a realistic level – as a principle which allows and secures 
freedom in the first place (Simitis)9 and therefore needs to be saved and protected. 
However, is there actually such a “Right to Ignorance”? 
II. Known and unknown fields of application 
In the recent past, one area-specific field of application, in which recognition of an 
individual “right to informational isolation”10 is no longer genuinely denied, has 
reached the center of attention in Germany.  
The Law of Gene Diagnostics11, essentially inured on February 1st 2010, fulfills 
the declared purpose of securing “that no one shall against their will be forced to 
take note of their genetic dispositions” and tolerate “such restriction of free 
personality development”12. The person that has agreed to medical examination is 
to be explicitly notified about this in order to allow for informed consent. 
Additionally, the person also has to learn that they do not need to take note of 
already available results and therefore may at any time request to have them 
destroyed. 
In the context of work and insurance policies, this basic understanding forms 
the fundamental notion for worries regarding specific genetic discrimination as 
well as far reaching prohibition of determination, cognizance, and exploitation of 
such information. 
Interpreting the fundamental right of everyman, which grants “bio ethical self-
ruling”13, proves to be considerably difficult to implement and substantiate when 
“bio informational” interests of multiple people collide. In the context of a human 
genetic medical examination, it is unavoidable to concurrently acquire genetic 
data14 of one’s relatives, without them being aware of such proceedings. This is 
where the individual’s right to attain information clashes with the right to secrecy 
and later – when positive results have come in and are subsequently passed on to 
the family members – with their “right to be let alone”15. How does the new law 
solve this conflict? It does not regard the prospect of affecting others as a reason 
why claiming of genetic examination shouldn’t happen. It also doesn’t stipulate any 
                                                     
9 Simitis, in: Kroker/Dechamps (issuer), Information – eine dritte Wirklichkeitsart neben Materie und 
Geist, 1995, p. 153 et seqq. 
10 Taupitz in: Wiese-Festschrift 1998, p. 583, 585. 
11 Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen v. 07-31-2009 (BGBl. I, 2529). 
12 Cf. The explicit reasons  of the draft law proposed by the faction Bündnis 90/Die Grünen from 
11-3-2006, BT-Drucks. 16/3233, S. 3; the bill of the Bundesregierung from 08-29-2008 (BR-Drucks. 
633/08) is unchanged in comparison to this idea. 
13 Detailed Koppernock, Das Grundrecht auf bioethische Selbstbestimmung, 1997. 
14 According to § 3 Nr. 11 i.V.m. Nr. 4 GenDG data (gained through genetic analysis) about genetic 
properties, i.e. inherited or during insemination or until nativity gained genetic information. 
15 Detailed Duttge, in: Der Staat 36 (1997), 281, 301 with further supporting documents 
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kind of notification of relatives concerning the planned (indirect) assembly of their 
genetic make-up. Should, of course, analysis reveal genetic qualities significant to 
an avoidable and treatable disease, then human genetic advice shall include an 
additional recommendation, namely for the examined person “to advocate a 
genetic consultation to these relatives” (§ 10 III S. 4 GenDG).  
Obviously, the legislator strove for a compromise, which aims to avoid evident 
disregard of the right to ignorance by immediate confrontation with negative 
information. Just as evident is, nevertheless, that the utilization of the advised 
person as well as the privatization of the information conflict, in accordance with 
general accountability principles,16 does not release the physician from their 
responsibility for the initiated notification of the family members, after all. 
This form of “conflict resolution” is somewhat Pharisee-like17 and moreover 
scarcely a fortunate task: Addressing the family members after the already occurred 
ascertainment of clinical results easily reveals to them that something is wrong. 
Consequently, they will hardly be able to evade – as secretly aspired – the 
recommendation to seek human genetic advice themselves. 
However, only as long as the future is yet untold, one can speak of tangible as 
opposed to simply postulated freedom of decision making. The prerogative of 
relatives to be spared the burden of information, accordingly, demands their prior 
notification about the planned examination. Otherwise it cannot be pledged that 
they will be able to decide for this new and unsought information source free from 
external influence. 
Since this freedom of decision making is not lost once a statement is made, a 
submitted consent must be revocable until the notification about the results is 
issued. Informing the relatives beforehand, however, inevitably collides with the 
possible wish of the patient to keep their plans secret. Then again, this concern 
does not prevail: Due to the preordained relation to third parties, it is not 
unreasonable to ask of the person to waive their right to secrecy, this being 
especially true because it regards a planned undertaking rather than already 
available information acquired through “covert” testing. 
It applies all the more since secretly carrying out the exam inevitably violates 
the warranted interest of the relatives not to have their personal data given up. As 
made clear by the German Supreme Court of Justice in its recent ruling on the 
subject of “secret paternity tests”, it is a constitutional statutory duty to “offer 
individual protection from third party access to personally identifiable information 
without the person’s knowledge or permission”. As a result, the relatives’ right to 
informational self-ruling would be infringed by allowing for the challenge of 
                                                     
16 to the ineligible „escape into private law“ in a different context (mission of contact persons) 
detailed Duttge, JZ 1996, 556 et seqq. 
17 Pharisee-excuses: we do not transfer information, which is moreover not having any concrete 
content and which is in particular not mentioning the positive diagnostic findings;; the findings are 
getting announced after abidance of the commendation and in with it authorised by the wish of 
information of the affilated. 
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coping with the aforementioned collision of fundamental rights to be “subject to 
the discretion of one individual”18. 
This surely does not mean that the family members are essentially handed a 
right of veto since that would mean long-ranging prevention of future genetic 
diagnostics and would rob the individual of any possibility of foresighted life 
planning. 
In ancestry cases, a doubting father’s claim to information must yield to even 
(only) anticipated prejudice of the child’s interests in the integrity of the current 
family structure and in avoiding of unwanted confrontation with existential 
insecurities19 (compare now § 1598a BGB in conjunction with § 17 GenDG). If 
this law is recognized, then the right to know one’s own genetic constitution shall 
certainly not be thwarted by the relatives’ interest in secrecy as long as their right to 
information (regarding the examination as such) as well as their freedom of choice 
(regarding the awareness of the medical results) are granted and protected. 
The thereof resulting question is: Is the recognition of a (basic) right to 
ignorance specific to genetic data or relevant to all (health related) information? 
The idea of “exceptionalism”20, which, despite all criticism, lays the foundation for 
the new Law of Gene Diagnostics, could suggest the first assumption.21 German 
development of law, however, has long been disregarding this drawn line, 
exemplified by the discussion on the reform of the Law of Pregnancy Conflict22, 
which was also enacted last year. It states that due to the psychologically 
exceptional situation, in which a pregnant woman finds herself after conspicuous 
results of a prenatal diagnosis, it is required not only to offer specific consulting (§ 
2a), but also to previously notify the patient about the “psychological and ethical 
potential for conflict” (Ziff. 2.2. of the PND guideline of the country’s medical 
association)23 which may require approval regarding the collection of prenatal 
diagnostics.  
A “right to ignorance” is unquestionably acknowledged in this situation, and 
that is, by no means, with limitation to genetic findings, howbeit the medical 
practice noticeably tends to systematically frustrate this right by giving insufficient 
information and by advertising the necessity of a “premature detection of high-risk 
pregnancy” 24. 
                                                     
18 BVerfG NJW 2007, 753, 754 et seq. – Notabene: beyond that it seems to be a legal contradiction in 
valuation, that in the lead-up to the genetic analysis there is attached great importance to an informed 
consent concerning the person getting analysed, whereas the affilated are not even getting informed. 
19 In this regard the BGH spoke about a „right to ignorance“, cf. in: NJW 2005, 497, 498. 
20 To this detailed Damm/König, MedR 2008, 62 et seqq.; Kiehntopf/Pagel, MedR 2008, 344 et seqq. 
21 Sceptical to a general right of lack of knowledge e.g. Simitis, in: Schweizerisches Institut für 
Rechtsvergleichung (issuer), Genanalyse und Persönlichkeitsschutz, 1994, p. 107, 121 et seqq. 
22 Act from 08-26-2009 (BGBl. I, 2990). 
23 Deutsches Ärzteblatt 1998, A-3236 et seqq. 
24 According to the general purpose of a PND as it is described in the so-called „maternity-
guidelines“ of the federal commission of doctors and health funds (available at: www.g-
ab.de/informationen/richtlinien/19); it is significant, that the claim for consultancy and advice in the 
lead-up to the PND-procedure is expressed quite vaguely (cf. chapter A, cypher 1). 
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Another, nowadays undisputed field of application, is the unauthorized HIV 
test in conjunction with the disclosure of the results, which, above and beyond the 
intervention into the integrity of the body by vein puncture, is considered a 
manifest violation of the right to self-determination.25 According to the prevailing 
opinion, the patient may generally forego owed explanations if they do not wish to 
deal with the risks and possible side effects of the designated therapy. It is, 
however, rightfully pointed out that a doctor must not assume such a waiver of 
information hastily or ever conclude conduct implying intent. In point of fact, it is 
to be implied that one wants to be informed. The information on diagnosis, order 
of events, and risks, nevertheless, is of such high relevance to one’s own 
personality that it is justifiable to allow partial or complete informational 
abstinence to those, who wish not to be bothered. 26 
Certainly there are also fields of application, in which recognizing a right to 
ignorance is out of the question: That is, in cases of endangerment of specific 
others or even the general population as for example in the event of infectious 
diseases or when somebody’s suitability to drive a motor vehicle is in question. 
When such a threat exists, which is to be determined by means of a medical-
psychological testing, the undoubted priority of the opposed interests call for the 
denial of a right to ignorance. 
Alarming, however, are those circumstances, in which the doctor proceeds in a 
paternalistic way “for the good” of the patient’s health without first giving them a 
choice in the matter. The across the board “screening” of newborns by means of 
tandem-mass-spectrometry seems to be such a recent instance in which the need 
for parental approval as well as the need for limitation to treatable illnesses is 
increasingly emphasized. 
With this last mentioned restriction to remediable symptoms, § 16 GenDG 
now allows “genetic mass screening”, i.e. systematically exercised medical 
examinations within the entire population for medical purposes (compare § 3 No. 
9 GenDG). The regulation, unfortunately, does not (at least not explicitly) include 
the seemingly natural requirement of voluntary participation on the basis of broad 
information. The explanatory statement of the law nebulously mentions that the 
                                                     
25 In this sense e.g. LG Köln NJW 1995, 1621 et seqq. with review Teichner MedR 2005, 409 et seqq.; 
Uhlenbruck, MedR 1996, 206 et seq.; to the contempt of an explicit refusal of a patient: EuGH NJW 
1994, 3005 et seqq. 
26 The concept of the SPD (social democratic party) for a so-called „patient-rights“ and accordingly 
„patient-protect-bill“ explicitly speaks about a „right to lack of knowledge“ (cf. coalition agreement 
from 10-28-2008, p. 90)“ (Eckpunkte eines Patientenrechtegesetzes from May 2009, p. 3, available at: 
www.spd.fraktion.de); the former opinion, after what an effective relinquishment assumed at least a 
vague idea of the contures of the object of the relinquishment (Roßner, NJW 1990, 2291, 2294; similar 
Fenger/Klotz/Hoffmeier, DMW 2005, 2910 et seq.), de facto implicates a forced advice. The judgement 
BGHZ 107, 222 et seqq. = NJW 1989, 2318 et seqq., which was misleadingly mentioned in favour of 
an obligation of informing, however regards the different case of a doctor paternalistically (because of 
supposed „mental lability“) avoiding to give advice to the affilated, although there was no indication, 
that the patient could be aversed to a consultancy. 
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“public interest in mass screening is valued superior to the individual interest of 
the examined person”27; such a way of thinking, however, just asks for abuse! 
The right to ignorance with consideration to a possible “benefit” is 
questionable in yet another context: The utilization of imaging processes within the 
scope of modern neuroscience introduces the possibility of so called “chance 
finds” in perspective to therapy as well as research. The physician’s main problems 
used to be the risk of facing criminal or liability charges when such conspicuous 
features were not spotted, moreover, the struggle of finding the boundaries of his 
investigative duties.28 Seemingly taken for granted, on the other hand, was – even 
in the context of research studies – the disclosure of findings (e.g. of an 
accidentally discovered brain tumor) to the person affected for reasons of 
consideration towards the person’s wellbeing. Slowly now the understanding 
prevails that the assigned treatment is oftentimes limited, and that (especially 
healthy) patients hardly ever expect such horrifying news. Consequently, the 
patient or test person shall explicitly consent in notification, something that can 
only be done “voluntarily” if it happens before the conduct of the (medical) check-
up and the (research) study respectively. It should be self-explanatory that a 
person’s refusal cannot be disregarded or pushed aside by relating to defense of 
necessity. In order to avoid the moral conflict a physician is bound to have, 
researchers suggest making it a requirement for participation in the study that the 
patient gives their consent to the notification about a possible chance find.29 The 
hereby cleverly intended avoidance of conflict, however, paradoxically assumes 
that one knows exactly what he does not want to be told, meaning which result 
may possibly be found. This is obviously the chief problem of a “Right to 
Ignorance” as an autonomous decision requires just the knowledge which in fact 
cannot yet be known.30 Essentially, a great deal of foresight is demanded of both 
the researcher and the doctor. This increase in complexity, conversely, is 
unavoidable due to the subject status pertained to not only the patient’s body but 
also his informational rights. 
III. Consolidation under constitutional law 
After all this, one concludes that although the basic right to “informational 
privacy” demands for no “absolute” validity, it sure does demand prima facie 
legitimacy. The latter is, not least of all, a result of the immediate connection 
between the fundamental right to ignorance and the basic idea of individual self-
                                                     
27 BT-Drucks. 16/10532, p. 33. 
28 See i.e. Hentschel/Klix, Fortschritte der Neurologie – Psychiatrie 2006, 651 et seqq.; Schleim/ 
Spranger/Urbach/Walter, Nervenheilkunde 2007, 1041 et seqq.; exemplary also Kummer, Deutsches 
Ärzteblatt 2007, A-3186: „If it is the diagnosting doctor istead of the disease, that is rated as a risk, 
ignorance gets elevated to an ethic principle“. 
29 Cf. Heinemann/Hoppe/Listl/Spickhoff/Elger, Deutsches Ärzteblatt 2007, A-1982, 1986. 
30 Taupitz, in: Wiese-Festschrift 1998, p. 583, 597. 
 Gunnar Duttge 
 
48 
determination, which is restricted not only by physical but also by informational 
“pressure”. This clarifies that, in the end, another aspect of the right to 
informational self-ruling is questionable, one that has not yet been sufficiently 
unveiled: The “sovereignty of data”, guaranteed since the famous Federal 
Constitutional Court ruling on “national census”, by no means only refers to 
“outgoing” but just as much to “incoming” personally identifiable data.31 
However, how can one speak of a “Right to Ignorance” when (self-)knowledge 
“has been extolled since the Delphian days as a symbol of higher life of which one 
can only have too little but never too much”? 32 – Obviously the “drawbacks”33 of 
wisdom and its “Janus-headedness”34 urge caution. Wisdom’s quality to affect 
behavior does not automatically have merely positive effects on the individual. But 
what about those who have knowledge at their disposal and believe to know it all? 
However indispensible their concern and care may be, it always also entails a 
tightrope walk. Too easily may it turn into infantilizing and then deserve the 
conclusion, which has once been appropriately articulated by the US-American 
judge Brandeis, himself the “discoverer” of the “Right to Privacy” 35: The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but 
without understanding!36 
IV. Outlook 
Now, where do my observations lead us? Hans Jonas once formulated that 
uncertainty is a “precondition to freedom”. From time to time it can be a relief not 
to have to know something. In other words: Ignorance is inevitably imminent in all 
human wisdom, yet not necessarily deemed a flaw. 
                                                     
31 As well as Hofmann, Rechtsfragen der Genomanalyse, 1999, p. 47 et seqq.; Katzenmeier, Deutsches 
Ärzteblatt 2006, A-1054 et seqq.; dissenting Retzko, Prädiktive Medizin versus (Grund-)Recht auf 
Nichtwissen, 2006, p. 149: „Allge­meines Persönlichkeitsrecht“; Stockter, Das Verbot genetischer 
Diskriminierung und das Recht auf Achtung der Individualität, 2008, p. 511 et seqq. 
32 Jonas, ib. 
33 Wehling, in: Brüsemeister/Eubel (Hrsg.), Evaluation, Wissen und Nichtwissen, 2008, p. 17 et seqq. 
34 Steinmüller (Fn 2), p. 235. 
35 Warren/Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review IV (1890), Nr. 5. 
36 In: Olmstead vs. United States (1927), 277 U.S. 479. 
 
Recent Research Accidents and New Approaches to 
Vaccination 




I. Introduction: Latest research accidents 
In the last years, spectacular cases occurred concerning phase I of clinical research. 
The pioneer patient, Gelsinger, at the University of Pennsylvania died a dreadful 
death after the administration of a new medicinal drug.1  The gene therapy study in 
question was performed the day after Jesse Gelsinger’s 18th birthday, avoiding the 
need for parental consent. The hospital steered clear of a trial by offering a high 
settlement, and exempted the co-defendant from liability, an ethical advisor, who 
had insisted on accepting an adult in the study although the particular disease is 
known to be easier to treat in children. 
The second attempt to go wrong was carried out by the American company 
Parexel for Tegenero Ltd., a company associated with the University of 
Wuerzburg.2 Eight volunteers from England, Australia, New Zealand, and South 
Africa were injected with the antagonist TGN 1412, two volunteers received 
                                                     
1 Savolescu, Two deaths and two lessons: Is it time to review the structure and function of research 
ethic committees?, jmedethics 2002, 28, page 1; Paul Gelsinger, Jesse's intent, Bull.Med.Eth., 
June/July 2002, page 5 ff.  
2 Bull.Med.Eth., March 2006, pages 3 ff. 
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placebo. All members of the test group suffered from severe side effects and had 
to be treated in the intensive care unit for multiple days. Tegenero’s insurance paid 
each injured person EUR 10.000. This and more would have been required of 
them, if experimentee insurance, i.e. insurance for test persons including 
international coverage, had been contractually applicable. 
The latest event occurred in Chicago, where a 36-year-old woman died of 
multiple organ failure.3 Jolee Mohr had participated in a gene therapy study by the 
pharmaceutical company Targeted Genetics, aiming to improve her arthritis 
treatment with the aid of an applied gene vector. The study has not yet been fully 
explored; however, it is quite clear she was infused with a vehicle carrying the gene 
for the tumour necrosis factor receptor. Reports suggest that it was an early clinical 
study of phase I, dealing exclusively with the safety of this typical gene remedy. 
The patient’s consent had been sought with the premise that these experimental 
treatments may not actually be able to relieve her symptoms.  
II. History 
One of the early cases of medical experiments involved vaccines, a vaccine against 
smallpox to be exact. In his Lettres anglaises, Voltaire describes medical trials with 
inmates of the Newgate prison in London. This case’s history is quite fascinating: 
The English emissary at the High Gates had conveyed an old custom of the 
Cherkessian, a tribe in the Caucasus. There, the skin of young children was scribed 
by the blood of a person infected with smallpox resulting in the effective 
prevention of the smallpox virus. This custom allegedly stems from Arabic 
cultures. Even the British ambassador’s wife, Lady Montagu, had inoculated her 
son with the blood of a person suffering from smallpox. 
According to Voltaire, condemned London prisoners were given the 
opportunity to participate in the inoculation with the smallpox virus in return for 
being released. The prisoners unanimously agreed and were released following 
inoculation. As a result of this trial, the inoculation against smallpox was very 
popular in England. At the same time, however, the Paris parliament (the courts 
prior to the revolution) outlawed the inoculation of the smallpox virus, citing 
bodily harm.4 Voltaire criticized this decision and represented the opposite 
standpoint in England. 
The largest medical experiment of all time also revolved around vaccination, 
namely the salk vaccine against poliomyelitis, which was tested on hundreds of 
                                                     
3 FAZ broadsheet daily newspaper from August 8, 2007, page 34: death after knee problems (Tod 
nach Kniebeschwerden) 
4 Voltaire in Fernand Massé (ed.), Lettres anglaises 1967 pages 62 ff.; the history of trials with pocks 
vaccines in the USA and England, described by Moore Daedalus 98 (1969), 502 (504 ff.); on 
vaccination trials in Hanover in 1766 Benzenhöfer, Der Hannoversche Hof- und Leibarzt Paul Gottlieb 
Werlhof (1699-1766) 1992, 10 and experiments in Breslau discussed by Vollmann/Wienau, Informed 
Consent in Human Experimentation before the Nuremberg Code BMJ 1996, 1445.  
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thousands of children in the United States of America in the mid 1950’s. The 
subjects were divided equally into two groups. Many hundreds of thousands of 
other children were treated with the vaccine through the extended access study. 
The experiment yielded an undoubtedly clear result regarding the efficacy of the 
salk polio vaccine.5 
The curse of smallpox, presumed exterminated, returns disguised as a possible 
terror attack, reminding oneself of the spread of the plague in the middle ages. The 
Genuese garrisons of Crimea were besieged by the Tartars. Through the use of 
catapults, the besiegers hurled the bodies of plague victims above the barricades 
into the enemies’ fortresses. This led the defenders to flee on galleys, subsequently 
carrying the plague to Europe.6 The following entry can be read in the Guinness’ 
“World Records”: Earliest use of smallpox as a biological weapon: During the French and 
Indian War of 1754-1767, British soldiers fighting in North America at that time distributed 
blankets contaminated with smallpox among the American Indians. Epidemics followed, killing 
more than 50% of affected tribes7. 
III. General rules of clinical trials 
The general rules of clinical trials apply for all new vaccines against smallpox and 
other emerging infectious diseases, such as the bird flu. However, one particularity 
needs to be stressed: The test subjects usually are not at risk of falling ill with 
smallpox or any other new epidemic. Such an event would only occur, if the 
experimental proceedings were similar to practices used during World War II, 
when prisoners were separated into groups of vaccinated and non-vaccinated 
persons and then exposed to the contamination.8 This, however, is unethical and 
possibly even criminal. An elaborate trial with a large number of experimentees, 
who are treated with the new vaccine, should set precedent in the determination of 
the safety of a particular drug or treatment, e.g. ensuring the treatment is 
efficacious and holds no risk of secondary viral infection. 
As far as efficacy goes, this is similar to the immunisation of donors for the 
extraction of plasma to make special immunoglobulins (§ 8 TPG). Here as well, 
volunteers are infected with a specific medication for the purpose of immunisation, 
e.g. against pertussis. The rationale often given includes the sufficient supply of 
                                                     
5 On polio experiments in third countries cf. Deutsch, Das Recht der klinischen Forschung am 
Menschen 1979 page 83. 
6 Ziegler,The Black Death 1975, pages 15ff. 
7 Guinness Book of World Records 2005, page 306 
8 Namely the concentration camp  experiment with thyphus: United States v. Rose, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals volume 2 page no. 264. Malaria trials with 
volunteers in the American Stateville Prison in Illinois during the Second World War, described in the 
bestseller of  Leopold, Life plus 99 years 1958 pages 305-338. 
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immunoglobulin for the population as well as the existence of a consenting donor.9 
§ 8 TPG regulates both the necessity of comprehensive information and written 
consent. Additionally, the donor is socially insured in the event of an accident. 
According to the new formulation of the Declaration of Helsinki10, and 
generally accepted rules transpired from laws (such as §§ 40 AMG, 20 MPG) and 
court rulings, clinical experiments are based on two pillars: Medical defensibleness 
and consent based on thorough information. Regarding medical defensibleness, 
the evaluation of possible advantages and foreseeable risks is a necessity. Thus, the 
experiment is medically defensible if reasonable to the patient, which in turn 
depends on prevailing judgements of the scientific and medical communities.11 
Concerning vaccinations, the primary consideration must be the underlying 
intention in the immunisation of the patient. 
Immunizations are recognized instruments for the prevention of infectious 
diseases, such as poliomyelitis, yellow fever, influenza, rabies, measles, mumps, 
rubella, chickenpox, diphtheria, tetanus, cholera, etc. Due to immunizations, 
smallpox has been eradicated since 1978, and poliomyelitis was successfully 
restricted to a handful of countries. 
The second and equally important prerequisite to research is, as mentioned 
above, the necessity of patient consent after having been fully informed. The 
research subjects should be told about the aims, methods, benefits, and risks of the 
study; the concomitant discomfort of the experimental treatment should not be 
kept from them. Medical experiments on uninformed patients have always been 
illegal and have even led to criminal proceedings. Consent is designed to follow a 
thorough explanation of the potential treatment(s) that lay ahead, must be given at 
utter liberty. Force, fear, and deceit should not play any part. Participating in 
clinical trials is reserved for volunteers as they are the only persons able of 
expressing their own free will based on comprehensive information. Consent given 
as the result of intimidation or deception is invalid and is in violation of both civil 
and criminal law.12 It is still uncertain, whether soldiers under the command of 
their officers require informed consent or whether the reception of information 
alone shall suffice. This issue shall be further discussed later on. 
Concerning informed consent, uncertainty remains with regards to whether 
information has to be communicated in writing and whether consent needs to be 
in writing. As long as the Law does not oblige differently (as it does in §§ 40 AMG 
and 8 TPG), consent is not bound by formal requirements. Nevertheless, the 
                                                     
9 For general justification of the immunisation of donors, cf. Deutsch/Bender/Zimmermann, 
Transfusionsrechts 2001, page 125f.; Lippert/Flegel, Kommentar zum Transfusionsgesetz (TFG) und 
den Hämotherapierichtlinien 2002 § 8 No. 2.3ff. 
10 Declaration of Helsinki by the World Medical Association Edinburgh 2000. 
11 Cf. for general information: Giesen, Arzthaftungsrecht 1995 pages 68ff.; Katzenmeier/Laufs, 
Arztrecht 16. Aufl. 2010 XIII, 14ff. 
12 Van Oosten, The doctrine of informed consent in medical law 1991 page 177ff.; Laufs/Uhlenbruck, 
Handbuch des Arztrechts 3.edition 2002 § 130; Deutsch, Das Vertragsrecht des Probanden, VersR 
2005 1609, 1610ff. 
Recent Research Accidents and New Approaches to Vaccination 
 
53 
written form is usually used to ensure distribution of uniform information and for 
means of proof. Regardless, consent must be given by the individual in complete 
freedom; which means that every volunteer may revoke their consent without 
listing reasons for doing so.13 
Clinical trials are rooted in part by the principle not to conduct experiments on 
vulnerable groups, such as children, mentally ill individuals, and members of esprit 
de corps, i.e. police officers and firemen. However, under certain circumstances, 
even within these experiments vulnerable groups can be permissible. The 
restrictions concerning these groups are due to the inherent inability of these 
individuals to give free consent. Children typically are too young and dependents 
of their parents; civil servants may feel obligated to participate due to pressure by 
their colleagues.  
The clinical trial is permissible, however, in the case it revolves around one of 
those groups, e.g. a typical children’s disease, § 40 IV AMG. Still, it must be 
confirmed that the experiment cannot instead be conducted with adults able to 
consent. There are, however, multiple ways of confirming the need for 
experiments on children: An ethics committee of which at least one member must 
be familiar with the treatment of children’s diseases, must examine and evaluate 
the proposal. The unresolved question that remains is whether it is permissible to 
include into the trial a control group consisting of matched children for the above 
mentioned children, especially when the control group shall only receive placebo, 
e.g. shall use a respirator for 15 minutes daily. In this context, it is necessary to 
differentiate and ensure the burden and inconvenience of the control group 
remains minimal. They shall not be expected to do more than participate in a 
superficial and time restricted manner.14  
It is still very controversial, whether the patients ought to be told on whose 
authority the study is to be performed and who shoulders the costs.15 The last 
principle shall be clarified by saying, that each participant may be given a monetary 
or similar incentive. Certainly, in case of a mishap, the innocent victim of an 
experiment shall be given compensation without having to prove fault of another 
party. This is where sacrifices come into play; the subjects jeopardize their own 
health for research and the welfare of the general public.16 Therefore, § 40 AMG 
grants insurance to the subjects, and French laws grant extended liability in case of 
research accidents. 
                                                     
13 For written consent cf. § 40 Abs. 1 Nr. 3b AMG. Under special circumstances, consent to 
experiments on ill people does not have to be in writing (§ 41 AMG). Compare Deutsch/Spickhoff, 
Medizinrecht 6. edition 2002 Rdn. 927. 
14 Compare Officially Directive 2001/20/EC of 4 April 2001, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States relating to implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on 
medicinal products for human use, Art. 17: Protection of incapacitated persons in research projects. 
15 Vgl. Finkel, Should Informed Consent Include Information on how Research is Funded? IRB 1991 
Nr.5 S. 1. 
16 Anders Granitza, Haftungs- und versicherungsrechtliche Fragen bei der Prüfung zu einem 
Arzneimittel, in: Helmchen et.al., Psychiatrische Therapieforschung 1978 page 83. 
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IV. Medical justification at the start 
The new medications are first applied in phase I; the vaccine’s safety is tested with 
regards to the patient’s tolerance and if the results reveal low risks to the volunteer. 
Only after safety is assessed, further medical experiments may commence. This test 
is especially important when healthy volunteers undergo an experiment with 
vaccines and when the vaccine is designed to protect an individual from diseases 
for which there is no cure available. Certain cases touch on the problem of safety. 
− Some live vaccines, such as the sabin vaccine, can cause mutations which 
have the same virulence as wild viruses. In countries with higher incident 
rates, the sabin vaccine was therefore replaced with the salk vaccine. 
− Cytokine Release Syndrome Study, incidents at the Northwick Park Hospital in 
London: Eight individuals participated in phase I of a clinical trial involving 
humanised monoclonal antibodies, and two subjects received only placebo. 
The six who were treated with the actual preparation fell critically ill. 
TeGenero, based in Wuerzburg, was the producer, with Boehringer-
Ingelheim as the manufacturer. The experiment was carried out by the US 
company Parexel with its head office in Brussels. The cause was assumed 
to be an overreaction (cytokine storm) due to the effects of the antibody 
TGN1412. This monoclonal antibody does not have an antagonistic effect 
but acts as an agonist. Its goal is the induction as opposed to the 
prevention of an immune reaction. Apparently the severe consequences 
were typical for an agonist.17 Meanwhile, the research subjects have been 
released from the hospital, albeit one was diagnosed with leukemia. The 
insurance company of TeGenero transferred EUR 10.000 to each sick 
person’s account, which amounts to the sum due according to the 
insurance conditions but yet disregards § 40 III AMG, which demands for 
appropriate compensation for the risks connected to the clinical trial; and 
in the event of death or unceasing inability to work even speaks of “at least 
EUR 500.000”. 
− Malaria experiment in the Stateville Prison, Illinois: During the Second World 
War, malaria tests were performed on volunteers in the American Stateville 
Prison located in Illinois. The press was invited and reported on the 
patriotic motivations and the wish of many prisoners to participate in the 
trial. They had been fully informed. The test subjects, by the way, released 
the head of the trial and all institutions from their liability. Many trial 
participants were pardoned in 1947 by the governor of Illinois.18  
                                                     
17 Compare for more details DÄBl 2006 A988: Patienten genesen, Hersteller entlastet. 
18 In more detail Leopold aaO (Fn. 4). Leopold himself participated in the tests. 




The efficacy of medication is tested in phases II and III; generally, it is a clinically 
controlled study, in which two groups are juxtaposed: Members of one group 
receive the medicinal drug whereas the members of the other group receive 
placebo or, in case this is too dangerous, the medication they have been receiving 
thus far. The concept of efficacy is a serious problem when testing a vaccine. Many 
cases concerned the efficacy: 
− The testing of the Salk polio vaccine: In 1955, the first vaccination against 
infantile paralysis was tested. It was a medication developed by Salk. The 
press reported a few hundred thousand children had participated.19 They 
were separated into groups; one group received the vaccine, the other 
group received placebo. It was also reported, that many parents cheated the 
system by signing up their children for the vaccination in multiple places 
hoping their child would at least once be in the test group.20 
− Malaria experiments in Oxford and the Gambia: A new vaccination against 
Malaria, which affects bacteria in the liver, was just recently tested on 70 
volunteers in Oxford. All had received the actual vaccination. Every 
participant was bitten five times by infectious mosquitoes. According to 
news paper articles, a partial but significant protection shield became 
apparent. Now there shall be a trial in the Gambia with 360 adults, half of 
whom shall receive the new vaccine whereas the other half shall receive a 
drug against rabies. During the malaria season, the test persons’ health shall 
be examined21; the results have yet to be published. 
 
The testing of whether a vaccine is efficacious raises difficult ethical and legal 
questions. Experiments with vaccines oftentimes are not illegal, even if the test 
subjects neither suffer from any disease nor are in the immediate danger of 
becoming infected. Clinical trials aiming at maintaining a low level infection, 
especially those of epidemic nature, are permissible. At the same time, one must 
also bear in mind the health and well-being of the participants. However, even if 
there is a significant chance of infection, especially for the members of the placebo 
group, it is a risk worth taking. If there was no control group to take the risk of 
becoming infected, drugs could enter the market which promise neither 
prophylaxis nor cure but rather feign them. An impressive example is the false 
evaluation of passive prophylaxis of tetanus during the First World War, when 
people believed to have found tetanus anti serum, a valuable prophylactic. The 
medical corps also used it in the Second World War, albeit the active vaccination 
                                                     
19 Compare for more information and for general information on experiments with children Deutsch, 
Das Recht der klinischen Forschung am Menschen (1979), 83ff. 
20 Strictly against experiments on children Pappworth, Human Guinea Pigs (1967). More careful Beecher, 
Research and the individual (1970).  
21 Cf. The Economist vom 20.8.2002 S. 60: A new Malaria vaccine is being tested in the Gambia.  
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was only given to paratroopers. Besides paratrooper casualties, many lives were 
lost to tetanus despite the passive treatment with serums. 
Test persons under command set forth particular problems. Generally affected 
are the military, however, members of other occupational groups are also 
considered, e.g. hospital staff. Consent is not necessary, if one is obligated to 
participate. Therefore the next question to present itself is whether the test persons 
may be left in the dark about experiments conducted with and on them. The so 
called Thorotrast case, which was carried out during the Second World War at the 
University hospital of Heidelberg, was about a contrast medium of which’s risk the 
patient was not informed. The case Desert Storm also left the soldiers clueless that 
a not yet authorized vaccine was tested on them.22 These practices should be 
questioned; not only for the reason of informed consent but to disclose to the 
participants the risks and give them the chance to claim damages, just as they were 
in the Heidelberg case. 
VI. Consent and Information 
Usually information supersedes consent and in most cases brought to court, claims 
are based on insufficient information. Yet consent is the actual legal justification 
for the experiment. As aforementioned, consent should be given by the subject 
personally; he or she ought to be free. Pressure and conceit are inadmissible. 
Consent is based on given information and cannot go beyond what the person has 
heard or read. Consent has two legal sides. The first refers to the permission of 
harming a person. The unlawful harm done is justified due to the given consent. 
On the other hand this implies that the consenting individual generally bears the 
risk of damage to his or her health. This is not applicable in the event of negligence 
or in the case compensation is granted for the sacrifices. However, usually it is the 
subject who bears the consequences. Consequently, information must be thorough 
and complete to be able to lead to consent. The individual must be told what is 
done to him during the experiment as well as how long it will take and which 
inconveniences, risks and possible advantages are entailed. Based on this 
information the person can consent. The following cases clearly capture the 
validity of this statement: 
− United States v. Rose23: Rose was the head of the department for tropical 
medicine at the Robert-Koch Institute. During the war, experiments were 
carried out on concentration camp prisoners using typhus, and his 
department supplied the concentration camps of Buchenwald and 
Natzweiler with rickettsia bacteria and vaccines. Rose visited the sick 
rooms in Buchenwald and studied the medical history. For purposes of the 
experiment, both a vaccinated and a control group were infected with 
                                                     
22 BGHZ 20, 61 (Thorotrast); Doe v. Sullivan 756 F. Supp. 12; 938 F. 2d 1376 (1991; Desert Storm). 
23 United States v. Rose, Trial of war-criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Bd. 2 S. 264. 
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typhus fever. Quite a few patients of either group died, many fell very sick. 
A total of 729 prisoners were infected, of whom at least 154 died. The 
experiment was described to them as harmless; better treatment had been 
promised. Rose was charged for both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
− United States v. Stanley24: In 1958, a sergeant of the American army 
volunteered for a program in which the effectiveness of protective clothing 
against chemical warfare was tested. Without his knowledge he received 
LSD, which leads to hallucinations and memory loss. Not until 1975 was 
he informed of the true circumstances of the experiment. 
VII. Control groups, placebo trials and randomisation 
Medical research is especially convincing when a comparison strategy is used. This 
approach is also applicable for vaccination trials against the smallpox virus. 
Utilizing different groups when testing vaccines, i.e. both a test and a control 
group, was rarely tried. New information came about in 1871: The German army 
was vaccinated whereas the French army was not and suffered from significantly 
more diseases, becoming the foundation of German vaccination laws. A clinically 
controlled trial on smallpox did not lead to results accepted by the medical 
community; in trials of 1959 and 1971 with vaccine antigens and MVA vaccines 
against smallpox, control groups were not utilized. An experiment conducted in 
1962 within the Netherlands used a combined active-passive vaccine but the 
homogeneity of the subjects was unverified. Some participants had been previously 
vaccinated as children.25 
The use of placebo, a substance containing no active ingredient, yields 
difficulties in itself. As long as different vaccines are tested against one another, 
medical research seems to be justified since the starting point is a subjective 
uncertainty.26 However, it is quite another matter to directly expose a group to the 
dangers of an incurable disease. This is considered unethical, illegal and even 
criminal. In the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki, the admissibility of 
Placebo trials was constrained. Accordingly, the use of mock medication is allowed 
only if there is no approved prophylactic diagnostic or therapeutic treatment 
method.27 Due to the protest of American medical doctors, a note of clarification 
has been issued by the board of the world medical association, stating that a 
placebo controlled experiment can be ethically permissible only if urgent and 
scientifically acknowledged methodical reasons prevail or if the possible symptoms 
                                                     
24 United States v. Stanley 107 S.Ct. 3054 (1987) 
25 Thomsen, Pocken- und Pockenschutzimpfung 2002 
26 Lorenz et.al, Chirurgische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für klinische Studien, Patientenzuteilung bei 
kontrollierten klinischen Studien in Der Chirurg 1982, 514; Deutsch loc cit (Fn. 9) Rdn. 542. 
27 Declaration of Helsinki Edinburgh 2000 C Nr. 29. 
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as well as the experiment itself cannot lead to additional risks of grave and 
irreversible damage.28 This is now expressed in the Social Version (2008) C32. 
Experiments with smallpox vaccines touch on this issue. 
Randomization, i.e. the allocation to the different groups by chance, is done in 
order to prevent erroneous results and make the groups more representative.29 
Normal vaccination trials require large subject groups. Due to the inherent 
complexity of each group, there is not much room for sensible randomization.  
VIII. Liability and Sacrifices 
In the event of negligent bodily injury during the planning or execution of an 
experiment, liability exists in the form of §§ 280, 823 BGB due to a breach of 
contract and a tortuous act.30 Negligence includes not observing due care and 
attention, § 276 II BGB. In Scotland, government agencies just recently were 
presumed to carry fault for not initiating clinical trials in response to repeated 
notifications by the medical community, warning about side effects. This case dealt 
with the treatment of men and women of small stature, whom were given growth 
hormones of animal origins. When multiple patients developed Creutzfeldt Jacob 
syndrome, state agencies reacted slowly to the reports on the very many side 
effects.31 This coined scientific and social progress by rendering the first case in 
which omission of a clinical experiment was perceived as negligent. In clinical 
trials, circumspection is chiefly the overseeing medical doctor’s responsibility.32 
Moreover, the ethics committee as well as government agencies are obligated to 
prevent overly dangerous experiments. 
In case no one is at fault, sacrifice compensation may generally be demanded, 
albeit it shall not lead to full damages but shall somewhat take care of the innocent 
victim. Each time the subject was not asked to consent such sacrifice 
compensation is demandable, especially in the case of soldiers under command. 
Moreover, many countries have established general rules for objective liability or 
have ensured that if the risks of a clinical trial are realized, there would be 
insurance for sacrifice compensation. France, for example, instated a law in 1988 
clarifying the rules on liability during medical experiments: For non-therapeutic 
experiments it provides objective liability; for experiments yielding immediate 
                                                     
28 Klinkhammer, Umstrittenes Dokument DÄBl 99 (2002), A 409; Taupitz, Note of Clarification – 
Kaum zu verantworten DÄBl 99 (2000), A 411.  
29 Vgl. Deutsch/Spickhoff, Medizinrecht 5. edition (2002) Rdn. 654. 
30 Fischer, Medizinische Versuche am Menschen 1979 S. 78; Deutsch, Haftung bei Forschungsunfällen, 
Mitteilungen des Hochschulverbandes 1979, 165; Jung, Die Zulässigkeit biomedizinischer Versuche 
am Menschen 1996 mit rechtsvergleichender Untersuchung auf Grundlage des französischen Rechts.  
31 Thus decided in The Plaintiffs v. U.K. Medical Council, Queens Bench, Bull. Med. Eth., 
November 1996, 16: 16 Children died of CJD, three more suffer from this disease. In 1977 there 
were more than enough signs suggesting the danger in using corpse hormones. However, the clinical 
study was delayed for two years. The Courts ruled this to be negligent.  
32 More in detail Deutsch, Das Vertragsrecht des Probanden, VersR 2005, 1609ff. 
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benefits for the test person, it instates responsibility for suspected negligence.33 
Germany provides casualty insurance in favor of a third party (§§ 40 AMG, 20 
MPG) for the testing of medicinal drugs and products.34 This casualty insurance is 
a seldom emergence of compensation insurance in the event of accidents. One 
ruling of the American Supreme Court illustrates quite well the liability for fault in 
case a government agency does not insist on sufficient testing: 
− Berkovitz v. United States35: A two month old child was injected with a polio 
vaccine, which had been produced by a company named Lederle. The so 
called Cox live vaccine contained a paralytic form of the polio virus. Within 
a short amount of time the child developed a very severe case of infant 
paralysis. According to the applicable law, liability of the federal 
government was possible in case the provided discretion had not been 
executed free from error or in case of a failure of obligation of either a 
government agency or an official. The suing child argued that the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) and its Department for Biological Standards 
should not have granted Lederle a licence to produce the vaccine. The 
appellate court dismissed the case; however, the Supreme Court allowed it, 
stating that it was probable that the NIH had exceeded its scope of 
discretion. If this could be proven, such government misconduct would 
lead to damages. 
IX. Extraordinary situations and war 
Rules of law and normal standards of ethical behavior affect normal situations. 
Yet, in the event of an “abnormal” situation, ethical standards are, if without 
complete abolition of legal and ethical rules, decremented. The case of Desert 
Storm well illustrates this fact36: 
− Doe v. Sullivan37: Desert Storm occurred during the gulf war operation. The 
United States of America faced the fear that in their war against Iraq 
chemical and biological weapons would be used as in previous conflicts. 
Therefore the Department of Defense sought permission from the Federal 
Drug Administration (FDA) to use medications and vaccines which had 
not yet been approved for use. They were supposed to be applied even 
without the knowledge of soldiers on the ground. They claimed military 
necessity. Due to the state of war, the FDA granted approval, also 
                                                     
33 Loi No. 88-1138 vom 20.12.1988. Cf  Jung loc cit (Fn. 27). 
34 Klingmüller, Zur Probandenversicherung nach dem neuen AMG in Festschrift für Hauß 1978 page 
169; Deutsch, Das Vertragsrecht des Probanden, VersR 2005, 1613. 
35 Berkovitz v. United States 486 U.S. 531 US Supreme Court 1988. 
36 Annas, Changing the consent rules for Desert Storm The New England Journal of Medicine 1992 
S. 770; Gunby, Informing of investigatonal drugs, devices JAMA 1995 s. 276. 
37 Doe v. Sullivan 756 F. Supp. 12; 938 F. 2d 1376 Federal District Court, Federal Court of Appeals 
1991. 
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acknowledging the obvious and immediate danger the soldiers found 
themselves in. This approval was contested in court, but the case was 
dismissed in two instances. The trial court claimed the approval to be a 
strategic decision and denied its jurisdiction. The majority of the judges of 
the appellate court recognized their jurisdiction for the reason that the case 
dealt with a special license given by the FDA rather than military matters. 
However, they still did not allow the appeal, stating that the main reason 
for using non-approved medication and especially vaccines was not 
scientifically but militarily sustained. Therefore normal restrictions were not 
applicable. 
 
The so called War on Terror established another situation. The danger that viruses 
may be used for terroristic activities is very real. Therefore people who may come 
in contact with infectious diseases are obligated to get vaccinated. This particularly 
affects personnel of health services, mainly of hospitals. On the occasion of these 
vaccinations it would be permissible to test a new vaccine against smallpox, which 
yields no known side effects. A known side effect of the current smallpox vaccine 
is encephalitis. Due to the large number of people affected by such a vaccination 
(presumably more than one million individuals), groups could be formed, and one 
would be treated with the usual vaccine and function as a control group while the 
other one would receive the new vaccine. 
X. Research with vaccines today 
These considerations lead to another controversy, namely active and passive 
vaccinations against pathogens of new developing epidemics and pandemics, e.g. a 
mutant form of the bird flu virus H5N1, allowing infection of humans. According 
to rumors a similar virus was contracted by US soldiers towards the end of World 
War I, resulting in influenza and the death of millions. The death toll is said to 
have been 30-40 million people worldwide.38 
The anticipation of the bird flu has led to a variety of experiments in Germany 
and the USA. While the pandemic risks were discussed in life insurances, the 
“virtual paperchase” made headlines in Germany. The Frauenhofer Institute for 
Applied Information Technology conducted an epidemic menace: Both a German and 
a Belgian Team compete against each other in solving the following virtual case: In 
a secret medical research laboratory a dangerous virus was discovered, which could 
lead to the extinction of human life on this planet. The research director clarifies 
that it is essential “to catch as many viruses as possible, then figure out who spread 
the virus, and take that person into custody”. In a communication center, 
                                                     
38 DÄBl. 2006 A 986: Impfstoffentwicklung: Begrenzte Immunogenität einer H5N1-Testvakzine; 
press release from 26 July 2006: H5N1-Pandemie-Impfstoff von Glaxo-Smith-Kline (hohe 
Immunantwort bei geringer Antigendosis).  
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surveillance cameras show the moves of the two groups, their members and the 
viruses. The simulated catastrophe, namely the contamination of all paths with 
dangerous viruses, is depicted by leaf-like shapes in red, green, orange, and pink. 
The members of both groups are supposed to see and destroy those shapes. They 
are equipped with a positioning technique, which is controlled from a weather 
station. The scenario is recorded by a game server aware of each player’s position. 
One member of each team is sent outside while the rest of the team via cell phone 
directs him where to find the shapes. Stationary and mobile players are switched 
out periodically. The viruses are exterminated with a shooting tool, with the simple 
push of a button. A hit is made known through music, whereas a miss sets off no 
audio stimulus. The player’s extent of infection is indicated in percent, and the 
more his capability decreases the more imperative it becomes to switch him out.39 
A very different procedure is used in the Center for Disease Control in 
Atlanta, where a combination of the bird flu virus H5N1 and the flu virus type 
H3N2 are crossed. Such a mix is pure horror for flu experts. It is even assumed 
that the pathogens of the two last flu pandemics of 1968 and 1957 followed from a 
gene swop of a bird virus. The virus mixture was tested on ferrets, which didn’t fall 
at all as sick as they had with the earlier H3N2. Also, they did not infect other 
ferrets in neighboring cages. Ferrets are used for flu experiments because their 
respiratory tract is similar to humans with respect to docking points for viruses.40 
The government of the United States of America decided on a program to 
fight pandemics, which includes distinct encroachments into current legal 
regulations for vaccination trials. These trails are to be facilitated, e.g. by total 
freedom from liability. Also, the experiments and first and foremost their results 
are supposed to be applied to hospital personnel. 
It is questionable whether studies on epidemiological models are appropriate in 
this time and age, chiefly due to the possible speed at which a pandemic H5N1 
infection can spread. Experiments for the production of experimental vaccines and 
their application are of greater importance. A current uncertainty revolves around 
an American vaccine, which has been planned in Rochester and produced in Paris 
by Sanofi-Pasteur: In case of a pandemic development, how can immune 
protection be generated as quickly as possible? The antigen composition of 
pandemics is unknown; the production of vaccines, therefore, cannot begin before 
it first presents itself and is isolated. Production requires several months. Maybe 
two doses of the vaccine ought to be injected with time lag in order to achieve full 
protection. Therefore the delay will be even greater. Owing to these circumstances, 
current model systems are testing whether a pre-vaccination with a current H5N1 
isolate can prepare a person in such a way that in case of a pandemic he or she will 
only require another dose of the epidemic stem. Such experiments, called “pre-
pandemic vaccination”, are very promising. Researchers are also occupied with 
                                                     
39 FAZ from 10 July 2006 page 48. 
40 SZ 03 August 2006: Killer-Experimente, H5N1-Kreation erstaunlich harmlos. 
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figuring out the necessary doses of the vaccine for intracutaneous and 
intramuscular injections, hoping to save serum which in case of an emergency will 
be needed in huge quantities.41  
Considering the risk of epidemics and pandemics from a medical and legal 
point of view, in case of an emergency many requirements revolving around 
experiments will be disregarded.42 Personal requirements will either be relinquished 
or strongly imposed upon. This includes the notification of being a member of the 
control group as well as sufficient information and consent, although minimum 
consent must remain required. Also, the country could initiate an obligation of 
certain personnel to participate in trials.43 Forgoing scientific requirements such as 
randomization or any kind of group organization is not feasible. When a new drug 
is tested, the group not involved in the trial, e.g. all doctors and nurses of a specific 
region, can be given the test drug by ways of extended access study.44 It remains 
uncertain whether insurance of the test persons can be waived, yet it would have to 
be limited to those actually participating in the trial. Insurance companies will 
prefer avoiding the risk. Maybe the government should step into the breach. 
An entire array of vaccines can be tested with the immune response of the 
body. In order to test a vaccine made to protect from pneumococcs, for example, 
1100 patients are divided into two groups; after one month a crossover takes place. 
The subsequent determination of the immune status of both groups, including the 
placebo group, is then used to determine efficacy. The efficacy is supposed to be 
determined without clinical controls. Obvious doubts from medical statistics 
remain. 
XI. Prospects 
Vaccination against smallpox was the very beginning in the discussion about 
medical experiments on humans. More than 250 years later we still face the same 
old problem. The possible attackers continue to be nature itself through mutation 
of her genes, but moreover human kind. 
                                                     
41 notification by R. Thommsen    
42 Wiesing u. Marckmann, Eine neue Pandemie – alte ethische Probleme. DÄBl. A 1888 even consider 
imposing on basic human rights. 
43 Already so described Carmi, The Challenge of Experimentation, in: Veröffentlichungen des IV. 
Weltkongresses für medizinisches Recht (July 1976). 
44 This extended access study was introduced unter this name by the FDA when experimenting with AZT 
and DDI against HIV infections. Since then, it has been used more and more often in clinical studies, 
especially regarding new drugs against absolutely deathly diseases such as renal cell carconoma. 
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Judicial Modification of  Contract in Relation to the 
Change of  Circumstances 
Youngjoon Kwon 
I. Introduction  
One of the purposes of contract law is to enforce valid agreements. Therefore, the 
famous maxim of ‘pacta sund servanda’ (one should abide by agreement),1 stressing 
the sanctity of contract, stands as the most important principle in contract law. 
Consequently, a contractual relationship is set forth at the time of the valid 
contract, and is, in principle, not subject to alteration or annulment afterward 
unless a new agreement allows it. However, there are cases where enforcing the 
contract on its face would put one party in a drastically disadvantageous position 
due to the ex post change of circumstances surrounding the contract. Imposing 
excessively onerous burden on a faultless party who has never assumed such an 
unanticipated risk at the time of contract seems unfair. The doctrine of change of 
circumstances addresses this pathological issue of the contract law. This brief 
paper touches upon this topic, particularly concentrating on judicial modification 
of contract as one of its remedies. This topic concerns itself with the issue of 
information and risk – main themes of this symposium – in that it deals with 
symmetric information imperfections on future unforeseen events as well as risk 
allocation in the aftermath of such changes. The argument set forth here is that the 
modification of the contract by the court, though it may and should take place 
rarely only in exceptional cases, can be justified as a necessary and justifiable tool 
                                                     
1 On this notion, See generally Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition 543, 576-582 (1990).  
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to prevent grossly unfair result. Although Germany has already recognized this 
mechanism, Korea is unfamiliar with this doctrine.  
Against this backdrop, I have structured this paper as follows. In part Ⅱ, I will 
give a general overview of the doctrine of change of circumstances in order to set 
the tone for a further discussion. In part Ⅲ, I will make an observation from a 
comparative perspective to show how prevalent this approach of the judicial 
modification of contract has become on an international level. In Part Ⅳ, I will 
make normative arguments on the necessity and justifiability of the judicial 
modification of contract to demonstrate that Korea may need to provide a legal 
ground for this by legislating a relevant provision. Finally in Part Ⅴ, I will give a 
brief summary of what has been discussed and conclude with a few remarks on the 
prospect of this doctrine.  
II. General overview on the doctrine of change of circumstances 
1. The doctrine of change of circumstances as a risk-allocation mechanism 
The doctrine of change of circumstances is, after all, a doctrinal vehicle that 
allocates unallocated risks of the contract. Contract concerns future obligations. 
Since future is full of contingencies, contract inherently faces certain future risks. 
In this sense, parties commonly assume and accept that circumstances may change 
between the time of contract and the time of performance. Therefore, allocating 
risks becomes the central element of a contract. Insurance contract, where 
premium is set according to the scale of the risks, is a representative example. 
Other forms of contracts also presuppose this sort of risk assessment though not 
as conspicuous as in an insurance contract. Sometimes, parties pre-allocate risks in 
the form of an explicit clause. For instance, hardship clause2 or MAC (Material 
Adverse Change) clause3 are contractual mechanisms designed to handle 
unexpected events. Even when there are no explicit clauses like these, there may be 
an implicit agreement between parties as to who bears the risk of unforeseen 
events in the future. In principle, a promisor assumes risks associated with 
performance. Therefore, a promisor bears an unconditional obligation to perform 
                                                     
2 Hardship clause is a clause in a contract that is intended to cover cases in which unforeseen events 
occur that fundamentally after the equilibrium of a contract resulting in an excessive burden being 
placed on one of the parties involved. See Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (ed.), 
Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts(PICC), 711 (2009) for more 
details.   
3 A MAC clause is a self-help clause that provides the right to terminate or renegotiate a contract 
under specified change of circumstances in the realm of M&A contracts or financing contracts. This 
clause enables the acquirer or a funder to refuse to complete the transaction with the party being 
acquired or financed if certain material and negative changes occur. See generally David Cheng, 
Interpretation of Material Adverse Change Clauses in an Adverse Economy, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 564 
(2009). 
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in principle. For this reason, a change of circumstances does not automatically 
invoke special treatment of the contract. Rather, a party is still bound to fulfill its 
contractual obligation even when performance becomes onerous. Therefore, a 
mere fact that the cost of performance has increased may not excuse a party from 
its obligation. Thus, even major changes in the economic climate do not 
necessarily justify judicial intervention since the economy normally fluctuates.  
However, not all risks are the same. Some risks are gross, while others are 
minor. Some are foreseeable, while others are not foreseeable. In reality, the limit 
of human capacity to foresee the future or bounded rationality of the parties makes 
it impossible for them to assume all the future risks in advance at the time of 
contract. There are some risks that both parties have never anticipated, making 
performance excessively onerous that it does not do justice to enforce the contract. 
Here comes the necessity of an ex-post risk allocation mechanism by virtue of law 
or the power of a court, instead of totally relying on a contractual framework that 
sometimes fail to provide a basis for alleviating or allocating such grave risks. This 
necessity becomes even more significant when it comes to a long-term contract, 
where its contractual relationship is vulnerable to a great number of contingencies 
throughout the contractual term.  
2. World-wide acceptance of the doctrine 
A majority of countries across the world have introduced some mechanisms to 
correct such injustice resulting from the change of circumstances, either in the 
form of law or legal doctrines. 
A. Germany and other European countries 
Germany has developed a peculiar form of doctrine on the change of 
circumstances. BGB, with its liberal and individualistic conceptual model of the 
contract, did not explicitly accept this idea at its first codification stage. The basic 
rationale was to ensure legal certainty in legal transactions.4 This was also partly 
due to the expansion of a will theory in the contract law as well as the retreat of the 
natural law theory which supported the notion of clausula. However, Germany has 
gone through a serious hyperinflation after the First World War, the peak of which 
was between 1920 and 1923.5 It was evidently unfair to enforce the contract on its 
face in the wake of an unprecedented hyperinflation. To address this problematic 
situation, the Reichtsgericht (RG) first resorted to the notion of the impossibility 
                                                     
4 A similar notion was advocated by a publication in 1850 by Windsheid, “Die Lehre des römischen 
Rechts von der Voraussetzung (The Doctrine of Pre-supposition in Roman Law)”. Although the 
legislators of BGB were familiar with this notion, it was not incorporated in BGB.   
5 At the end of 1921 – to some degree due to the reparation payments of the Versailles Treaty of 
1919 – prices were 35 times higher than before the war. And a year later they had risen to a level that 
was 1,475 times higher. Hannes Rösler, Hardship in German Codified Private Law ß In Comparative 
Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law, 15 EuRP, 487 (2007). 
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of performance, which had already been codified in § 275 (1) BGB. The RG, with 
the notion of economic impossibility, released the party from its duty to perform 
according to the above provision.6 At the same time, the notion of 
“Geschäftsgrundlage” was first introduced by Oertmann in 1921.7 
Geschäftsgrundlage, the basis of juridical act if translated literally, is the term 
representing circumstances or perceptions shared by both parties at the closing of 
the contract that forms the basis of contract. RG began to accept this notion from 
Feb. 19228 on the basis of good faith doctrine in BGB § 242, and this continued to 
solidify throughout numerous decisions to follow.9 In 2002, Germany codified this 
judge-made doctrine of “Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage” in BGB § 313. 
According to the above Article, modification or termination of contract is made 
available if the circumstances that have become the basis of the contract have 
changed fundamentally after the contract was concluded. 
Many European countries - including Austria,10 Greece,11 Portugal,12 Poland,13 
Spain,14 Russia,15Italy16 - have also provided similar mechanisms either by statute 
or case law. France and England show some reluctance toward this based on their 
strong advocacy of the sanctity of the contract. However, they are not without 
remedies. France Civil Code Article 1148 allows the release of the party from 
contractual obligation in the case of force majeure. In French administrative law. the 
imprévision (unforseeability) was recognized by the highest judges where adjustment 
of contract was allowed at the occurrence of unforeseen events.17 In England, the 
doctrine of frustration handles this problematic situation, as I will explain below.  
B. England and U.S.A.  
In common law, this mechanism partially finds its place in the doctrine of 
frustration, and the doctrine of impracticability. The basic logic of the doctrine of 
frustration is that if, after a contract is made, something happens through no fault 
of the parties and makes its performance meaningless, the contract is said to be 
                                                     
6 RGZ 94, 45, 47; RGZ 100, 129, 130.  
7 P. Oertmann, Geschäftsgrundlage-Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff (1921). 
8 RGZ 103, 328. 
9 RGZ 104, 394; RGZ 111, 157. BGHZ 25, 390, 392; BGHZ 74, 370, 372. Fikentscher/Heinemann, 
Schuldrecht, 10. Aufl. (2006), S. 127. 
10 ABGB § 936, 1052, 1170a, by way of analogy, served as the statutory starting point for the 
development of the changed circumstance rule. Christian von Bar & Eric Clive, Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law – Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR), Full Edition (2009), Vol 1. p. 717. 
11 Greek Civil Code § 388. 
12 Portuguese Civil Code § 437. 
13 Polish Civil Code § 357. 
14 Spanish case law permits the court to end the contract if a less radical way of preserving it cannot 
be found. Ole Lando & Hugh Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Parts Ⅰand Ⅱ (2000), p 
328. 
15 Russian Civil Code § 451. 
16 Italian Civil Code § 1467. 
17 Conseil d’État, 30 March 1916, Gaz de Bordeaux, D. 1916. III. 25. 
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frustrated, and the relevant obligation comes to an end. Until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the common law always required specific performance of 
contractual obligation under the ‘rule of absolute liability’. However, Taylor v. 
Caldwell 18 paved the way for the doctrine of frustration by establishing its 
precursor, the doctrine of impossibility.19 The doctrine of frustration first appeared 
in Krell v. Henry20, where a party was excused from contractual obligation to make 
payment for the room it had contracted to rent to view King Edward Ⅶ’s 
coronation when the coronation parade was cancelled due to the King’s illness. 
Unlike in Taylor, performance of the contractual obligation, payment in this case, 
was not impossible. However, forcing a party to pay for the room was 
inappropriate and meaningless. Thus, the English court expanded the logic of the 
doctrine of impossibility to the case where the purpose of the contract was 
frustrated, thus establishing the doctrine of frustration.  
Both doctrines were accepted in America. For instance, the doctrine of 
impossibility and frustration were both included in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts in Section 263 and 265. American courts went even further than this. 
The doctrine of impracticability evolved out of the doctrines of impossibility and 
frustration,21 providing a remedy where performing one’s obligation becomes 
impracticable, though not impossible. Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code deals with impracticability in the contest of sale of goods. Section 261 of the 
Restatement(Second) of Contract touches upon this as well. This is in line with the 
doctrine of the change of circumstances, or the notion of hardship that is 
commonly used in the cross-border transaction contracts.  
C. Japan and Korea 
Influenced by European jurisdictions, Asian countries have also taken on a similar 
approach. Japanese Civil Code, which has been quite influential on Korean Civil 
Code due to the past colonization of Korea by Japan, does not include any explicit 
and comprehensive provision on the change of circumstances. This is quite 
understandable since Japan, at the stage of preparing its draft for Civil Code, was 
heavily relying on French Civil Code and the first draft of BGB, both of which did 
not have such a provision. However, under the influence of the doctrine of 
                                                     
18 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).  
19 The parties in the case had entered into a rental agreement concerning the use of the Music Hall 
for a series of concerts. Six days before the planned date for the first concert, the building was 
destroyed by fire, making it impossible for the concerts to go ahead. The party planning to put on the 
concerts was sued for breach of contract, but the action failed because performance was impossible, 
thus establishing the doctrine of impossibility. 
20 2 K. B. 740 (1903). 
21 See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 p. 458 (1916);  Transatlantic Financing 
Corporation v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir, 1966). . See also Paul L. Joskow, Commercial 
Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 119 (1977); Richard Posner & 
Andrew Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Leg. 
Stud. 83 (1977).  
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Geschäftsgrundlage in Germany, Japanese scholars and courts began to develop 
the doctrine of change of circumstances from 1920s. The first decision by the 
highest court approving this doctrine was handed down in 1944. This doctrine 
remains valid up to now.  
The Civil Code of Korea does not have any provision comparable to BGB 
§313, either. As mentioned above, Japanese civil law has been influential on Korea 
and the doctrine of change of circumstances was no exception to this. Korean 
scholars have accepted this doctrine, mainly building on academic discussions by 
Japan. Yet, Korean judiciary has been extremely stringent in applying this doctrine. 
It has never accepted an argument based on this doctrine in a specific case. Even 
in a case where the value of the object has hiked 1,620 times the original price due 
to the Korean War, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the doctrine.22 
However, Korean Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the feasibility of this 
doctrine in its decision in 2007,23 though the argument itself failed to pass through 
the strict muster of the Supreme Court. Recently, this doctrine has drawn attention 
with thronging of multiple cases regarding KIKO contracts, which I will explain 
further at the later part of this paper.   
D. Model laws 
This doctrine has been accepted not only by domestic laws, but also by 
international model laws as well.   
European model laws,, such as “Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL)” in § 6:111 and “Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)” in Book 3-
§ 1:110 deal with this doctrine. For example, PECL § 6:111 (2) states that “if, 
however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a 
change of circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a 
view to adapting the contract or ending it” under certain conditions provided in 
the same section, and section (3) of the same article further states that courts may 
end or adapt the contract if the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable 
period.  
“Principles of International Commercial Contract (PICC)” by UNIDROIT 
also addresses this in § 6.2.1. through § 6.2.3. Although it states this issue using a 
different terminology of ‘hardship’, a basic rationale and the solution are very 
similar to the above European model laws. The incorporation of the doctrine on 
an international-level model laws shows that this is not worldly accepted doctrine.24  
                                                     
22 Supreme Court 63Da452, Decided on Sep. 12. 1963. 
23 Supreme Court 2004Da31302, Decided on Mar. 29. 2007. 
24 This notion is also accepted in the realm of public international law, as can be seen in Art. 62 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and as an axiom of customary public international 
law that also binds the EU Institutions(ECJ Case C-162/96-Racke[1998] ECR Ⅰ-3655). 
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3. The requirements and legal consequences 
A. Requirements 
There are multiple ways of describing the requirements of the change of 
circumstances. The Korean Supreme Court has stated its requirements as follows; 
1 the change takes place after the contract, 2 the change was not foreseeable at 
the time of the contract, 3 the change has nothing to do with the fault of the party 
claiming this doctrine, and 4 adhering to the original contract would yield 
outcome contrary to good faith.25 German BGB § 313 requires that 1 the basis on 
which the contract was made has drastically changed, 2 the same contract should 
not have been made if the party has foreseen the change, and 3 the party cannot 
be expected to bound to the original contract in consideration of all the 
circumstances including risk-allocation. PECL § 6;111 suggests that 1 
performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a change of 
circumstances, 2 the change of circumstances have occurred after the contract 
was made. 3 circumstances should not have reasonably been taken into account 
by the parties, and 4 the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, 
according to the contract, the party affected should not be required to bear.  
Although languages are different, three factors seem to play a dominant role.  
Firstly, there is a change related factor. The change has to be excessively 
onerous and unforeseeable. In general, price fluctuation due to the inflation does 
not satisfy this requirement since it is neither excessively onerous nor 
unforeseeable. This is to be distinguished from the notion of impossibility in the 
sense that the performance is still possible, though the borderline is sometimes 
blurry. Additionally, it should not arise from the obligor’s fault. One should not be 
allowed to benefit from her own fault.  
Secondly, there is a time related factor. The change should take place after the 
contract was made. If this change has already taken place at the time of contract, 
and the parties have failed to take notice of this, it is not a matter of change of 
circumstance but rather a matter of mutual mistake. How mutual mistake is to be 
handled differs among jurisdictions. For example, Germany would take this issue 
in the same framework of “Geschäftsgrundlage”, while Korean Supreme Court 
dealt with this case from the perspective of supplemental interpretation of contract 
(ergänzende Auslegung).26 Though both approaches share the notion of the 
judicial intervention, the latter is slightly different from the former in the sense that 
it does not completely lose the connection with the intention of contract parties,. 
The notion of Geschäftsgrundlage allows judicial gap-filling without regard to the 
parties’ intention, whereas the notion of supplemental interpretation of contract 
presupposes hypothetical intention of the parties.   
                                                     
25 Supreme Court 2004Da31302, Decided on Mar 29. 2007. 
26 Supreme Court 2005Da13288, Decided on Nov. 23. 2006.  
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Thirdly, there is a risk-allocation related factor. If the risk has already been 
allocated to the parties by way of contract, there is no room for the doctrine of 
change of circumstances to step in. When there are explicit provisions against 
future risks, those provisions will govern. The mere fact that a given risk is a low 
probability risk does not mean that it has not been foreseen or assigned to one or 
the other party.27 Insurance contract is a typical example of risk-allocation over a 
low probability risk. Even when there are no such provisions, the court should see 
to it that if the risk has implicitly been assumed or allocated between parties. A 
more speculative contract is more likely to have allocated the risk in advance. For 
instance, a sale on the future market is a speculative contract. Thus, one might 
easily assume that the party has already born the risks in advance. Same thing can 
be said of KIKO contract, which has been quite a controversial legal issue in 
Korea. KIKO (Knock-in, Knock-out) contract is a currency hedging contract 
designed to reduce potential risks from foreign exchange rate fluctuations. Under 
the contracts, exporters could sell dollar earnings at a higher exchange rate to the 
banks when the currency fluctuates, thereby hedging the fluctuation risks. This will 
give bank some losses in return for contract fees. However, if the foreign currency 
strengthens against the won over a specified limit, the exporters must sell foreign 
currency at a lower rate, which leads to losses of exporters and gains of banks. 
Contrary to the common expectation, foreign currency has dramatically soared up 
in the wake of global financial crisis, leading to tremendous losses of exporters. 
Concerned exporters have filed total of more than 110 cases, arguing the invalidity 
of this contract on various arguments.28 Among them was the argument based on 
the change of circumstances. Though there was a case where the court has decided 
that it amounts to the change of circumstances, thereby granting an exporter the 
right to terminate this contract,29 courts generally have been reluctant to accept this 
argument.30 This outcome can easily be understood from the risk-allocation 
perspective. The contract itself was aimed at hedging or allocating risks arising out 
of currency fluctuation. Therefore, the exporter has already agreed to assume the 
risks at the time of contract. In this case, there is no room for the doctrine of 
change of circumstances.  
Korean Supreme Court also suggests the requirement based on good faith 
principle. However, the above three factors already presuppose good faith or 
fairness basis. Therefore, it would be sufficient to consider fairness in the process 
of interpreting those requirements.  
                                                     
27 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993), p 128. 
28 As of Feb. 16. 2010, 117 KIKC-related cases are pending at the level of the court of first instance.  
29 Seoul Central District Court, 2008Kahap3816, Decided on Dec. 30. 2008. 
30 For example, Seoul Central District Court, 2008Kahap4262, Decided on Jan. 8, 2009; Incheon 
District Court, 2009Kahap228, Decided on Mar. 9. 2009; Seoul High Court, 2009Ra997, Decided on 
Aug. 21. 2009. 
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B. Consequences of the changed circumstances 
When the change of circumstances satisfies above requirements, special legal 
consequences come into being.  
Most jurisdictions that do recognize the doctrine of change of circumstances 
discharge a concerned party from her obligations. Korean Supreme Court has 
declared that the party suffering the change has the right to terminate the contract. 
German BGB § 313 expressly states that the disadvantaged party can terminate the 
contract, if a modification is not possible or reasonable. The Restatement of the 
Contract (2nd) §265 in the U.S.A., with regard to frustration, states that “remaining 
duties to render performance are discharged unless the language or circumstances 
of the contract indicate the contrary”. PECL, PICC and DCFR take similar, but 
somewhat different approach. In those model laws, the court, upon the request of 
parties, finally determines the termination as well as its terms and conditions 
(PECL § 611 (3)(a); PICC § 6.2.3. (4)(a); DCFR Book 3, § 1:110 (2)(b)).     
Another possible treatment is a modification of the contract. Here, the 
modification refers to the judicial modification, meaning that the court finally 
decides or at least confirms the terms and conditions of the modification. 
Voluntary modification by parties is also possible and desirable. However, this is 
rather a consequence from new agreement than a consequence from the change of 
circumstances itself. Whether or not judicial modification of contract is an 
acceptable form of the legal consequence is highly controversial. This is the very 
topic addressed in this paper. Therefore, I will examine this issue more in depth 
and details later on.   
In addition to the above consequences, there is an issue of the obligation of 
renegotiation. For instance, PECL § 6:111 (2) requires parties to renegotiate before 
they demand for modification or discharge of the contract. The aim is clear; to 
facilitate autonomous solution between parties before seeking a court remedy. If 
one of the parties refuses to renegotiate contrary to good faith, she is subject to 
damages. However, PICC and DCFR do not recognize the duty to renegotiate. 
Domestic laws are not favorable to this approach either. In Germany, the parties 
are not bound to renegotiate according to prevailing view.31 Likewise, neither the 
Italian nor the Dutch Code provisions on hardship oblige the parties to 
renegotiate. Although it is clear that autonomous dispute resolution by 
renegotiation should be favored than judicial intervention, it does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that parties have “obligations” to renegotiate.  
                                                     
31 See Grüneberg in; Palandt, BGB, 67. Aufl. (2008), §313, Rn. 41. For an opposite view, see Roth in; 
Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 5. Aufl. (2007), §313, Rn. 90. 
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III. Comparative overview on the judicial modification of 
contract 
European jurisdictions generally show favorable stance to judicial modification of 
contract. As mentioned above, Germany has employed judicial modification of 
contract as a prior remedy for the change of circumstances in BGB § 313.32 
Netherland (§ 6:258), Greece (§ 388), Italy (§ 1664), Russia (§ 451), and 
Scandinavian contract law (§ 36) have adopted the same device. In other countries, 
judicial modification is allowed in either common mistake as can be seen in 
Luxembourg (§ 1118), Portugal (§ 293), and Austria (§ 872) or unfair contract as 
can be seen in France (§ 1681), Austria (§935) or Slovenia (§ 119). This wide 
tendency to admit judicial modification of contract is also found in European 
model laws such as PECL or DCFR. In PECL § 6:111, judicial modification of 
contract is enumerated as the first remedy against change of circumstances. DCFR 
has almost identical clause in § 1:110 in Book 3. PICC, prepared as the global 
contract principles by UNIDROIT, takes the same stance in § 6.2.3.  
England and U.S.A. have been reluctant to accept this attitude. However, the 
controversial decision by the U.S district court in 1980 has sparked a debate as to 
the adequacy of court-imposed modification. In Aluminum Co. of America 
(ALCOA) v. Essex Group, Inc.,33 the court chose to modify the contract itself, 
instead of taking all-or-nothing approach.  In this case, ALCOA entered into 
twenty-year contract with Essex, agreeing to supply molten aluminum. They had 
price-adjustment index within a contract, with the help of economist Alan 
Greenspan, to correlate the price with fluctuating costs. This contractual device of 
risk-allocation worked fine until economic upheavals caused by oil crisis drastically 
raised the costs far beyond the basic presumption of the index. This left ALCOA 
with an estimated sixty million dollars loss on the contract. The court has modified 
the contract, instead of discharging ALCOA from contractual relationship or 
conferring all burdens on the shoulder of ALCOA. This conclusion, however, 
caused controversy. While some commentators welcomed this approach,34 it 
invited criticism as well.35 There is no decision to the same effect after ALCOA. 
                                                     
32 The English version of § 313 (1) BGB reads as follows. “If circumstances which became the basis 
of a contract have significantly changed since the contract was entered into and if the parties would 
not have entered into the contract or would have entered into it with different contents if they had 
foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account 
of all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory distribution of 
risk, one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration.”  
33 499 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Pa. 1980). 
34 Robert W. Reeder, Court-imposed modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge 
Cases, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 1079 (1983); Robert Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An 
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 Duke L.J. 
35 Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L.J. 1 
(1991). 
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Therefore, it is not certain at this point if this approach has reached the position of 
doctrine.36  
Now looking at East-Asia region, Japan or Korea has no provision or doctrine 
justifying the judicial modification. Although invoking on good faith principle to 
modify the contract made by parties seems theoretically possible, this has never 
happened. However, there is notable sign of change in Japan. Japan is in the 
process of preparing the draft for a large-scale civil code amendment. In April 
2009, the concerned committee has published the “Basic Principles of the 
Amendment of Japanese Law of Obligations (hereinafter “Principles”)”, which is 
likely to serve as the very first draft. Article 3.1.1.91 of the Principles provides a 
general provision for the requirements and effects of the change of circumstances. 
It proposes that the party of the contract can request the court to modify the 
contract at issue by presenting a draft of what she thinks to be the most adequate. 
Korea has also considered introducing similar provision back in early 2000s. The 
Ministry of Justice has launched the committee for the amendment of Korean Civil 
Code back in 1999. In the process of creating a draft, the committee members 
unanimously agreed that a provision governing change of circumstances needed to 
be codified. The committee also considered judicial modification as one of the 
possible remedies for the change of circumstance. However, this proposal was 
rejected by a narrow margin after some discussion. The main ground for the 
rejection was that it might impair party autonomy in contract law and that it will 
increase the caseload due to the outcry of contract party’s call for modification.     
IV. Thoughts on the judicial modification of contract 
Having examined the comparative background of this issue, I turn to the issue of 
the judicial modification of contract. Since Germany has already accepted and 
codified this doctrine, I analyze this issue from Korean perspective.  
Having no provision to govern this issue, there are two dimensions to this 
discussion. The first dimension regards the feasibility of the judicial modification 
within current civil code, with no express provision. It may be possible, as can be 
seen in Germany. Though there was no explicit ground in BGB, German court has 
developed this doctrine under BGB § 242, which stipulates good faith principle. In 
theory, this may be feasible in Korea as well. Yet, I feel that it is just too much a 
stretch of good faith principle. Good faith principle is the last instrument to rest 
on, and should be used in moderation. Germany was in an exceptional 
circumstance - the hyperinflation in the aftermath of the First World War – when 
they first created this doctrine. Without such an extraordinary factor, stretching 
good faith principle to such extent seems unfeasible considering the strict attitude 
                                                     
36 Restatement of Contract (2nd) § 265 refers to the change of circumstances. However, it only states 
the discharge of obligation as its legal consequence. In contrast, American Jurisprudence (2nd) § 517 
addresses judicial modification of contract based on ALCOA decision.  
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of the Korean Supreme Court toward the doctrine of change of circumstances. 
The second dimension regards the feasibility of the judicial modification on a level 
of legislation. It concerns the desirability of accepting judicial modification of 
contract on a legislative level as a means to resolve problematic situations caused 
by the change of circumstances. Since Korean Civil Code Amendment is now in 
progress, this may be a possible and realistic way of accepting it. Therefore, I 
address the desirability of allowing judicial modification in the would-be amended 
Korean civil code. I will examine this from two viewpoints; necessity and 
justifiability.  
1. Necessity  
The first challenging aspect of this issue is that the judicial modification of contract 
rarely takes place even in countries where they explicitly allow this. Furthermore, in 
those rare cases where this mechanism should step in, jurisdictions without such 
provision already have some substitute mechanisms that can work nearly as fine.  
This raises the issue of necessity. If it is seldom used and has some other 
alternative means by which the same result can be reached, what is the use of 
codifying this controversial doctrine? The argument in a more detailed version will 
be as follows. Courts will seldom feel the need to exercise the judicial modifying 
power, even when they can do so. Change of circumstances that is grave enough to 
justify annulment or alteration of the contract rarely happens in reality. The fact 
that Korean Supreme Court has never accepted the argument based on the 
doctrine of change of circumstances vividly supports this statement. Even when 
the case at issue satisfies strict requirements provided by this doctrine, courts can 
still reach the same conclusion by using other methods without taking troubles to 
modify the contract. There may be explicit contractual clauses, such as force 
majeure or hardship clauses, that have already allocated these risks between parties, 
making judicial intervention unnecessary. Even when there are no such clauses, 
court may take this issue in the context of contract interpretation. Despite the non-
existence of such clauses, courts may assume that there has been an implicit 
agreement on who will be bearing unforeseen risks. The recognition of such 
agreement also bars judicial intervention, at least ostensibly. In fact, Korean courts 
have been virtually modifying the contract in the name of interpretation and good 
faith principle. Court-led mediation procedure has also played a great role in 
modifying the contract to suit the notion of fairness. Considering all these 
alternative means to guarantee fair outcome, there is little necessity to recognize 
explicit mechanism of judicial modification of contract.   
The above argument has its own merits. However, it does not lead to the 
conclusion that there is no necessity at all. In addition, not all the provisions in 
Civil Code are meant to be used extensively. Some are used on a daily-basis, while 
some are provided for a ‘just-in case situations’. Thing is that there are these sort 
of extreme situations. Time-limitation or lack of experience may cause a party 
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unable to take reasonable steps to consider effects of the extreme contingencies. 
Even the most considerate parties can fail to do so. Furthermore, the difference of 
the legal culture may aggravate this. Compared with American contracting culture, 
European and Asian cultures are relatively accustomed to simpler and shorter 
contracts, especially in contracts where individuals, as opposed to corporations, are 
involved. In these cases, a problem associated with a gap between contract and 
circumstances typically arises. The altnernatives mentioned above may not be able 
to get rid of the gap completely. It is evident that something needs to be done with 
regard to the gap arising out of the contract and the unforeseen circumstances. 
The ideal way of solving this deadlock is to make a new agreement based on the 
changed circumstances. However, reaching a new agreement is not something that 
you can always expect to take place. Excusing an obligor from contractual 
obligation is one of the remedies in this regard, as is found in a large number of 
jurisdictions. Yet, this remedy stands on ‘all or nothing approach’ that renders fine-
tuning of the contractual interests of both parties unfeasible. This is also true when 
both parties intend that the contract be preserved but fail to find a solution by 
themselves due to opposing micro-interests. In this context, the court needs to 
step in prudently and draw out the fairest conclusion. What courts do in the name 
of interpretation or good faith principle has its own limitation. Though solving the 
contractual dispute by way of interpretation seems attractive since it preserves the 
party autonomy while enabling the fair outcome, interpretation should be based on 
the intent of the parties. Courts can enforce a contract only to the extent of the 
agreed terms. Stretching outside this scope is not an interpretation, but a hidden 
form of judicial creation of the contract. I am not saying that this function, which 
exists in practice, should be completely expelled. Rather, I am saying that this 
should be done in a more upfront way based on the statutory ground provided by 
legislators. Good faith principle, due to its amorphousness, also has its dangers of 
misuse or overuse. This is why good faith principle should yield its way to specific 
provisions containing explicit requirements. After all, those provisions all 
incorporate the spirit of good faith principle, yet provide more refined solutions. 
Therefore, providing a way by which a court can intervene to solve the dead-lock 
contractual dispute is a candid and refined way of dealing with this issue.  
2. Justifiability  
Would it lead to fair and efficient outcome? Would it not invite too wide judicial 
discretion into the realm of contract law where legal certainty and stability need to 
be preserved? As for the justification of the judicial modification, three aspects of 
this issue – fairness, efficiency, and the role of the court in contract law – come 
into our sight. 
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A. Possible concerns  
The argument against judicial modification may raise following concerns.  
(a) Party-autonomy and fairness concern 
In the first place, judicial modification is not consistent with the notion of fairness. 
It infringes upon the autonomy of the party, the very foundation of the contract 
law. The intervention of the court seems, on its face, to be enhancing fair and just 
outcome of a specific case. However, its fairness is not guaranteed. Rather, it will 
fall to arbitrariness of the judicial discretion, thereby sometimes rendering bizarre 
outcome. This problem will be aggravated when the resolution of the dispute calls 
for highly sophisticated and specialized knowledge and experience, which judges 
usually lack.  
(b) Inefficiency concern 
Secondly, judicial modification is likely to undermine efficiency. It will lower legal 
certainty and stability, which will in turn chill market activities. Moreover, it is the 
most efficient way to have parties provide relevant contractual clauses in advance. 
The possibility of judicial modification of a contract will severely decrease 
incentives to negotiate and incorporate such clauses. Same can be said of the 
incentives to purchase insurance plans that can spread the risks. These will lead to 
the increase of dispute-resolution costs. The increase of the costs will occur in the 
following sense as well. Parties who feel that they have been disadvantaged by 
unforeseen events will throng to the court to demand modification of the contract. 
In turn, court might have to use considerable time and energy in the process of 
modifying the contractual terms of tons of cases.  
(c) Judicial expansion concern 
The third and final point focuses on the fear of the emergence of despotic court in 
the realm of contract law. Contractual relationship is to be created, altered, and 
extinguished by the parties. The intervention of the court in this regard should 
remain minimal. As mentioned above, judges are by no means wiser than parties in 
terms of information as to what will enhance their interests. This is especially true 
when it comes to a contract between sophisticated parties.37  
 
 
                                                     
37 Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: 
A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 91. J.L.Econ & Organization 230 (1993).  
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B. Thoughts  
Although the above arguments have their own merits, the judicial modification of 
contract can still be justified for the following reasons.  
(a) On party autonomy and fairness 
In the first place, I doubt if judicial modification of contract infringes upon party 
autonomy. The supremacy of a party’s contractual freedom is unquestionable in 
the realm of contract law. Yet, the intervention of the court in the above context 
does not directly conflict with parties’ contractual freedom. Contractual freedom 
has its own ambits. It is only to be respected when there exists a contract or an 
intention to make a contract. When things at issue fall outside the realm of 
contract, no binding contract exists. The judicial modification of contract only 
matters when there is indeed no agreement over who will bear risks to what extent. 
Further, this only matters when the parties finally fail to reach a new agreement to 
deal with the situation. In reality, this failure is something we can naturally predict. 
Parties would typically not enter into modifications unless they both feel better off 
relative to the position that would or might have obtained without a 
modification.38 This is where legal or judicial intervention is justified. In addition, 
contract parties are completely at liberty to contract out of this intervention by 
providing such clauses in a contract. For example, they may put an arbitration 
clause to bar the court from stepping into the contractual dispute resolution, or 
they may agree to deny any sorts of judicial intervention at any unexpected 
incidents. This is possible since the provision for judicial modification of contract 
will stay merely as a default rule, not as a mandatory rule.  
From the fairness standpoint of view, this can enhance fairness of the 
outcome. This is the very reason why a substantial number of countries and 
international model laws have opted to allow this. Leaving risks outside the scope 
of contract as they are, leads to undeserved gains or losses of contract parties. 
Rigid adherence to ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, as opposed to what I would call as 
‘sharing’ approach, can often lead to injustice and fail to fine-tune micro interests 
of contractual parties.39 
(b) On inefficiency 
From the efficiency standpoint of view, judicial modification of contract can leave 
efficiency of the contract unharmed, and sometimes even enhance it. This may be 
explained both from ex-ante and ex-post perspectives. From ex-ante perspective, 
making a complete contract, meaning providing contractual clauses for every 
                                                     
38 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993), p 136-137. 
39 Charles Fried argues that in many cases where both parties are harmed and neither is at fault, the 
principle of sharing comes into play. This principle applies where no convergent intentions exist as to 
the contingency in question, no one in the relationship is at fault, and no one has conferred a benefit. 
Sharing applies where there are no rights to respect. See Fried, Contract as Promise (1982), 69-74 
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possible contingency, is impossible or too costly in reality. Strict rule of discharge 
would only create an incentive to write a more detailed and complicated contract, 
thereby creating additional negotiation costs.40 Moreover, assigning all the risks to 
a certain party may increase transaction costs in trying to insert additional 
provisions to allocate risks in a different manner.41 The strength of incomplete 
contract is that parties do not have to involve themselves into time and money-
consuming negotiations and writing process to come up with complete contract, as 
long as there are reasonable default rules and judicial gap-filling mechanisms 
supplementing what was not expressly bargained for. Therefore, the judicial 
modification of contract can reduce unnecessary costs of complete contract. From 
ex-post perspective, judicial modification of contract can contribute to the 
continuation of the contractual relationship. This is particularly true in the long-
term contract.42 In contrast to demolishing the contractual relationship where 
parties might have invested so much of their resources, maintaining it by 
modifying it may enhance efficiency. A concern on the increase of the litigation is 
somewhat overstated. Provided that the court take a strict stance toward applying 
the provision, as witnessed in many jurisdictions with this provision, the litigation 
won’t dramatically increase in the long run.  
(c) On the role of the court in contract law 
From the judicial role standpoint of view, this can be justified as well. Contract law 
is not only a norm of parties, but also a norm of a community. There are a great 
number of provisions in current civil code where things are solved by law or 
judges, not by parties either due to the lack of contract in contractual disputes or 
due to the need for protecting fundamental social values. Thus, contract law 
embraces both autonomy and social values. Contract law is a not a regime that is 
entirely internal to the parties to the contract. On top of this, it is noteworthy that 
there is a gradual paradigm-shift taking place, mainly in Europe, that permits more 
judicial discretion than before in the area of contract law. This may be a reflection 
of anti-formalism in contract law, or a reflection of diverse and risk-full world 
where a great number of interest-factors should be taken into account for a more 
reasonable outcome. For example, PECL widely uses the notion of reasonableness 
as well as good faith, which invites some degree of judicial discretion. This 
tendency still exists in PICC or DCFR, where strict rules are gradually replaced by 
flexible standards. Whether or not this tendency is desirable is subject to further 
                                                     
40 Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. Legal Stud 
119, 154 (1977). 
41 Charles Tabor, Dusting off the Code: Using History to find Equity in Lousiana Contract Law, 68 LA. L. 
Rev. 549, 563 (2008). 
42 Ian R. Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law”, 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854, 905 (1977-
1978). Also see Fried, Contract as Promise (1982), 69-74 where he acknowledges that there are gaps 
that cannot be filled by the promise principle, for the simple reason that the parties have no 
convergent intentions.  
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discussion. However, it is evident that there are cases where judicial discretion 
needs to step in. Courts should be highly prudent not to impound on parties’ 
autonomy, but should be flexible once the case qualifies the stringent 
requirements. It is true that courts are not always better than parties in drafting a 
modified contract since they have limited information as to parties’ circumstances 
and preferences. First of all, this is a common feature of nearly every litigation. 
Parties are nearly always in a better position to acquire information as to the 
disputes and their well-beings. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that courts cannot 
adjudicate the case due to their inferiority in terms of information. Moreover, in 
practice, courts are likely to consider the drafts of a contract and relevant 
information competitively presented by both parties to get a better result.  
V. Conclusion 
I have so far examined the feasibility of the judicial modification of contract in the 
changed circumstances. This is not likely to be allowed under current civil code 
regime, given the strict stance of the Supreme Court toward the doctrine of change 
of circumstances and the lack of explicit provision providing the ground for the 
modification. Yet, there is room for discussion over this issue in the process of the 
Civil Code amendment, though it will cause fierce controversy.  
I am of the opinion that the judicial modification of contract as a legal 
consequence of the change of circumstances can be justified in exceptional cases, 
as I have so far argued. In principle, contract law is the typical domain reserved for 
self-determination. Yet, judicial modification can function as the last resort to 
ensure fair outcome in extremely onerous cases. If that is the case, it is better to 
regulate that exceptional realm by legislation, rather than leaving it to the realm of 
interpretation or good faith. A comparative study on this matter also shows a wide 
trend toward accepting this mechanism. 
 
 
New Developments in Data Privacy for Employees 
in German Law 
Rüdiger Krause 
I. Introduction: On the way to a Worker Data Privacy Act 
In December 2010 the German Government passed the draft bill of an Act on 
employee data protection.1 Although the bill is contested not only between 
employer associations and trade unions but also within the Government, it is 
expected that the Act will enter into force in 2011 bringing a long lasting 
discussion to its end. The first demands for a particular act on data protection for 
workers go back to the 1980s but for a long time the German legislator didn’t 
make any real attempt to regulate this topic. The situation changed in 2008, when 
the abuse of employee data in several large German companies became public.2 
Driven by the public, the previous Government reacted immediately and inserted 
just before the last election in 2009 a single provision into the Federal Data 
Protection Act (= Bundesdatenschutzgesetz = BDSG) which expressly addresses 
worker data privacy for the first time. At the same time the Government 
announced that this amendment should only be an interim solution and should be 
                                                     
1 BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011. 
2 Several retailers have spied on their employees with hidden video cameras at the workplace. 
German Telekom has wiretapped employees who are suspected of passing confidential information 
on to journalists. German Railway has executed a furtive screening of personal data of some 170.000 
employees in order to unveil and prevent corruption. More details on these and other comparable 
cases in Däubler, Gläserne Belegschaften, 5. Aufl. (2010), Rn. 2a ff. 
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followed by a more detailed Act. The new Government, in office since fall 2009, 
has picked up that project and started the current legislative procedure. 
This paper does not aim to go too much into all details of the existing Federal 
Data Protection Act or the current draft of an amendment to this Act. In fact it 
will focus on some more general problems. First, the paper tends to analyse the 
conflicting interests each legal order has to consider in the issue of data privacy of 
employees (II). Secondly, it will turn to the legal background and in particular to 
the approaches of German and European law (III). Thirdly, this paper will sketch 
some main aspects of the new Act and tackle some specific problems (IV). 
II. Conflicting interests 
1. Employer interests 
As regards the employer interests at stake one should distinguish between the 
situation prior to and after the conclusion of the employment contract. 
In the pre-contractual phase the employer faces a dilemma: On the one hand 
the employer has an economic interest to get the best quid pro quo for his pay. On 
the other hand the value of an employee cannot be assessed entirely at the moment 
of the conclusion of the employment contract, but only by experience if he or she 
has worked for some time in the enterprise. So the employer must decide with 
uncertainty whether or not he will hire a particular applicant. In order to gain a 
maximum of output for his input and to avoid or minimize risks adherent to the 
person or the behaviour of the employee, the employer has an interest to gather as 
much information as possible on the applicant for a job. In detail, the employer is 
interested to know whether the applicant is sufficiently qualified for the job, has a 
strong physical and mental condition and doesn’t have attitudes which can cause 
frictions with the employer, other employees or customers. 
To put it more generally: In a market economy every actor needs a high level 
of information as the basis for a rational choice because the actor will bear the 
risks if the decision turns out to be disadvantageous. In this respect the possibility 
of grasping information is the backbone of private autonomy and is consistent 
with the general principle of the informed consent as a concept of modern 
contract law.3 
After the closing of the employment contract the situation changes in 
principle. In institutional terms the employment relationship is a principal-agent 
setting. The employer as principal has an interest that the employee performs his 
work in a proper manner and does not violate his obligations by causing any 
damage or even criminal acts like theft or fraud. But the employee as agent can 
                                                     
3 Cf. Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill (Ed.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal 
Market (2001). 
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misuse his position as contract partner and for example could work slowly or deal 
on his own account. Thus, the employer is interested in monitoring the employee 
to guarantee a specific behaviour and prevent moral hazard. 
More generally the employer has an interest to collect all data he needs to 
organize and optimize the operations within the enterprise. An economic success 
depends on information on the environment of the company like the general 
market conditions but first and foremost on precise information on the operating 
procedures. A lot of personal data of workers is from the employer’s point of view 
mere operational data.4 Hence, one of the fundamental questions of every 
regulation on worker data privacy is who “owns” the data that are both personal 
and operational. 
One particular problem is the safeguarding of compliance. Compliance is one 
of the most discussed keywords in the context of data privacy of employees in the 
past few years5 and it is often used as an argument against a strict regulation on 
data protection. The German legislator has mentioned it in its grounds for the 
current draft too.6 But what is the meaning of compliance and in which way is 
compliance connected with data privacy of employees? 
Compliance can be conceptualized as regarding of rules. These rules can be 
imposed on the employer by external actors, in particular by the legislator, or they 
can be created internally by the employer himself. In the latter case it is an 
additional problem whether or not the employer actually has the authority to create 
rules which he wants to enforce by observing employees.7 It is clear that there is 
no legitimate interest in collecting employee data if the goal, namely to enforce a 
regulation, is in itself invalid. Hence, the safeguarding of compliance can be used as 
an argument against a rigid data privacy law but it can not be used in all cases. 
2. Employees 
On the side of the employees there are tangible and intangible interests. First, the 
worker might have an interest to hide particular data because the disclosure of 
these data would worsen his chances to get the job. Secondly, he has an interest 
not to be handled like an object. Nobody wants to be seen only as a sum of data 
                                                     
4 H. Buchner, Vom “gläsernen Menschen” zum “gläsernen Unternehmen”, in: Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht (ZfA), 1988, 449-488 (at 451 f.) 
5 Kort, Zum Verhältnis von Datenschutz und Compliance im geplanten Beschäftigten- 
datenschutzgesetz, Der Betrieb (DB) 2011, 651-655; Thüsing, Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz und 
Compliance (2010). 
6 BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011, p. 1. 
7 A much debated issue is the enforcement of “ethics rules” of U. S. corporations like Honeywell and 
Wal-Mart under German Law; cf. BAG 22.7.2008 – 1 ABR 40/07 – BAGE 127, 146 = NZA 2008, 
1248; LAG Düsseldorf 14.11.2005 – 10 TaBV 46/05 – NZA-RR 2006, 81; Deinert/Kolle, Liebe ist 
Privatsache. Grenzen einer arbeitsvertraglichen Regelung zwischenmenschlicher Beziehungen, Arbeit 
und Recht (AuR) 2006, 177-184; Kort, Ethik-Richtlinien im Spannungsfeld zwischen US-
amerikanischer Compliance und deutschem Konzernbetriebsverfassungsrecht, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (NJW) 2009, 129-133. 
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which are used by others persons for their selfish goals. Even more, nobody wants 
to be monitored permanently by other persons. An unlimited observing and 
indexing of personal data touches human dignity. Furthermore the collecting of 
personal data might influence the behaviour of the employee. If the worker does 
not know which personal data are gathered by the employer or even if he knows it 
is likely that he will behave in a manner which he assumes to be wanted by the 
employer. This does not only mean to work as hard as possible and to avoid 
negligence. Depending upon the concrete personal data which are collected it is 
possible that the employee stops acting naturally because he fears that the 
employer will draw negative consequences. For example, the employee will omit to 
go to the toilet if he or she knows that every walk to the toilet will be exactly 
registered. 
3. Common goals 
Concerning the common goals, different aspects can be distinguished. First, there 
is a common goal that enterprises function efficiently so that they can provide job 
opportunities and pay taxes. But this is not automatically an argument in favour of 
weak data protection law and the possibility to observe employees without 
restrictions. The efficiency of enterprises and the efficiency of the economy all 
depend on the existence of a certain level of mutual trust between employers and 
employees. An economic system in which the employees are demoralized because 
they were generally treated with distrust will not work properly. Thus, personal 
data privacy can enhance the so called “social capital” within a society and produce 
more efficiency. 
Secondly, the compliance issue has to be mentioned once again. In respect of 
corruption, antitrust, accounting standards, environmental law and so on society 
expects from employers that the enterprise as a whole does not violate the law. 
Given that enterprises are only working with the help of their employees there is a 
common goal to enable the employers to combat criminal acts which would be a 
detriment to the society as a whole. 
A particular problem will be the execution of internal investigations if there is a 
worker suspected to have committed a criminal act. If the prosecutor starts 
investigations against a suspicious employee the worker is protected by specific 
rights of criminal procedure law. If the employer takes the investigations in his 
own hands there is the danger that the employee lacks these rights. 
To sum up, the problem of data privacy in the field of employment touches 
very different aspects. It is for two reasons obvious that the adjustment of the 
conflicting interests can not only be achieved by market forces. Due to the unequal 
bargaining power of the parties to the employment contract, the employer will 
regularly prevail. Furthermore common goals cannot be the object of private 
bargaining but have to be respected at all costs. 
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II. Development and current state of German law on worker 
data privacy 
In regard to worker data privacy German law provides traditionally a “two-
channel-approach:” The older channel follows from the so called “General right to 
personality” (= Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) and is developed by case law. 
The newer one is based on the Federal Data Protection Act. These two channels 
which provide a substantial level of protection are completed by a more procedural 
provision stemming from worker participation. 
1. First channel: General right to personality (case law) 
The general right to personality is a product of case law. The German Civil Code 
(= Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 1900 does not provide such a right. The German 
legislator back then refused the creation of a general right to personality because it 
estimated that it will not be possible to give such a right clear limits in particular as 
regards damages in case of violation. The former Reichsgericht affirmed this 
position in its case law.8 It was not until 1954 when the Federal Civil Court (= 
Bundesgerichtshof) acknowledged the general right to personality in a landmark 
case as part of private law, referring to the German Constitution (= Grundgesetz) 
from 1949 with its fundamental rights of protection of human dignity (Art. 1 GG) 
and to self-fulfilment (Art. 2 I GG).9 A lot of further decisions of the Federal Civil 
Court approved the general right to personality.10 Hence, this right has long been a 
commonly accepted element of German private law, although it was never laid 
down as such in statutory law.11 
The acknowledgment of the general right to personality can be regarded as an 
expression of the important role of fundamental rights provided in the German 
Constitution for all parts of private law. In this respect the Federal Constitutional 
Court (= Bundesverfassungsgericht) held in an early landmark decision from 1958 
that fundamental rights are not only relevant as rights against state action.12 Rather, 
fundamental rights represent objective values that influence the whole legal order 
and give guidance for the interpretation of private law.13 
In its early decisions the Federal Labour Court actually went one step further 
and applied fundamental rights even directly against the employer, arguing that the 
                                                     
8 E. g. RG 7.11.1908 – I 638/07 – RGZ 69, 401; RG 12.5.1926 – I 287/25 – RGZ 113, 413. 
9 BGH 25.5.1954 – I ZR 211/53 – BGHZ 13, 334. 
10 Important older decisions: BGH 2.4.1957 – VI ZR 9/56 – BGHZ 24, 72; BGH 14.2.1958 – I ZR 
151/56 – BGHZ 26, 349. 
11 See MünchKomm/Rixecker, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 5. Aufl. (2006), Anhang zu § 12 – Das 
Allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht; Palandt/Sprau, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 70. Aufl. (2011), § 823 Rn. 
83 ff. 
12 BVerfG 15.1.1958 – 1 BvR 400/51 – BVerfGE 7, 198. 
13 Legal theorists have stated that the term “value” could be replaced by the term “principle” in the 
meaning of Dworkins concept of rights; see Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (1986), p. 125 ff. 
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power of the employer is comparable with the power of the state.14 Although the 
Federal Labour Court dismissed this approach in the 1980s,15 the concrete results 
do not differ very much. According to the currently prevailing approach 
fundamental rights oblige the state on the one hand to respect them directly and 
on the other hand to protect them against violation by private actors.16 This applies 
also in regard to the general right to personality. Although this right is part of 
private law, it must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to 
personality. This is important insofar as the constitutional duty to protect human 
dignity and the right to self-fulfilment has a “dynamic” character which prompts 
the legislator and the courts to refine the legal order further if private actors cause 
new dangers to the right to personality.17 
The general right to personality is regarded as a source from which derive 
different characteristics developed by case law. Contrary to other goods like the 
right to the own person or the right to property the right to personality does not 
protect a clear definable sphere. Thus, it must be assessed in every case, whether 
the general right to personality is affected and, if so, whether it is violated, which 
has to be checked by means of balancing all interests at stake. If the right to 
personality is infringed the affected person can claim for the elimination of the 
impairment, and in case of a serious violation also for damages.18 
From the very beginning the Federal Labor Court gave protection to the 
private sphere of employees vis-à-vis the employer in general and in particular 
concerning personal data although the right to personality as such and even more 
the term data privacy was not mentioned until the 1980s. The Works Constitution 
Act from 1972 (= Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) supported this trend by providing 
expressly that the employer and the works council must protect and encourage the 
free development of the personality of the employees (§ 75 Abs. 2 BetrVG). 
A much debated kind of cases concerns interviews with applicants. In all of 
these cases the Court held that the employer is only entitled to ask for those facts 
(for example previous offenses) if they are relevant for the performance of the job. 
Other questions are qualified as unjustified intrusion into the private sphere of the 
applicant.19 In other cases the Court held that data in a personnel record must be 
deleted if they are wrong20 and even if they are true but no longer relevant for the 
                                                     
14 BAG 3.12.1954 – 1 AZR 150/54 - BAGE 1, 185; BAG 10.5.1957 – 1 AZR 249/57 – BAGE 4, 
274. 
15 BAG 27.2.1985 – GS 1/84 – BAGE (GS) 48, 122. 
16 v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 1, 6. Aufl. (2010), Art. 1 Rn. 312 
ff.; comprehensive Ruffert, Vorrang der Verfassung und Eigenständigkeit des Privatrechts (2001), S. 
141 ff. 
17 Cf. MünchKomm/Rixecker, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 5. Aufl. (2006), Anhang zu § 12 – Das 
Allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht, Rn. 3. 
18 Cf. MünchKomm/Rixecker, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 5. Aufl. (2006), Anhang zu § 12 – Das 
Allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht, Rn. 221 ff.; Palandt/Sprau, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 70. Aufl. 
(2011), § 823 Rn. 123 f. 
19 BAG 5.12.1957 – 1 AZR 594/56 – BAGE 5, 159. 
20 BAG 27.11.1985 – 5 AZR 101/84 – NZA 1986, 227. 
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employment relationship21. Furthermore the Court held that monitoring of 
employees by means of technical devices affects their general right to personality 
and is only allowed under certain requirements.22 Hence, the general right to 
personality is a well established tool to limit the power of the employer to 
supervise employees and collect and store personal data. 
2. Second channel: Federal Data Protection Act (statutory law) 
The second channel is the Federal Data Protection Act which came into force in 
1977.23 This Act is the result of the rising awareness of the dangers to privacy in 
the 1960s and 1970s by the ongoing technical development in information 
technology. Although the focus was in the first instance on the processing of 
personal data by the state, the Act applies from the very beginning also to the 
processing of personal data by private bodies. The general concept of the Federal 
Data Protection Act in its primary version was two-fold: On the one hand the Act 
covered only automated data processing or at least the using of data from non 
automated filing systems. In this respect the field of application of the Federal 
Data Protection Act was originally smaller than the general right to personality-
approach. On the other side the Act is stricter because it establishes if applicable a 
general prohibition of processing personal data with the reservation of permission, 
a legal technique often used in administrative law but alien to private law. The 
central argument of the legislator was that the misuse of personal data can affect 
the private sphere of the citizens and thus it has to be protected against specific 
kinds of processing of personal data which are deemed to be exceptionally 
dangerous.24 
Some legal scholars argue that this concept can be regarded from a doctrinal 
point of view as a kind of risk management. While the general right to personality-
approach protects only against violations of the private sphere the Federal Data 
Protection Act goes further and inhibits already the creation of risks which can 
violate the general right to personality in future.25 This is supported by the grounds 
of the Federal Data Protection Act which stated for example that the transferring 
of personal data to third parties endangers (that means not violates) the private 
                                                     
21 BAG 13.4.1988 – 5 AZR 537/86 – NZA 1988, 654. 
22 BAG 27.3.2003 – 2 AZR 51/02 – BAGE 105, 356 = NZA 2003, 1193; BAG 29.6.2004 – 1 ABR 
21/03 – BAGE 111, 173 = NZA 2004, 1278; BAG 26.8.2008 – 1 ABR 16/07 – BAGE 127, 276 = 
NZA 2008, 1187. 
23 The term “data protection” is misleading because it is not to protect data but persons against the 
misuse of their personal data. 
24 BT-Drucksache 7/1027 of 21/9/1973, p. 14 ff. 
25 Bull, Zweifelsfragen um die informationelle Selbstbestimmung – Datenschutz als Datenaskese?, 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2006, 1617-1624 (at 1623); Ehmann, Zur Zweckbindung 
privater Datennutzung, Recht der Datenverarbeitung (RDV) 1988, 169-180 (at 178); Franzen, 
Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz – rechtspolitische Perspektiven, Recht der Arbeit (RdA) 2010, 257-263 (at 
258); Zöllner, Daten- und Informationsschutz im Arbeitsverhältnis (1982), p. 6 ff. 
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sphere.26 Other scholars argue – in line with case law of the Federal Civil Court27 – 
that the Federal Data Protection Act concretizes the general right to personality 
and thus every violation of the Act must be regarded as a violation of the general 
right to personality.28 At any rate, the Federal Labor Court uses the general right to 
personality to fill the gaps of the Federal Data Protection Act.29 
For more than thirty years the Federal Data Protection Act did not provide 
particular regulations for worker privacy. Therefore, only the general rules for data 
processing by private bodies apply. Although the Federal Labor Court refers to 
this Act in some cases30 it remains an exceptional part of employment law because 
the legal “style” of the Act resembles administrative law more than private law. 
In 2009, induced by the data protection scandals mentioned at the beginning, a 
new provision devoted especially to worker data privacy was introduced into the 
Act (§ 32 BDSG).31 In principle this provision approves only the state of case law 
providing that any processing of personal data of workers shall only be allowed if it 
is necessary for job-related purposes. But the new provision expands the 
application of the Federal Data Protection Act fundamentally by declaring as 
irrelevant whether or not the employer carries out automated data processing or at 
least uses personal data from non automated filing systems. This means that the 
primary purpose of the Act, namely to provide protection against particular 
dangers, was sidelined. Now according to the Federal Data Protection Act every 
processing of worker personal data is prohibited unless it is allowed by the Act. 
Thus, the general right to personality is no longer necessary as an instrument to fill 
the gaps of the Act. 
 
3. Constitutional law: Right to “informational self-determination” 
In 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court developed in a landmark case the so 
called fundamental right to “informational self-determination” (“Grundrecht auf 
                                                     
26 BT-Drucksache 7/1027 of 21/9/1973, p. 18. 
27 BGH 7.7.1983 – III ZR 159/82 – NJW 1984, 436; BGH 22.5.1984 – VI ZR 105/82 – BGHZ 91, 
233 (at 239-240). 
28 Simitis, Datenschutz: Von der legislativen Entscheidung zur richterlichen Interpretation, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1981, 1697-1701 (at 1701). 
29 BAG 6.6.1984 – 5 AZR 286/81 – BAGE 46, 98 = NZA 1984, 321 (employer has to wipe out a 
questionnaire of an applicant who doesn’t succeed); BAG 16.11.2010 – 9 AZR 573/09 – NZA 2011, 
453 (employee is entitled to inspect his personnel record after the termination of the employment 
relationship). 
30 Cf. BAG 27.5.1986 – 1 ABR 48/84 – BAGE 52, 88 = NZA 1986, 643; BAG 22.10.1986 – 5 AZR 
660/85 – BAGE 53, 226 = NZA 1987, 415; BAG 30.8.1995 – 1 ABR 4/95 – BAGE 80, 366 = NZA 
1996, 218. 
31 Cf. Erfurth, Der „neue“ Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz im BDSG, Neue Juristische Online-Zeitschrift 
(NJOZ) 2009, 2914-2927; Joussen, Die Neufassung des § 32 BDSG – Neues zum 
Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz?, in: Jahrbuch des Arbeitsrechts (JArbR) 47 (2010), 69-91; Schmidt, 
Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz gemäß § 32 BDSG – Eine Neuregelung (fast) ohne Veränderung der 
Rechtslage, Recht der Datenverarbeitung (RDV) 2009, 193-200; Thüsing, Datenschutz im 
Arbeitsverhältnis, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2009, 865-870. 
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informationelle Selbstbestimmung”), which derives from the fundamental general 
right to personality,32 although some aspects of such a right were acknowledged in 
precedents33. The Court held that modern forms of automated processing of 
personal data create serious risks for the self-determination because people can be 
blocked from unconstrained behaviour if they cannot know which information 
about their own person is known in their social environment. Hence, everybody 
has the right to decide in principle on the disclosure and use of personal data. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has affirmed its opinion in a lot of decisions.34 From 
this point of view there is no personal data which is irrelevant at the outset. 
Therefore the right to “informational self-determination” tends to be a more rigid 
approach than the right to privacy-approach in its traditional meaning of a “right 
to be left alone”.35 In particular the right to “informational self-determination” 
protects not only against infringements of the right to personality but also against 
endangering this right.36 
The relevance of that decision, which is often called the “Magna Charta” of 
German data protection law,37 for worker data privacy is contested. Some legal 
scholars regard the decision as a great step forward and transfer the right to 
“informational self-determination” immediately into the employment 
relationship.38 Other scholars stress that the Federal Constitutional Court has dealt 
with a state action, namely a census, and point out the fundamental difference 
between public law and private law.39 But in later cases the Federal Constitutional 
Court didn’t hesitate to apply the right to “informational self-determination” to 
private legal relations.40 The Federal Labor Court doesn’t worry too much about 
                                                     
32 BVerfG 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83 – BVerfGE 65, 1. See also BVerfG 
27.6.1991 – 2 BvR 1493/89 – BVerfGE 84, 239 (at 280): „Fundamental right of data protection 
(Grundrecht auf Datenschutz)”. 
33 Beginning with BVerfG 16.7.1969 – 1 BvL 19/63 – BVerfGE 27, 1. 
34 Cf. BVerfG 12.4.2005 – 2 BvR 1027/02 – BVerfGE 113, 29 (at 45 f.); BVerfG 4.4.2006 – 1 BvR 
418/02 – BVerfGE 115, 320 (at 341 f.); BVerfG 13.6.2007 – 1 BvR 1550/03, 2357/04, 603/05 – 
BVerfGE 118, 168 (at 183 ff.). Current and comprehensive overview on the case law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court on the right to “informational self-determination” Frenz, Informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung im Spiegel des BVerfG, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl.) 2009, 333-339; 
critical of Ladeur, Das Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung: Eine juristische 
Fehlkonstruktion?, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 2009, 45-55; Pitschas, Informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung zwischen digitaler Ökonomie und Internet, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 
(DuD), 1998, 139-149 (at 146-148). 
35 Warren/Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review (1890), 193-220 (at 195). 
36 Cf. BVerfG 10.3.2008 – 1 BvR 2388/03 – BVerfGE 120, 351 (at 360); BVerfG 11.3.2008 – 1 BvR 
2074/05, 1254/07 – BVerfGE 120, 378 (at 397 f.). 
37 E. g. Hoffmann-Riem, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung in der Informationsgesellschaft, Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 123 (1998), 513-540 (at 515). 
38 Simitis, Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung – Grundbedingung einer verfassungskonformen 
Informationsordnung, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1984, 398-405 (at 400-402). 
39 Zöllner, Die gesetzgeberische Trennung des Datenschutzes für öffentliche und private Daten- 
verarbeitung, Recht der Datenverarbeitung (RDV) 1985, 3-16 (at 12-13). See also Giesen, Das 
Grundrecht auf Datenverarbeitung, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2007, 918-927. 
40 BVerfG 11.6.1991 – 1 BvR 239/90 – BVerfGE 84, 192 (at 194-195); BVerfG 23.10.2006 – 1 BvR 
2027/02 – RDV 2007, 20; BVerfG 13.2.2007 – 1 BvR 421/05 – BVerfGE 117, 202 (at 228); BVerfG 
11.7.2007 – 1 BvR 1025/07 – NJW 2007, 3707. 
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doctrinal questions. In some cases the Court referred expressly to the right to 
“informational self-determination”.41 In other cases which are in fact worker’s data 
privacy cases too the Court neglected this aspect and referred only to the general 
right to personality but came to the same results.42 Nevertheless, the development 
of a particular fundamental right to “informational self-determination” has 
contributed to the amendment and the sharpening of the Federal Data Protection 
Act during the last twenty years. In particular this right has increased the awareness 
for data privacy problems at the workplace and is fuelling the efforts to elaborate 
worker data privacy. 
4. Protection of worker data privacy by means of worker participation 
One particular kind of protection of worker privacy stems from worker 
participation law. According to the Works Constitution Act of 1972 the employer 
is not allowed to introduce technical devices which are determined to monitor 
employees unless he has achieved an agreement with the works council if existing 
(§ 87 I Nr. 6 BetrVG). If the parties fail to agree then a conciliation committee 
decides (§§ 87 II, 76 BetrVG). This regulation additionally aims to safeguard the 
general right to personality of the employees. The Federal Labour Court interprets 
that provision in a broad sense and applies it to all cases of automated data 
processing irrespective of whether or not the employer has the intention to 
monitor his staff. It is sufficient that the technical device is as such part of a system 
which is able to monitor employees by processing personal data of workers 
automatically.43 Furthermore, according to another provision of the Works 
Constitution Act questionnaires require the consent of the works council (§ 94 
BetrVG). In both cases the collective actors cannot deprive the employee of the 
protection provided by the general right to personality. The level of protection is 
mandatory and does not stand at the disposal of employer and works council. 
5. Impact of European law 
European law has not had a deep impact on German law on worker data privacy 
until now. In 1995 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC was enacted. This 
directive concerns the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data in general by state or private 
actors and does not address in particular employment law. Furthermore – and in 
line with the original version of the Federal Data Protection Act44 – it covers only 
                                                     
41 Cf. BAG 14.12.2004 – 1 ABR 34/03 – NJOZ 2005, 2708. 
42 Cf. BAG 29.6.2004 – 1 ABR 21/03 – BAGE 111, 173 = NZA 2004, 1278. 
43 BAG 9.9.1975 – 1 ABR 20/74 – BAGE 27, 256. But there is no general exclusion of evidence 
improperly obtained on grounds of violation of worker participation rights; cf. BAG 13.12.2007 – 2 
AZR 537/06 – NZA 2008, 1008. 
44 See above II 2. 
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processing of personal data by automatic means or by non automated filing 
systems.45 There have been several announcements of the European Commission 
to propose a directive especially on the protection of employee personal data but 
nothing has happened. Nevertheless Directive 95/46/EC gives some guidelines 
which have to be respected at the level of Member States’ law although the 
directive refers only to the approach that data protection seeks to protect the 
private sphere of persons while a right to “informational self-determination” is not 
mentioned.46 
The most important aspect so far is that according to the ECJ case law this 
directive has the effect of full harmonization, because it aims to establish a level 
playing field for enterprises in Europe.47 That means that the level of data 
protection provided by the directive is strict in both directions. Therefore national 
law is prohibited from setting either a lower or a higher level of protection of 
personal data.48 
Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009, Art. 8 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) which guarantees the protection 
of personal data must also be recognized because pursuant to Art. 51 the Charter is 
applicable if the Member States implement Union law.49 It is at this moment far 
from clear whether Art. 8 ECFR will affect the full harmonization-approach. 
In 2010 the European Commission launched a new comprehensive approach 
on data protection in the European Union to adjust the existing legal framework to 
the current demands of informational society.50 The Commission has announced it 
would propose new legislation in 2011, but up to now nothing has happened. 
                                                     
45 See Art. 3 para. 1 Directive 95/46/EC. 
46 Cf. Art. 1 para. 1 Directive 95/46/EC. This is in line with the Council of Europe Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28/1/1981 
(cf. Art. 1). 
47 ECJ 20.5.2003 – C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 – ECR 2003, I-4989 = RDV 2003, 231 – 
Österreichischer Rundfunk (para 39); ECJ 6.11.2003 – C-101/01 – ECR 2003, I-12971 = RDV 2004, 
16 – Lindqvist (para 96); ECJ 16.12.2008 – C-524/06 – ECR 2008, I-9705 = RDV 2009, 65 – Huber 
(para 51). 
48 Brühann, Mindeststandards oder Vollharmonisierung des Datenschutzes in der EG, Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2009, 639-644; Forst, Wie viel Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz 
erlaubt die EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie?, Recht der Datenverarbeitung (RDV), 2010, 150-155. 
49 See Britz, Europäisierung des grundrechtlichen Datenschutzes?, Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 2009, 1-11. Another basis for data protection at European level is Art. 6 para. 2 
EU (= Treaty on European Union) in conjunction with Art. 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which protects the right to privacy. Art. 8 
of this Convention is also referred in recital 10 of Directive 95/46/EC.  
50 COM (2010) 609 final (4/11/2010). 
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IV. Main aspects of the bill 
1. General issues 
A. Policy considerations 
The policy of the draft is to foster legal certainty in an important field of 
employment law. The main purpose is of course to protect the interests of the 
employees.51 However, the draft also aims to take care for the interests of the 
employer in particular in ensuring the demands of compliance and in preventing 
corruption.52 It is remarkable that the grounds also emphasize the creation of a 
climate of mutual trust as a goal or at least a result of the Act.53 This may be 
regarded as reference to an economic analysis of data protection regulation and 
notably to the concept that employees are more motivated to perform their work 
with due diligence and loyalty if they are respected as equal partners and not 
treated with distrust. But the grounds refer in this respect neither to conceptual 
nor to empirical analysis. 
A recent inquiry of works councils gives some evidence that excessive 
surveillance of workers is detrimental to the quality of their work performance and 
in the long run to the efficiency of the enterprise.54 This inquiry shows that there is 
a certain correlation between data protection problems and other conflicts in the 
enterprise like disregarding of participation rights, a stressed working atmosphere, 
a poor economic performance and even work stoppage.55 But, as regards the 
interplay between neglecting worker data protection and inefficiency of an 
enterprise it is hard to say what is the chicken and what is the egg. 
B. Structure and main rules and principles 
In respect of the structure first of all it must be noticed that the Act shall not be 
separate but shall be included into the existing Federal Data Protection Act. This 
might cause some uncertainties on the relation between the new specific provisions 
and the general provisions of the Act, although this problem should not be 
overestimated. 
While the amendment in 2009 comprised only one provision the current draft 
provides thirteen rules. These new provisions establish a two-fold system. First, 
the Act makes a distinction between the different periods of the employment 
relationship and differentiates between the period prior to the conclusion of the 
                                                     
51 BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011, p. 12. 
52 BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011, p. 12. 
53 BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011, p. 12. 
54 WSI Report (5/11/2010); available at http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_report_5_10.pdf. 
55 See also Gantt, An Affront to Human Dignity, Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector 
Workplace, 8 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (1995), 345-425 (at 419). 
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employment contract and the period during the employment contract. Secondly, 
the draft combines the two generally possible techniques for regulating a permit: 
On the one hand the bill provides some general clauses.56 On the other hand it 
regulates in a detailed manner under which prerequisites the usage of special 
instruments for monitoring workers shall be lawful, like video surveillance,57 
positioning systems58 and biometric methods,59 which are deemed to be 
exceptionally dangerous to the right to privacy of employees.60 Thus, the draft 
combines more abstract and more concrete rules. The concrete rules shall 
contribute to legal certainty in situations with a high risk of violating the rights of 
workers. The general rules shall apply to all other cases and therefore provide an 
all-over regulation notably for those methods of monitoring employees which are 
not known today. The bill seeks to use the advantages of both manners of 
techniques for regulating permits.61 Finally, the envisaged provisions contain a 
large number of provisions (no less than 18) on the documentation and disclosure 
of the processing of personal data which are to contribute to a high level of 
transparency.62 
According to the fundamental rule of the Federal Data Protection Act as 
mentioned above every kind of collecting, processing or using of personal data is 
prohibited unless it is permitted by law or by consent of the concerned person.63 
This general rule is concretized by some other rules of the draft. Prior to the 
conclusion of the employment contract the employer may collect the name and the 
address of the applicant for a job.64 This seems as a matter of course. But last fall 
the German Ministry for Family Affairs and five large companies (inter alia 
German Mail, German Telekom, Procter and Gamble) started a pilot scheme with 
entirely anonymous applications to avoid any discrimination in the hiring 
procedure because there is some evidence that applicants with Turkish names have 
less chances to get a job than applicants with German names. More important is 
another point: The employer may collect only those other personal data which he 
must know for assessing the ability of the applicant to perform the intended job.65 
In other words, the personal data must be job-related. 
                                                     
56 §§ 32, 32b, 32c, 32d, 32e BDSG-E. 
57 § 32f BDSG-E. 
58 § 32g BDSG-E. 
59 § 32 h BDSG-E. 
60 Additionally the processing of personal data is regulated if these data are generated by using 
communication systems for professional purposes (§ 32i BDSG-E). If communication systems are 
permissibly used by the employee for private goals then media law (Telecommunication Act = 
Telekommunikationsgesetz = TKG) applies. 
61 Thus, it is partial if some scholars state that this mode of regulation cumulates the disadvantages; 
cf. B. Buchner, Betriebliche Datenverarbeitung zwischen Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit, in: 
Festschrift für H. Buchner (2009), 153-162 (at 156 ff.); Franzen, Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz – 
rechtspolitische Perspektiven, Recht der Arbeit (RdA) 2010, 257-263 (at 261). 
62 Cf. BT-Drucksache 17/4230 of 15/12/2011, p. 12 f. 
63 § 4 Abs. 1 BDSG. 
64 § 32 Abs. 1 S. 1 DDSG-E. 
65 § 32 Abs. 1 S. 2 and 3 BDSG-E. 
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In respect of those grounds which are covered by antidiscrimination law (race, 
ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation)66 the draft is 
more rigid in order to prevent circumvention. Personal data may only be collected 
if an unequal treatment based on these grounds exceptionally constitutes no 
discrimination because the strict requirements of antidiscrimination law are met.67 
That means that the existence or non-existence of a characteristic related to one of 
these grounds constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, 
provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. This 
spillover effect of antidiscrimination law on data privacy law is internationally well 
known and for example part of U. S. law too.68 The draft will extend this test to 
the criminal records of an applicant although there is no need for a spillover effect 
of antidiscrimination law. This would apparently modify the case law at hand 
because the Federal Labor Court has required up to now only a job-related reason 
for the question on previous convictions69 while antidiscrimination law is stricter. 
The grounds do not give any explanation to this change of case law.70 
Furthermore the draft refers several times to the principle of proportionality as 
a requirement of collecting, processing or using of personal data.71 This reflects a 
development in case law but so far it is not expressly provided in the Federal Data 
Protection Act. 
C. Effect of the consent of the employee concerned 
As mentioned the Federal Data Protection Act permits in general the processing of 
personal data, if the affected person declares her consent and some additional 
requirements are met.72 In particular this consent must be based on a free decision. 
The draft will depart from this rule and will give effect to the consent only in a 
few cases which are expressly mentioned.73 The reason for this deviance is 
obviously the general distrust of the possibility of free decisions of applicants or 
workers. Some scholars argue that this is not in line with Art. 7 (a) of Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which provides the possibility of a consent, 
because according to the full harmonization-approach of the ECJ74 Member States’ 
law may not derogate from the protection level of Union law.75 On the other hand, 
                                                     
66 According to the German Equal Treatment Act (= Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) of 2006 
as implementation of Directives 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC, 2002/73/EC and 2004/113/EC. 
67 § 32 Abs. 2 BDSG-E. 
68 Cf. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law, 3rd Ed. (2009), p. 217 ff. 
69 BAG 20.5.1999 – 2 AZR 320/98 – BAGE 91, 349 = NZA 1999, 975. 
70 Critically Forst, Der Regierungsentwurf zur Regelung des Beschäftigtendatenschutzes, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2010, 1043-1048 (at 1045). 
71 §§ 32 Abs. 7, 32c Abs. 4, 32d Abs. 1 Nr. 3, Abs. 2 Nr. 1, 32e Abs. 3 S. 1 BDSG-E. 
72 §§ 4 Abs. 1, 4a BDSG. 
73 § 32l Abs. 1 BDSG-E. 
74 See above III 5. 
75 Forst, Wie viel Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz erlaubt die EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie?, Recht der Daten- 
verarbeitung (RDV), 2010, 150-155 (at 152-153); Thüsing, Verbesserungsbedarf beim 
Beschäftigtendatenschutz, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2011, 16-20 (at 18). 
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the provisions in the draft can be seen as an irrefutable presumption that due to 
the subordination of applicants and employees to the employer, unambiguous 
consent also required by the directive will not exist within a hiring procedure or an 
employment relationship. 
2. Selected Problems76 
A. Medical screening 
Inter alia the bill addresses the problem of medical screening of applicants. It 
provides that medical screenings will be only lawful if a particular health status of 
the employee is an essential and determining occupational requirement.77 For 
example the employee shall be sent into the tropics. Furthermore the consent of 
the applicant is necessary. This consent is entirely voluntary. The employer may 
not discriminate against the applicant because of his reluctance to undergo a 
medical screening which is not necessary to assess the ability to perform the job 
although this is not expressly mentioned in the bill. Genetic screenings are 
regulated by a particular Act which came into force in February 2010 and which 
provides that such screenings are generally prohibited, with very few exceptions in 
order to protect the worker himself.78 
B. Video surveillance 
One of the most disputed situations concerns the surveillance of employees with 
video cameras.79 At the moment different rules apply depending on the fact 
whether the observation occurs in publicly accessible areas or non-publicly 
accessible areas.80 
In a nutshell: As regards publicly accessible areas like shops, banks, restaurants 
a special provision of the Federal Data protection Act applies.81 According to this 
provision the surveillance is permitted if there is a sufficient purpose (for example 
prevention of robbery or theft). The surveillance must be appropriate and 
                                                     
76 Due to the limited extent of this paper many other important topics like whistleblowing, 
compliance and enforcement are omitted. 
77 § 32a Abs. 1 BDSG-E. 
78 §§ 19 ff. Act on Genetic Screening of People (= Gendiagnostikgesetz). More details by Fischinger, 
Die arbeitsrechtlichen Regelungen des Gendiagnostikgesetzes, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 
(NZA) 2010, 65-70. Genenger, Begrenzung genetischer Untersuchungen und Analysen im 
Arbeitsrecht, Arbeit und Recht (AuR) 2009, 285-289; Wiese, Genetische Untersuchungen und 
Analysen zum Arbeitsschutz und Rechtsfolgen bei deren Verweigerung oder Durchführung, 
Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2011, 313-317. 
79 The Federal Constitutional Court has decided that each video surveillance affects the right to 
“informational self-determination”; cf. BVerfG 23.2.2007 – 1 BvR 2368/06 – DVBl. 2007, 497 (at 
500). 
80 Comprehensive overview Grimm/Schiefer, Videoüberwachung am Arbeitsplatz, Recht der Arbeit 
(RdA) 2009, 329-344. 
81 § 6b BDSG. 
 Rüdiger Krause 
 
98 
necessary to achieve this purpose and the interests of the employer on the one 
hand and the employees on the other hand must be balanced. Furthermore the 
employer must disclose that the area is under surveillance. In regard to non-
publicly accessible areas only case law applies. So far the Federal Labor Court has 
held that in general an observation must be visible. But a hidden surveillance is 
exceptionally lawful if it is the only instrument to investigate criminal acts.82 
The bill tackles the problem of video surveillance of non-publicly accessible 
areas mainly with three rules:83 First, an observation is only permitted for a 
particular purpose and if the principle of proportionality is regarded. This rule also 
applies in the case of dummies because these devices can influence the behaviour 
of workers too. Secondly, the draft will abolish the exception of hidden 
observation with video cameras completely. In every case the observation must be 
transparent to the employees. Hence, the legislator will make it more difficult to 
convict a worker having committed a theft. Thirdly, video surveillance shall be 
completely prohibited in rooms for personal retreat like restrooms, locker rooms 
and dormitories. 
C. Social Networks 
One of the most relevant aspects of data privacy during the hiring procedure is the 
question of which sources of information the employer may tap. In this way the 
bill breaks new ground and considers the increasing role of the internet. 
As a general rule the draft provides that the employer must collect the data 
directly from the employee.84 Thus, the employee keeps the control of the data 
flow to the employer. This is in line with some conceptions of privacy in the U. S. 
which try to specify and overcome the traditional “right to be let alone”-
approach.85 If an information source is freely accessible (like the internet) then the 
employer can use it if he has given a hint to the employee, for example in a job 
advertisement, and the interests of the applicant in the exclusion of the data do not 
prevail.86 
Special attention is paid to social networks which are playing a growing role in 
the selection of staff. According to an inquiry from 2009 nearly 15% of all 
companies with more than 1,000 employees are using social networks as a source 
of information.87 The bill makes a distinction:88 If a social network is determined to 
                                                     
82 BAG 27.3.2003 – 2 AZR 51/02 – BAGE 105, 356 = NZA 2003, 1193. 
83 § 32f Abs. 1 and 2 BDSG-E. 
84 § 32 Abs. 6 S. 1 BDSG-E. 
85 Cf. Schoeman (Ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (1984); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 
California Law Review (2002), 1087-1155. 
86 § 32 Abs. 6 S. 2 BDSG-E. 
87 Available at: http://www.bmelv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Verbraucherschutz/Internetnutzung 
VorauswahlPersonalentscheidungen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (18/4/2011). 
88 § 32 Abs. 6 S. 3 BDSG-E. See also Forst, Bewerberauswahl über soziale Netzwerke im Internet?, 
Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2010, 427-433; Göpfert/Wilke, Recherchen des Arbeitgebers 
in Sozialen Netzwerken nach dem geplanten Beschäftigtendatenschutzgesetz, Neue Zeitschrift für 
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support the private communication of the members like Facebook then the 
employer may not make investigations. However, if the social network functions as 
a platform for professional self-advertisement (like LinkedIn or Xing) the 
employer may use it. The reason can be seen in the fact that Facebook is often 
used by younger people who are not fully aware of the risks of the internet. 
Furthermore social networks aim to establish non-professional contacts between 
people. It is dysfunctional if an employer uses this kind of network for professional 
goals. If this collecting of information was lawful adverse reactions concerning the 
use of these networks would be possible. Insofar as social networks serve 
professional goals then the employer is allowed to use this source. 
Thus, the provisions concerning social networks can be conceptualized as 
tools to insulate private communication from professional relations. If, for 
example, a pregnant woman who applies for a job cannot be sure that the 
employer does not investigate in Facebook then she will be reluctant to tell all her 
friends that she is pregnant. Hence the draft protects not only the private sphere of 
applicants in a spatial sense89 but also societal communication as a value that shall 
not be affected by the logic of economy.90 
V. Concluding remarks 
Worker data privacy problems are not unique to a particular country. They arise in 
each developed society. Thus comparative law can be useful because each legal 
order has to answer the question whether or not it accepts the right to 
“informational self-determination” of employees and whether or not it qualifies 
collecting and processing of personal data of workers as impairment of this right 
which has to be justified by legitimate purposes. This is in general the approach of 
German law. Or to put it differently: Workers shall not check their rights at the 
door of the factory or the office. 
                                                     
Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2010, 1329-1333; Oberwetter, Soziale Netzwerke im Fadenkreuz des Arbeitsrechts, 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2001, 417-421. 
89 Partial view of privacy as some kind of social isolation Sofsky, Privacy – A manifesto (2008). 
90 Emphasizing the role of “informational self-determination” as an instrument to safeguard 
communication Hoffmann-Riem, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung in der Informationsgesellschaft, 




SECTION 3:   
INTERNET LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
 
 
Korean Netizen Equality in the Shadow of  Real 
Name Verification1 
John M. Leitner 
I. Introduction 
In 2007, the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) became the first nation in the world2 to 
introduce a government-mandated system by which an individual wishing to 
contribute content using popular internet portals must first verify his or her 
identity using a Korean national identification number. This real name verification 
system (the “RNVS” or the “System”) has since been expanded to include a larger 
number of websites.  A case currently pending in the Korean Constitutional Court 
(the “Constitutional Court”)3 has challenged the constitutional validity of the 
System,4 but at the present time it continues to operate as a precondition to 
content contribution in the most trafficked channels of Korean internet life, and as 
a general tool for the official unmasking of netizen identity.5   
                                                     
1 I wish to thank Choi Ko Ya and Yang Li for their excellent research assistance.  I also wish to thank 
Chung Hyungyo for helpfully commenting on this article. 
2 Korea is at the present time the only country with a mandatory nationwide internet user identity 
verification program.  See John Leitner, Identifying the Problem: Korea’s Initial Experience with Mandatory 
Real Name Verification on Internet Portals, 9 J. KOREAN L. 83, 90 (2009). 
3 The Constitutional Court is the Korean high court for adjudication of constitutional law questions.  
See Constitutional Court of Korea, About the Court, http://english.ccourt.go.kr. 
4 2010 Hun-Ma47.  At the time this article was published, a decision in the case was expected shortly.  
For general information about the arguments advanced by the complainants and the respondent, see 
Press Release, Public Relations Department of the Constitutional Court, July 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/storybook/storybook.jsp?seq=30&eventNo=2010헌마47&sch_cod
e=BYUNRON&sch_sel=&sch_txt=&nScale=10&sch_category=&list_type=01). 
5 As explained infra, user identity is not publicly displayed on the internet portal, but the record of the 
particular individual’s identity is retained and can be matched with the corresponding username in the 
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Supporters of the RNVS champion its potential to aid law enforcement in 
policing online expression that may run afoul of a variety of Korean criminal laws.6 
The System also assists potential civil litigation plaintiffs in bringing causes of 
action against netizens for such actions as alleged defamation or contempt.7 
Opponents argue that the System is not only generally ineffective at punishing 
offenders and deterring malign online behaviors, but also infringes on legally 
protected rights of internet users.8  This article develops key arguments on both 
sides of the debate, with a special emphasis on the role of online activities in the 
advancement of individual rights. I argue in particular that the potential for 
anonymity plays a critical role in preserving the potency of cyberspace as a venue 
for promoting the right to equality and to an autonomous private life.   
The article begins by sketching the background of the RNVS, including 
rationales for its creation, technical architecture, and scope of applicability online. 
Next, I describe the implementation of the System and its initial results, followed 
by a discussion of the pending constitutional challenge.  I proceed to consider the 
general relationship between individual “privacy” (critically, for this article, privacy 
of identity) and engagement with the online community, including a discussion of 
major personal freedoms that may be impacted by the enforcement of the System.  
I further address the legal status of privacy in Korea and explore expanded notions 
of the concept in light of issues related to the right of expression and the right of 
equality. I conclude with a reflection on the relationship between government 
incursions into the basic mechanisms of cyberspace participation and the 
experience of individuals in the society. Throughout this article, I seek to elaborate 
upon the following notion: an essentially free cyber community meaningfully 
advances the social equality and personal autonomy of individuals.   A supervised 
and ex ante restricted cyberspace is not just a missed opportunity to promote 
attractive policy, but an affront to individual rights.9 
                                                     
future. This is described in Korea as “restrictive boninhwaginje”, or “restrictive self-identity 
verification”. 
6 Relevant criminalized expressions include certain political expressions, defamation, and contempt.  
See Gukgaboanbeop [National Security Act] (Law No. 10 of 1948; amended by Law No. 5454 of 1997); 
Hyeongbeop [Criminal Act] (Act No. 293, Sep. 18, 1953, amended by Act No. 7623, Jul. 29, 2005), 
arts. 307, 311.  For a detailed analysis of criminal laws in Korea related to expression, see John Leitner, 
To Post or Not to Post: Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression in the Republic of Korea, TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2011). 
7 Defamatory and contemptuous statements can give rise to civil suits for damages and other 
remedies.  See Minbeop [Civil Act] (Act No. 9650, Aug. 9, 2009), art. 764. 
8 Current efforts by opponents of the System utilize a constitutional rights theory in a pending legal 
challenge to the application of the RNVS, as opposed to a serious campaign to advocate for its 
legislative repeal on the basis of policy arguments.  See supra note 4. 
9 By “right”, I refer to an entitlement of a party to act in a particular way.  As I use the concept of a 
“right” in this discussion, the entitlement in question is a right by virtue of the fact that it may be 
legally exercised in a manner that is distinctly anti-majoritarian (exercisable in a manner that a social 
majority disapproves of) and anti-utilitarian (exercisable in a manner that does not produce the 
optimal outcome under a particular calculation of social welfare or utility). See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 268-278 (1977). 
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II. Background of the RNVS10 
The RNVS was introduced into law through an amendment of the Information 
and Communications Network Act, passed on January 26, 2007.11  Under the 
terms of the statute, the Korean president is empowered to decree that websites 
with more than 100,000 users per day must prompt their users to confirm their 
identities using Korean national identification numbers;12 the identifying data is 
preserved and can be matched in the future with the username associated with a 
particular post.13 After previously establishing a less inclusive scope for the 
RNVS,14 the present enforcement decree engages the full scope of the statutory 
grant of authority and applies to all websites with more than 100,000 users per 
day.15  As a further precaution against the existence and continuing public 
availability of legally suspect content, the Information and Communications Act 
provides that internet portals are to respond to complaints of allegedly illegal 
content16 by following certain takedown procedures.17  Legally prescribed 
procedures18 enable government officials, including prosecutors, officials of the 
Korean tax service, and officials of the Korean CIA to obtain information on the 
identities of particular netizens from internet portals.   
The stated justifications for the RNVS advance an objective of improving the 
civility of cyber-etiquette and deterring malign comments, such as those violating 
the laws of defamation, contempt, and tortious invasions of privacy. Cyber-
defamation19 is considered a widespread problem in Korea,20 and famous instances 
                                                     
10 For a more detailed explanation of the design and introduction of the RNVS, see Leitner, supra note 
2, at 90-91. 
11 Jeongbo tongsinmang iyong chokjin mit jeongbo boho deunge kwanhan beopryul [Act on 
Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection] 
(Act No. 8289, Jan. 26, 2007), art. 44-5 (the “Information and Communications Network Act”). 
12 Id. See also Hyung-eun Kim, Do new Internet regulations curb free speech?, JOONGANG DAILY, Aug. 13, 
2008, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577. Individuals who do 
not have a Korean national identification number are effectively prevented from actively engaging 
with the online community through the internet portals subject to the RNVS. The question may be 
posed: does one exist as a person in cyberspace without the capacity for interacting with the online 
community? 
13 See Enforcement Decree of the Information and Communications Network Act (Presidential 
Decree No. 21278, Jan. 28, 2009), art. 30. 
14 See Enforcement Decree of the Information and Communications Network Act (Presidential 
Decree No. 20199, July 27, 2007), art. 22. 
15 This standard is consistent with the parameters authorized by the statute and specified by executive 
enforcement decree.  See Enforcement Decree, supra note 13. 
16 The scope of defamatory materials to be taken down is statutorily specified. Information and 
Communications Network Act, supra note 11, at art. 44-7(1), (2). 
17 The Information and Communications Network Act prescribes that internet portals delete 
obviously offensive posts, while taking down posts of ambiguous legality for 30 days during a review 
period.  Id. at art. 44-2(4). 
18 Jeonki tongsin saob boep [Electronic Telecommunications Business Act] (Act no. 10166, March 
22, 2010), art. 83. 
19 Cyber-defamation is designated as a specific crime under Korean law and is subject to greater 
punishments than defamatory statements made offline. See Information and Communications 
Network Act, supra note 11, at art. 70. 
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of malicious online comments have catalyzed public opinion against the perceived 
menace of objectionable online expression.  In a particularly significant instance, 
the suicide of beloved actress Jin-sil Choi21 in October of 2008 led to speculation 
that her suicidal feelings were shaped to a significant degree by online rumors, 22 
and expansion of the RNVS was expedited following the suicide.23   
Further examination reveals an additional government motivation. Social 
movements organized online have in some cases resulted in notable civic unrest. A 
persistent rumor that American beef could infect consumers with mad cow disease 
triggered growing social fomentation, largely online, culminating in massive 
outdoor demonstrations.24 The Korean government responded to the 
embarrassing and disruptive episodes by seeking new instruments for the 
prevention of at least certain forms of social demonstration.25  One such 
instrument is the RNVS. The advance identification of potential demonstration 
organizers facilitates state interference with or prevention of public spectacles.  In 
defending the need for further online identity-related measures, President Myung-
Bak Lee declared that Korea must counteract “a phenomenon in which inaccurate, 
false information is disseminated; prompting social unrest that spreads like an 
epidemic.”26 
III. Initial Results 
Initial research has produced little evidence of a substantial reduction of legally 
objectionable comments since the introduction of the RNVS. A general survey of 
Korean netizen behavior has found that, contrary to common assumption, the 
rates at which internet user behavior deviates from particular social norms are not 
increased when netizens are acting anonymously, casting doubt upon the promise 
                                                     
20 The Korean police reported 10,028 cases of online libel in 2007, a substantial increase from the 
3,667 cases reported in 2004.  Sang-hun Choe, Korean Star’s Suicide Reignites Debate on Web Regulation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/technology/internet/13suicide.html. 
21 In Korea, family surnames are stated first, followed by the individual’s given name.  In this article, I 
adopt the western practice for the reader’s convenience, except in footnote references, where I follow 
the convention used by the source publication. 
22 See, e.g., Sang-hun Choe, Web Rumors Tied to Korean Actress’s Suicide, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/world/asia/03actress.html?em; Choi Jin-sil, 
Akpeuli Jukyeotda Dongryo·Netizen Kongbun [Negative replies kill Choi], SportsKhan, Oct. 2, 2008, 
available at 
http://sports.khan.co.kr/news/sk_index.html?cat=view&art_id=200810022225376&sec_id=562901. 
23 See Lee Tee Jong, Seoul Rushes Internet Bill, The Straits Times, Oct. 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_289173.html; Tong-Hyung 
Kim, More Limits Planned on Internet Anonymity, Korea Times, Oct. 3, 2008,  
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/10/123_32121.html. 
24 See Jin-seo Cho, Portals Turning Into Rumor Mills?, KOREA TIMES, May 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/05/123_24189.html. 
25 See Michael Fitzpatrick, South Korean government looks to rein in the Net, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/business/worldbusiness/05iht-sknet.html. 
26 Id. 
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of enforcing notions of civility through identity verification.27  A study concerned 
with assessing the impact of the RNVS examined comments and replies on a 
popular internet portal’s bulletin boards. The study found that the number of total 
comments decreased after the introduction of the RNVS, but the proportional 
share of defamatory comments did not decrease.28   
A Korea Communications Commission study29 of the first phase of the 
introduction of the RNVS found that there was a decrease in the rate of malign 
internet posts30 from 15.8% to 13.9%.31  This study provides the most favorable 
results to date of the RNVS’s effectiveness.  The law has produced, at best, 
marginally improved protection of private reputation. 
Initial Korean government analysis suggested that the RNVS has not had a 
“chilling effect” on Korean expression through the internet because its study 
indicated that the number of internet posts on Korean internet portals has 
remained consistent or increased since the System was introduced.32  However, this 
fact does not establish a lack of chilling effect, as the introduction of the RNVS 
may have prevented an increase in posting that may have otherwise occurred.33  
Furthermore, statistics alone do not reveal the content of expression that is made 
(or not made) through the internet, and it is possible that certain kinds of speech, 
such as speech regarding sensitive but socially important subjects, has been 
reduced.34   
                                                     
27 Yong-suk Hwang, Internet Kesipan Silmyeongjee Daehan Bipanjeok Yeongu [Critical Approach to the 
Implementation of Real-Name system on Bulletin Board of the Internet], 15 EONRONKWA SAHWE [PRESS AND 
SOC’Y] 97, 108 (2007). 
28 Jisuk Woo et al., Internet kaeshipan shilmyeongjaeui hyokwae daehan siljeung yeongu: Jaehanjukboninhwakinjae 
sihenge ddaren kaeshipan nae keulsseuki haengui mit bibangkwa yokseului byeonhwareul jungsimeuro [An Empirical 
Analysis of the Effect of Real-name System on Internet Bulletin Boards: Focusing on How the Real-name System and 
Users’ Characteristics Influence the Use of Slanderous Comments and Swear Words], 20-21, 
Hengjeongnonchong Vol. 48(1), Seoul Daehakgyo Hangukhengjeongyeonguso [Seoul National 
University Korean Administration Institute] (2009). 
29 This study evaluated the rate of malign reply; sought to gauge the “chilling effect” of the law, or the 
degree, if any, to which it discouraged use of the internet; and also attempted to measure the “balloon 
effect,” or the degree, if any, to which the law caused netizens to switch from using large internet 
portals subject to the RNVS to smaller ones not subject to the requirement.  
Bangsongtongsinwiwonhoe [Korea Communications Commission], Jaehanjeok boninhwakinjae 
hyogwabunseokeul wihan josa bogoseo [Analysis of the Effect of Limited Real Name Verification], October 2007, 
1-2.  The study asserted that because the number of internet posts and the popularity of large internet 
portals remained constant, no chilling effect or balloon effect was observable.  Id. at 18-20. 
30 The term used to describe these messages in the study is “Akseongdaetgeul,” translated here as 
“malign”. The study defines the term to include libel, sexual harassment, invasion of privacy, and 
contempt. Id. at 9. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 18. 
33 This possibility is supported by the fact that, since the introduction of the RNVS, the number of 
Korean internet users has significantly increased, while the number of posts on portals has been 
stagnant. An alternative explanation, however, may be that internet portals are becoming less favored 
as sites of online expression, bypassed by some users in favor of alternatives like social networking 
sites.   
34 As I argue, infra, the RNVS impacts particular individuals and groups disproportionately, more 
greatly deterring their expressive and associative activities and obstructing their opportunities for 
more equal status in the society. 
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As a further practical matter, the RNVS is susceptible to “leakage” concerns.  
Sites outside of the jurisdiction of the Korean government, such as sites based in 
other nations, may provide an attractive alternative to Korean users who are not 
comfortable with revealing their identity information online.  A specific illustration 
of leakage has arisen within Korea’s own jurisdictional boundaries.  The Google-
owned website YouTube permits registered users35 to upload videos that can then 
be streamed by anyone who accesses the website.  Registered users can also post 
comments about a particular video, which are displayed below the video box on 
the computer screen. Google maintains a Korea-based subsidiary that 
administrates, amongst other properties, the Korean version of the YouTube site.36  
Google objected to the RNVS as compromising user anonymity in a manner 
inconsistent with its vision of online freedom.37  Google interpreted the law to 
only apply to the Korean version of the YouTube site, and so it deactivated the 
uploading and commenting features for individuals whose country preference is set 
to “South Korea” in order to avoid a legal obligation to participate in the RNVS.  
When YouTube is accessed from a Korea-based IP address, the front page 
contains a message explaining the limited functionality of the Korean page and 
offering a “one-click” conversion of the user’s preference to the U.S. 
While many instances of “leakage” may be largely conjectural or at least 
difficult to gauge, the case of YouTube provides a vivid illustration of the practical 
limitations of the RNVS.  Migration to the use of Google products for a variety of 
online activities, including blogging38 and other methods of creating online 
content, has become an increasingly popular method for individuals in Korea to 
remain anonymous.39  Given the means available to a party who intends to defame 
another online, including the use of someone else’s identification number,40 the 
RNVS is particularly unlikely to prevent the most premeditated and organized acts 
of defamation.41 
                                                     
35 YouTube requires users wishing to post content to provide certain personal information, but the 
only verified information is access to the email address that is provided. 
36 See kr.youtube.com. 
37 Google’s protection of user anonymity is not absolute.  Google’s privacy policy states that it will 
share information with third parties when “[w]e have a good faith belief that access, use, preservation 
or disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, 
legal process or enforceable governmental request…”  Google Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, 
http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html. 
38 Google provides its “Blogger” service (www.blogger.com) to Korean users.  So far, it has not 
qualified for inclusion as an internet portal within the scope of the RNVS due to an insufficient 
number of daily users, but the site could be the source of future conflict with the Korean government 
if its popularity continues to grow. 
39 See Tong-hyun Kim, Google Avoids Regulations, Korean Portals Not so Lucky, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2009, available at  
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/tech_view.asp?newsIdx=43939&categoryCode=129 
40 A google.com search conducted by the Korean Information Security Agency produced well over a 
hundred thousand Korean ID numbers that could be obtained for free online.  Google Exposing 
Thousands of Korean ID Numbers, CHOSUNILBO, Sept. 22, 2008, available at 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200809/200809220010.html. 
41 Provocative research already exists suggesting that instances of online defamation have not been 
curbed by the introduction of the RNVS.  See Woo et al., supra note 28, at 20-21. 
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IV. Constitutional Court Challenge 
On January 25, 2010, three Korean citizens filed a constitutional complaint arguing 
that the RNVS violates several of their constitutional rights.  The complainants 
asserted that they desired to post expressions on a number of Korea-based 
websites, including ohmynews.com and ytn.co.kr, but were unable to do so 
because they were unwilling to comply with the RNVS.  Oral arguments in the case 
were heard by the Constitutional Court on July 8, 2010;42 a decision is expected 
imminently.43 
The complainants argued44 that their freedom of expression was violated by 
the RNVS, in particular their freedom to express anonymously.45  They argued 
further that the law effectively imposes prior restraint, a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition on censorship.46  The complainants claimed that the 
RNVS violates the least restrictive means principle47 and improperly undervalues 
individual private interest against the public interest.48  As an alternative theory, the 
complainants asserted that the high risk of information leakage poses a threat to 
privacy grave enough to threaten the constitutional right to privacy, defined in 
Constitutional Court precedent as the right to freedom of a private life and the 
freedom to control one’s own personal information.49  Finally, a theory of equality 
was presented, alleging unequal treatment between those seeking to express 
themselves on the internet and those utilizing any other medium, where no 
equivalent name verification requirement operates. 
The respondent50 argued that the RNVS requirement is an appropriate means 
of achieving justified government purposes. The purposes advanced included 
promoting a more responsible and respectful online space for public expression 
and stimulating more use of online bulletin boards by lessening the apprehension 
                                                     
42 See supra note 4. 
43 The decision in this case had not been made at the time this article was published, and pursuant to 
Constitutional Court practice, the date of decision is not publicly announced in advance. 
44 See id. 
45 Under the Constitution of Korea (the “Constitution”), citizens have a right to freedom of speech, 
but such speech shall not violate the honor or rights of other persons or undermine public morals or 
social ethics. Heonbeop [Constitution], art. 21 (S. Korea), translated at 
http://korea.assembly.go.kr/board/down.jsp?boarditemid=1000000155&dirname=/eng_data/1000
000155E1.pdf. 
46 Id. at art. 21(2). 
47 For a discussion of the special status (to utilize non-Korean parlance, “heightened scrutiny”) that 
freedom of expression formally receives under Korean law, see 89Hun-Ma165, 3 KCCR 518, 534 
(Sept. 16, 1991). 
48 The rights of citizens may be restricted by the government when such restrictions are necessary for 
national security, maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare.  The Constitution asserts that 
such restrictions cannot violate the “essential aspect” of the right in question.  Constitution, supra 
note 45, at art. 37. 
49 See 99Hun-Ba92, 2000Hun-Ba39, 2000Hun-Ma167 · 168 · 199 · 205 · 280 (consolidated), 13(2) 
KCCR 174, 203 (Aug. 30, 2001). 
50 In this dispute, the Korean Broadcasting Commission, a government agency within the Korea 
Communications Commission, defended the law as the respondent. 
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of individuals that they will be treated in an illegal manner by other netizens.51  The 
respondent asserted that, because the identity of the posting individual is not 
displayed in public view on the internet portal, her interest in anonymous 
expression is not violated, and the policy does not violate either a “least restrictive 
means” or “balance of private and public interest” test.52  The defense argued that 
the formal requirements for legally proscribed prior censorship were not met in 
this case.  The fact that posting is voluntary was argued by the defense to negate 
the claim of a privacy right violation. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court is expected shortly.  The outcome of 
the complaint can hardly be predicted, but in the following discussion I offer 
briefly my own assessment of the merits of the case.   
As a matter of legal principle, the plaintiffs should succeed on their claim of 
freedom of expression.  The RNVS requirement imposes an affirmative obligation 
and, in many cases, an actual and “chilling” burden on essentially all the members 
of Korean cyber-society, many of whom are also rights-holding citizens of Korea.  
In the face of this limitation to individual rights, the state offers only general 
notions of a state interest in an attractive and widely used cyberspace.  On the 
former consideration, of desirable internet culture, the state advances a speculative 
vision of promoting, if tenuously, certain characteristics of what the government 
defines as preferred internet etiquette.  If this government interest is accepted as a 
legitimate basis for limiting individual rights, it is a broad and dangerous one.  A 
further question of the nature of individual rights is also raised. Is the “right” in 
question that is to be limited a legal entitlement at all, if a roughly sketched notion 
of attractive social behavior in a particular public forum is a legitimate basis for 
limiting the right?  As for the latter consideration, of promoting the widespread use 
of the internet as a forum for expression, the fact that the RNVS has arguably 
reduced the total quantity of online expression that would otherwise have occurred 
indicates that the law is inappropriate for advancing this public interest. 
I argue below that the RNVS also violates meaningful individual rights to 
privacy and equality.  The arguments of the complainants did not capture the full 
scope and applications of these two legal theories,53 but a nuanced and 
                                                     
51 The respondent analogized the case to a recent precedent, 2008Hun-Ma324, 2009Hun-Ba31 
(consolidated), 161 KCCG 595 (Feb. 25, 2010), in which complainants challenged a law that requires 
“internet news sites” to verify the names of individuals posting politically relevant content during a 
several week period preceding elections.  The sites are required to delete posts where the author has 
not verified her real name.  The Constitutional Court, after considering claims that the law was void 
for vagueness, constituted prior censorship, violated the least restrictive means principle, and 
compromised privacy, upheld the law. 
52 Balancing interests under Korean law reflects a distinctly utilitarian character.  According to the 
Korean Supreme Court, “When the protection of a person’s reputation and the freedom of 
expression are in conflict, how the two rights should be mediated depends on the comparison of 
various social interests by comparing the benefit of free expression and the values achieved through 
the protection of personal rights.” 85Da-Kha29, Gong 1988.11.15. (836), 1393 (October 11, 1988). 
53 The complainants’ equality theory is particularly formalistic and subject to a powerful rebuttal.  The 
state may contend that, in the absence of the RNVS, online speakers conceal themselves behind a veil 
of anonymity that is generally not available to offline speakers, where identity concealment is often 
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contextualized consideration of equality and privacy leads to the conclusion that 
the RNVS cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy that is protective of 
these individual rights. I begin with a general discussion of privacy, an often 
nebulous concept in many legal systems that can and should be seen to operate 
actively to promote the “human dignity” that the Constitution purports to protect 
absolutely.54  I then synthesize the “autonomy” notion of privacy with the right of 
equality.  Understood to go beyond facial neutrality and to seek deeper fairness on 
the level of social status, the individual right of equality forms a powerful basis for 
a social duty to defend the equal rights potentials of a free and open cyberspace.55 
V. Reflection on Privacy and the Rights of “Netizens” 
The concept of “privacy” is by its nature a varying and indefinite one, perpetually a 
moving target in philosophical and legal analysis.  To clarify the meaning of this 
concept as it pertains to the System, several general variables should be isolated 
and discussed.56  Firstly, is a violation of “privacy” conditioned on particular kinds 
of affirmative actions external to the individual, such as the acquisition, 
dissemination, and compilation of private data by third parties?  Or, alternatively, 
should privacy be understood from the subjective perspective of the individual, 
such as a person’s perception of whether her or she exists in a “private” sphere 
with certain privacy-related characteristics, such as freedom from observation or 
interference, freedom of choice and action, or a sense of well-being?  These two 
perspectives are inevitably closely interrelated.  For instance, a lapse of “data 
privacy” (such as non-consensual dissemination of a person’s health information) 
of which the subject is aware might in many cases have as one result an impact on 
the affected individual’s personal view of his or her privacy.  However, in principle, 
data privacy is compromised independently of the individual’s knowledge or 
particular concern. In the latter sense of privacy as personal perception-based, 
privacy may be compromised in a variety of settings, which may not be as clearly 
specifiable or linked to identified external triggers as cases of wrongful data 
dissemination. 
                                                     
difficult or simply not possible.  A widely accessible expressive forum with almost universal 
anonymity (barring ex post identification) is a unique result of the rise of cyberspace public discourse, 
and a particularized government policy may be either a rational distinction in treatment of online and 
offline speakers or, more dramatically, an effective rectification of a previously “unequal” 
arrangement. 
54 Under the Constitution, “All citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth…” 
Constitution, supra note 45, at art. 10. 
55 While rights are generally discussed in terms of prohibition of government actions that offend 
those rights by obstructing the legal exercise of an individual entitlement, it may be argued that the 
state has a duty to act affirmatively to promote a state of greater vindication of individual rights.  This 
possibility is referenced in “Equality/Autonomy Approach”, infra, although the approach presented 
in this article is not conditioned upon acceptance of a theory of positive rights. 
56 I provide a synopsis of existing Korean privacy law, infra, but my objective here is to discuss 
general parameters for thinking about privacy. 
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As a second consideration, assume that privacy is understood at least in part 
from the standpoint of the individual’s personal conception and experience.  What 
standard for personal privacy might be adopted?  One definition of privacy, or an 
element of the definition, is privacy as concealment of certain aspects of life from 
uninvited members of the public.57  This notion is often associated with privacy as 
rooted in “place”, such as the privacy right identified in certain American Supreme 
Court precedents as “emanating” from the Bill of Rights.58  The idea, for instance, 
that a personal home is sacred, and that outside intrusion, including by the 
government, must be prevented or minimized,59 is the archetypical notion of 
privacy as place-based and concealment-based.  However, privacy can potentially 
be far more complicated.  Why are certain personal decisions, such as the decision 
of a woman to have an abortion procedure60 or the decision of a person to engage 
in a homosexual relationship,61 categorized in American law as relating to a 
“privacy right”?62  In such cases, the analysis does not depend on whether the 
activities related to these decisions can be concealed in a private place, but rather 
whether the decision itself, even if observable and potentially publicly known, is by 
its nature a “private” one that a dignified person must be free to make for herself.63 
This notion of privacy is not based primarily on a particular private place,64 but 
rather on aspects of human life that must be controlled by the individual through a 
private process independent of government proscription or coercion.  Such a 
privacy right is often constructed out of the notion of “liberty”;65 as I suggest infra, 
                                                     
57 This may seem similar to the previous discussion of information obtained and disseminated by 
third parties.  Here, however, the key is not the acts external to the individual, but rather the feeling 
and perception of freedom from observation. 
58 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-
522 (1961) (Justice Harlan, dissenting). 
59 Compare Constitution, supra note 45, at art. 16 (“All citizens shall be free from intrusion into their 
place of residence”) with U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated…”). 
60 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
61 See Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
62 I illustrate notions of privacy using examples from American law to illustrate, within an inter-
jurisdictional context, the complexities of “privacy” as an identified and substantive legal right. 
63 The assertion of this constitutional right to privacy has long been controversial.  For just one 
famous illustration, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973). 
64 However, in Lawrence, the Supreme Court did reference the notion of the home as “the most 
private of places”.  Lawrence, supra note 61, at 567. 
65 In American law, it is asserted in precedent that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment 
protects liberty that encompasses personal control over certain intimate decisions.  See Casey, supra 
note 60, at 851(stating “Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education… These 
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”). 
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the notion of “autonomy”, as related to the broader principle of equality, is more 
useful in clarifying the nature of this privacy right. 
In light of the social value of free expression, the concept of “privacy” in the 
online space becomes more complicated.  Proponents of the RNVS correctly 
assert that individuals have an interest in the protection of their private “personal 
rights”, 66 such as reputation and freedom from defamation.67  However, 
individuals also have an interest in privacy in a different sense, that is, in 
maintaining an anonymous profile online for the purposes of utilizing legitimate 
expressive and associative opportunities while being insulated from the possibility 
of stigma or suppression.68  While some have questioned the value of anonymous 
expression, examples of the value of anonymity include the sharing of sensitive 
information regarding personal health issues, matters of personal and sexual 
identity,69 and politically controversial topics.   
The Constitution explicitly protects the reputation of Korean individuals, but 
reputation concerns weigh on both sides of this debate.  The right of reputation 
surely contains the interest of the individual to be free from defamation, contempt, 
or other “malign” statements impugning her character.  On the other hand, this 
reputation right should also be understood to include personal influence over the 
inputs of reputation.  Integral to that influence is power over the public identity 
that the individual creates in both the offline and online worlds. 
Some may find the assertion that the RNVS violates an individual right to 
privacy to be a specious one. Taking the notion of privacy as data dissemination-
based, where the right or interest in question is violated when data is shared 
impermissibly, the RNVS appears to present no immediate violation of a “privacy 
right”.70  Privacy as personal and place-based may also seem little-compromised by 
the RNVS: does one have an expectation of privacy in cyberspace, and does the 
revelation of identity represent a violation of any privacy right that may exist 
                                                     
66 See, e.g., Wan Choung, Cyberpokryeokui Pihaesiltaewa Daeeungbangan [A Legal Study of Cyber Violence], 13 
PIHAEJAHAKYEONGU [KOREAN J. OF VICTIMOLOGY] 329, 347-48 (2005).  Professor Choung 
describes “in-gyeok kwon”, translated here as “personal rights”, as requiring the protection provided 
by such policies as the RNVS. 
67 This is made explicitly clear in the text of the Constitution, which states: “Neither speech nor the 
press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics.”  
Constitution, supra note 45, at art. 21(4). 
68 As stated by the United States Supreme Court, “Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize the oppressive practices and laws either anonymously 
or not at all... It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive 
purposes.” Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1960). 
69 See Jisuk Woo and Jae-Hyup Lee, The Limitations of “Information Privacy” in the Network 
Environment, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 28-29 (2006) (citing David J. Phillips, Negotiating the 
Digital Closet: Online Pseudonyms and the Politics of Sexual Identity, 5 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 406 
(2002)). 
70 As a practical matter, the security of gathered identity information has been questioned, providing 
an opportunity for complainants to challenge the RNVS on a data dissemination theory.  See, e.g., Kim 
Jung Wan, Leaked Personal Information Prevalent, Real Name Verification Should be Repealed [Kaeinjungbo 
Yoochul Wonhyung Internet Shilmyungjae Paejidueya], Boan News, September 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=22766&kind=1.  
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online?  However, if privacy is understood to encompass personal decisions and 
independent life behaviors, the RNVS becomes more troubling as a matter of legal 
principle. 
1. Privacy and the Nature of Interactions 
Online activities potentially and actually fill substantial roles in personal decision-
making and the interaction between individuals and various communities within 
society. The interactive and geographic barrier-defiant nature of the internet 
facilitates the development of intimate and essential life experiences in cyberspace.  
The availability of online anonymity, and the related potential for construction and 
reconstruction of personal identity, facilitates meaningful additional opportunities 
for self-realization online.  It may be tempting to focus on negative applications of 
online anonymity, but I would like to suggest two categories of cases of 
individually vital (and socially valuable) social activities that are centrally or 
exclusively conducted on the internet and are substantially bolstered by the 
availability of anonymity.   
A. Activities Significantly Facilitated by the Online Medium   
Various activities that are possible and occur on some level in traditional physical 
forums may be significantly facilitated and expanded by the availability of online 
interaction. For example, participation in organizations or less formal social 
settings involving the exchange of sensitive and personal information, which may 
reveal private details about an individual, may be much enhanced by online 
collaboration.  Individuals seeking to discuss health conditions, religious and other 
belief-based affinities, or controversial (if legal) lifestyle choices, may find far 
greater opportunities for meaningful interaction in cyberspace.   
B. Activities Only Possible Online 
In some of the above cases, the activity in question may only be likely to occur 
online, due to physical-world obstacles. However, it is at least theoretically possible 
for the activity to happen on some scale in the physical world, and fundamentally 
these are endeavors of the sort that may happen and have happened in offline life. 
Distinguishable are those forms of interaction and engagement that exist and are 
understood and defined in terms of the online space.  The essence, and not just 
form and venue, of the activity is defined by its online character. The most 
dramatic illustration may be the idea of a “second life”, in which an individual 
constructs an online identity that may or may not closely resemble the individual’s 
identity in the physical world, in the form of an online avatar.   
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My contention is not that any particular personal lifestyle choice related to 
public identity is necessarily and unambiguously good.71  Rather, my contention is 
that the discretion to “space-shift” activities online or, more dramatically, to create 
and cultivate cyber-personae and engage in other novel online pursuits, is central 
to a free and independent life in a modern, developed society.  Beginning with the 
underlying principle that individuals are free to pursue an independent life and that 
privacy contains the freedom to make intimate lifestyle and persona-development 
choices, the contextualized application of this principle in a technologically 
advanced society must include a robust conception of online freedom. 
In cyberspace, the threshold question of existence is, does an individual have 
[high-speed] internet access? In a society employing a mandatory system of real 
name verification, the further question must be posed: does an individual have the 
means to directly contribute to and interact with the online community?  The 
common characteristic of the internet activities described above is the actively 
participatory nature of the individual’s engagement online. To limit a particular 
individual to the status of passive observer and recipient of online culture, and not 
a semiotic collaborator, is arguably to deny that person “existence in cyberspace”. 
At a minimum, the individual has a profoundly unequal and deprived status in 
cyberspace due to lack of capacity to engage. The RNVS deprives some individuals 
of any opportunity to participate in certain channels online, and poses to all others 
the choice between unmasking their identity to the government or else not 
participating in those channels. All individuals face potential limitation of their 
freedom for development of online identities, and the impact is greatest for those 
individuals who are already marginalized and stigmatized in the offline world (and 
who would most directly benefit from the liberating status of online anonymity). 
2. Privacy and Empowering Personal Freedoms in Korea 
“Privacy” may be identified as an independent and sufficient basis for a rights-
based claim under Korean law, but the meaning and substance of “privacy” 
concerns as a rights claim are imbued by other legal principles.  In Korea, privacy 
is interpreted to contain three rights-related components: the protection of secret 
private information from being revealed (private facts and facts likely to cause 
social misunderstandings); the protection of freedom of privacy (a zone of privacy 
from which the outside world can be excluded); and a right to control the manner 
in which personal information is disseminated.72  Construed this way, Korean 
                                                     
71 A single answer to the question of to what ends discretion will be channeled is never possible. 
Some online personae, as cultivated and advanced online, are bullies or thieves. This observation 
does not seem, on its face, to distinguish the experience of cyberspace from the experience of offline 
communities in the physical world. 
72See supra note 49.  The first two conceptions of privacy are understood as “passive” (where the 
individual can exercise the freedom to preserve the status quo of private information and places), 
while the third is described as “active” (where the individual can control or influence particular 
channels and manners of information distribution that are being engaged). 
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privacy is rooted in privacy of place and secrecy of information.  Both notions 
arguably lack a clear connection to the privacy of interacting in cyberspace in a 
manner that involves the utilization of public and shared space and the potential 
voluntary revelation of at least some forms of personal information.  Understood 
in this light, the constitutional right to privacy as place-protective provides little or 
no legal succor to those objecting to the RNVS; the data-dissemination dimension 
of the privacy right may be implicated, but the arguable remedy for the threat of 
data security breaches is ex post litigation to address liability and damages, not an 
ex ante finding of a constitutional violation.  Might other rights-based objections 
be available?  I offer as a specific and relatively straightforward example concerns 
related to freedom of expression, before briefly sketching a broader equality 
framework for safeguarding online freedoms, including netizen anonymity. 
A. Expression  
The specter of suppression of expression exists in all societies at all times, leading 
to the insight that anonymous expression may play a vital role in sustaining and 
nourishing social discourse when application of state coercion might otherwise be 
stifling.  This is particularly pressing, and may be most probable to occur, in 
matters of political and social conflict-related expression.  A recent case in Korea 
provides a poignant example.  Dae-sung Park was a widely read blogger on 
financial issues who posted his writings under the internet alias “Minerva”.73  Mr. 
Park, whose “Minerva” identity gained fame after Park pseudonymously predicted 
the demise of the bank Lehman Brothers, was arrested on January 7, 2009.74  He 
was accused of posting online speculation regarding Korean monetary policy.75  
The prosecution alleged that these speculations were false and that Mr. Park spread 
the rumor with the intent to damage public interest, in violation of the Electronic 
Communication Fundamental Law.76  He was acquitted by the Seoul Central District 
Court on April 20, 2009.77  The legal provision in question was recently declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.78  The Court concluded that the 
                                                     
73 Minerva is the goddess of wisdom in Roman mythology (known in Greek mythology as Athena). 
74 See Christian Oliver, Financial Blogger Arrested in South Korea, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/092a99ca-ddab-11dd-87dc-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1; see 
also Jane Han, Foreigners Puzzled over Park’s Arrest, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, available at 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2009/01/123_37648.html. 
75 See Ju-min Park and John M. Glionna, Case of Internet Economic Pundit Minerva Roils South Korea, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/16/world/fg-korea-minerva16. 
76 Jeonki tongsin kibonbeop [Electronic Communication Fundamental Act], Act No. 9780, art. 47(1) 
states: 
A person spreading a false rumor maliciously intending to damage the public interest by using an 
electronic machine can be sentenced to imprisonment for under five years or given a fine of under 
50,000,000 won.  
77 S. Korean Court Finds “Minerva” Not Guilty, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/113_43467.html.   
78 2008Hun-Ba157, 2009Hun-Ba88 (consolidated) (Dec. 28, 2010), available at http://www. 
ccourt.go.kr/home/view2/xml_content_view02.jsp?seq=10&cname=결정문&eventNo=2008헌바1
57&pubflag=2&eventnum=25749&sch_keyword=&cid=01010002. 
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intent element of the crime, which is based upon a purpose of harming the public 
interest, is too vague.  The intent element failed to provide the legal clarity 
necessary for a restriction on freedom of expression and generally violated the legal 
principle of nulla poena sine lege.79  While the decision is, on its face, an 
advancement of the protection of individual rights, the holding itself is narrow.  It 
is unconstitutionally vague to ask courts to divine intent by a defendant to damage 
public interest, but this legal defect has limited applications in other cases, 
including the challenge to the RNVS.  In fact, it seems entirely possible that the 
National Assembly could modify the language of the statute to satisfy the 
vagueness objection, potentially reinstating a similar proscription on expression. 
Expression-related considerations may be the most obvious difficulties raised 
by the RNVS, but their significance is heightened and clarified in the context of 
other, and I argue more foundational, legal rights.  I propose as an alternative a 
rights framework of equality/autonomy as a critique of the RNVS.  In this context, 
respecting the “right of anonymous online expression” also respects, on an 
essential level, the basic equality and autonomy of the members of the society. 
B. Equality/Autonomy Approach 
At its most sweeping and ambitious, cyberspace creates the potential for 
dramatically improved degrees of equality amongst individuals.  Taking for a 
moment the notion of equality as equal access to and sharing of a benefit, a form 
of “equal treatment”, internet high-speed access via an uncensored network 
provides (in general and thus far) equal online access to each end user.  Based on 
the low barriers to content contribution through various online channels, equal 
access also means equal opportunities to interact with and contribute to the body 
of publicly available shared content. Surely, there is no guarantee that any 
particular content will receive equal exposure to an audience or equal readership or 
viewership.  However, the fact remains that the channel of expression is open, a 
perpetual soapbox in the public square, whether or not anyone is listening to the 
particular speaker.   
Access to high-speed internet is a central assumption of the view of cyberspace 
as a resource and community of equal accommodation.  The assumption is 
certainly violated in every society, as ubiquitous network access does not exist in 
any particular society (Korea is one of the nations that comes closest80).  Network 
access introduces a crude and general division (between the class of individuals 
with access to high-speed internet and those without access) with a distinctly socio-
economic dynamic.  Within the class of individuals that does have access, however, 
                                                     
79 This maxim roughly translates as “no penalty without law”.  
80 Some studies have found Korea to have the world’s highest internet access rate.  See S. Korea Tops 
OECD in Internet Penetration, KOREA TIMES, June 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/06/123_26007.html; OpenNet Initiative: South 
Korea, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/south-korea (May 10, 2007); Rob Frieden, Lessons from 
Broadband Development in Canada, Japan, Korea and the United States, 29 Telecomm. Pol’y 595, 597 (2005). 
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cyberspace represents a sphere of existence free from (or at least freer from) socio-
economic inequalities and social constraints.  Equality is often understood in terms 
of formally equal treatment from the government, with a special focus on equality 
of basic political participation.81  The government cannot engage in actions that 
impermissibly exclude citizens from the political process.   
This conception of equality, focused on political participation and perhaps the 
rejection of many forms of facial statutory or regulatory distinctions based on 
demographic group, is an inadequate elaboration of the concept of equality in a 
modern, developed democracy.  It should not be accepted, and a more robust 
vision of equality should be pursued. 82  The RNVS presents a particularly stark 
example of obstructing an opportunity for greater social equality.  The equality 
captured by cyberspace is, by its nature, potentially one of equal access to the tools 
that can achieve uniquely personality-affirming and lifestyle-liberating potentials.  
The opportunity exists for the avoidance or mitigation of stigmas, attaching to 
individuals or groups, because of an exemption from those social constructs that 
impose stigmas and burdens.  In the case of Korea, for instance, where individuals 
of a non-heterosexual orientation frequently find it difficult or impossible to reveal 
their orientation,83 the anonymous and geographic obstacle-negating characteristics 
of cyberspace may prove vital to self-expression, sharing of experiences, and the 
elaboration of personal identity. 
Another brief example may be illustrative.  Korea imposes a variety of express 
restrictions on political expression, as codified in such statutes as the National 
Security Act.84  Individuals who engage in purely abstract political expression may 
risk prosecution, even at the present time.85 This issue may be understood in terms 
of a debate over freedom of expression, which in Korea is conducted according to 
the weighing of individual liberty interests against social stability and security 
interests, as discussed supra.  But might this case present a question of equality?  
Does the society treat its citizens as equal, not just in terms of neutral application 
of laws, but with an awareness of the disparate impact of the laws on differently 
                                                     
81 Even confining one’s focus to equality of political participation, the RNVS is problematic in its 
impact on individual expression regarding political and social issues. 
82 The Constitutional Court recognizes a theoretical “hierarchy” of rights, determined according to 
the necessity and importance of the right in question in advancing human dignity.  According to the 
Court, “Freedom of expression is the foundation for the existence and development of a democratic 
country, and therefore one of the characteristics of modern constitution is that this freedom enjoys a 
‘superior status’.”  89Hun-Ma165, 3 KCCR 518, 534 (Sept. 16, 1991). 
83 For example, at Seoul National University, the national university of Korea, undergraduate students 
involved in a student gay-lesbian-bisexual journal work from an undisclosed office location and write 
pseudonymously.   
84 National Security Act, supra note 6. 
85 In one recent example, a sociology professor was prosecuted for his comment that America was to 
blame for joining the Korean War and preventing North Korea from uniting the peninsula under a 
single communist regime.  Jung Eunjung, Violation of National Security Law by Professor Kang Jungku, 
Sentenced to 2 years of Imprisonment and 3 years of Probation, [Kukbobeob Uiban Kang Jung Ku kyosu 
jingyoek2nyun, jiphengyuye3nyun seongo], HERALD KYUNGJAE, May 26, 2006, available at 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=016&aid=00002098
79. 
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situated individuals?  Does the law accord to each citizen an equal degree of 
respect and, to utilize the language of the Constitutional Court, “dignity”? The 
government has an obligation not to obstruct the equality of citizens through the 
creation and enforcement of policies that violate the principle that individuals be 
treated as equals.86  The ability to articulate at least abstract philosophical views is 
not only a question of expression, but also of the individual’s entitlement to be 
regarded as politically and socially equal to other members of the society.  The 
inequality underpinning this legislation is the suppression and marginalization of 
members of the society based upon their beliefs and their desire, in the absence of 
criminal sanction, to develop their public persona in the context of those beliefs. 
The logistically simple but, practically speaking, presently impossible87 
rectification for this particular injustice is the repeal of at least certain provisions of 
the National Security Act.  Expanded and continuous public debate of this law, 
and potentially further public impact lawsuit adjudication, is in order.  In the 
meantime, a principally anonymous cyberspace facilitates a more open forum for 
discourse that does, inasmuch as it eludes suppressive police action, advance a de 
facto situation of equal respect of individuals with varying philosophical and social 
views. 
If one considers seriously the notion that “privacy”, or any other legal right, 
contains within it an entitlement to formulate personal decisions that operate 
within a sphere of privacy that is psychological and not necessarily physical,88 then 
the state has a duty to respect the exercise of that autonomy, whether it is in the 
“privacy of one’s own home”, another more observable physical locale, or in 
cyberspace.  Individual freedom of certain individuals to pursue a life that is more 
equal to those with less stigmatized or marginalized proclivities or opinions is 
obstructed by the RNVS, which poses heightened threats of identity revelation and 
various forms of legal and social repercussions.  Whether or not such 
repercussions frequently occur, the mere existence of the requirement to reveal 
one’s identity “chills” the expressions and activities urgently needed to mitigate the 
marginalization of society’s most vulnerable members. 
                                                     
86 This articulation of a negative right of equality, that is, a right to be free from government action 
that causes or exacerbates one’s status as unequal, could be made more robust by including, explicitly, 
a positive equality right.  In the latter case, the government would bear affirmative obligations to 
actively promote greater equality within the society.  I confine this discussion to negative right 
applications (specifically, freedom from government coercion to reveal one’s identity online), but the 
idea of positive rights is certainly provocative. 
87 The specter of military conflict with North Korea provides a rationale for legislators supportive of 
the law’s police power dimensions to invoke to justify its perpetuation.  For a further discussion of 
the National Security Act, see Leitner, supra note 6. 
88 For a discussion of differing conceptions of liberty, where “liberty as independence” is 
distinguished from a notion of license, see Dworkin, supra note 9, at 262-265.  Liberty as 
independence may be a useful frame of reference for construing the nature and scope of autonomous 
personal control. 




The general effect of the RNVS has been to recast the Korean experience of 
cyberspace as relatively less private, less expressive, and less equal.  All three of 
these terms may be subject to varying interpretations, but I have intended to 
convey the following meanings:  
(1) Private: Korean internet users wishing to actively utilize popular 
channels of communication and interaction have significant 
obstacles to (legal) concealment of their identities.  Individuals are 
obstructed from engaging with online communities, a failure to 
respect privacy as it relates to personal choices about identity and 
independent lifestyle. 
(2) Expressive: the absolute quantity of expression is reduced, including 
expression that is not illegal or otherwise eligible for curtailment 
under existing Korean law.  Expression that may be of questionable 
legal status under existing laws, but with significant substantive 
political and social content, is particularly likely to be limited.  This is 
most true for political and social expression relating to ideological 
and social minorities in Korean society. 
(3) Equal:  cyberspace’s central characteristic as a place of equal access 
and equal participation is diminished.  Online activities also lose 
their potentially unique character as avenues for achieving actual 
equality of treatment, status, and dignity amongst individuals, 
especially for those most likely to be stigmatized outside of an 
anonymous cyberspace context. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the Constitutional Court will conclude that the 
System, as currently operated, violates constitutional requirements and as such 
must be modified or abolished.  I argue that the System should be seen to violate 
individual rights principles identified in the Constitution, and should be struck 
down as unconstitutional.  Other societies who value and seek to protect broad 
and technology-adaptive conceptions of equality, privacy, autonomy, and free 
expression should carefully consider the impact that such policies as name 
verification would ultimately have on individual rights, understood in the context 
of the unique potentials and frailties of cyberspace. 
 
An overview of  food safety regulation in Korea  
- Precautionary Principle vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis - 
Seong Wook Heo 
I. Introduction 
I would like to give a presentation on the issue of food safety regulation in Korea 
in the order of next two sequences. 
The first one is an overview of the Food Safety Act of 2008 which has been 
enacted recently in Korea, and the other one is some short discussion about the 
relationship between precautionary principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis in food 
safety regulation. 
II. The Food Safety Act of 2008 
1. Background 
While getting through with the incidents of mad cow disease and melamine 
additive, Korean people got more interested in the issue of food safety. And these 
increased interests of the public in food safety lead the Congress to enact the new 
Food Safety Act of 2008 (hereinafter the ‘FSA’) which was promulgated in June 
13th 2008 having its effect from December 2008. 
Before the enactment of the FSA, the Korean food safety regulatory system 
was under the criticism of being incomplete and inefficient, in the sense that the 
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relevant rules and regulation on food safety was separately divided according to the 
types of food and to the level of distribution, and each different administrative 
agency was in charge of maintaining food safety.1 
2. Overview 
A. The Food Safety Policy Committee (Article 7 -14) 
To cure these incompleteness and inefficiency in food safety regulation, the FSA 
establishes the Food Safety Policy Committee (hereinafter the ‘FSPC’) which is to 
comprehensively coordinate the food safety policy of government.  
The FSPC belongs to the Office of Premier and is headed by the Prime 
Minister as a chairperson.  The FSPC is composed of about 20 members who are 
considered to have specialized knowledge and experience about food safety 
including the Minister of Strategy and Finance, the Minister of Education, Science 
and Technology, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Food Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, the Minister for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, the Minister of 
Environment, the chief of the Office of Food and Drug Safety, and civilian 
specialists, etc. 
The FSPC does the review and coordination of following issues. 
(1) Basic planning of food safety 
(2) Major policies on food safety 
(3) Rules and regulations on food safety 
(4) Hazard analysis on food safety 
(5) Countermeasures against serious food safety accident 
 
Through the role and function of FSPC, it is expected that the food safety policy 
be executed in a more systematic and consistent way. 
B. The Planning of Food Safety Administration (Article 6) 
The Prime Minister has to devise the master plan for food safety under the 
deliberation of FSPC every three years. 
The Ministers and the governors of local government have to devise and 
enforce food safety administrative plan based on the master plan above. 
Through these planning and evaluation of the plan enforcement, it is expected 
that more systematic devising and enforcement of food safety policy be possible 
and through this overall food safety be improved. 
                                                     
1 It was reported that Korea had more than 230 legislations related to food safety in 2004, and the 
regulatory authority on food safety was dispersed to many different administrative agencies. 
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C. Building up the emergency measures system and a follow-up survey  
(Article 15 – 19) 
To cope with the advent of new style hazardous food additives, it is necessary to 
build up the central government-level emergency measures system. 
When the central or local government finds that there happened or probably 
would happen serious risk to the health of people, it should devise the emergency 
measures plan and enforce it. 
The Ministers can prohibit the producing and selling of the hazardous food, 
even before the scientific evidence of the hazardousness has not been provided, 
and should do the follow-up survey of the source of hazardousness. 
By these emergency measures, it is expected that people’s uneasiness about the 
food safety can be calmed at the earlier stage. 
D. The mandatory risk assessment (Article 20) 
The Ministers have to do the mandatory ex-ante risk assessment when making or 
revising the rules and regulations on food safety. 
The Ministers have to enforce the HACCP(Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Point) regulatory system. 
By these scientific administering of food safety, it is expected that the 
efficiency of food safety administration and public confidence in food safety can 
be heightened. 
E. The information disclosure on food safety (Article 24) 
The government has to build up and operate the comprehensive food safety 
information managing system. 
The Ministers have to disclose the related information to the producers and 
consumers when making a food safety policy. 
The Ministers can open the information of the producers and their products 
when they violate food safety rules and regulations. 
F. The participation of consumers into the food safety administration (Article 28) 
The Ministers have to make systematic channels through which consumers can 
participate into the making of food safety rules and regulations. 
3. Summary 
By integrating the dispersed authorities and regulations on food safety to one 
authority and one framework legislation and reinforcing the policy measures to 
fight against hazardous food, the FSA is expected to build up the more 
sophisticated and powerful administrative system in food safety. 
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However, the story may not end as such a happy ending as many Aesop’s 
Fables did. 
We need to talk more about food safety regulation in the perspective of 
precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis. 
III. Precautionary Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis in food 
safety regulations 
1. Introduction 
The food safety regulation issue is about the problem of Risk in modern society. 
The administrative measure against Risk has the choice under uncertainty as its 
essence. 
Compared to other traditional issues in administrative law, the modern 
administrative law issues are more complicated in the sense that they have to deal 
with the problem of Risk, for example, hazardous food, swine flu, mad cow 
disease, global warming, and the war against terror. 
It is hard to know how hazardous some new food additives, for example, 
melamine, ex-ante. However, still under such uncertainty, governments are 
required to do something about the melamine, when the public people are terrified 
by the possible harm from eating melamine to themselves or to their children.  But 
it is not easy to find the appropriate policy measures in such situations. 
It seems to me that the FSA can possibly be understood as requiring the 
government to take the Precautionary Principle posture in food safety. 
But, the food safety issue is not as simple as that. 
2. The Precautionary Principle 
A. Background 
In such a Risk situation, the governments are commonly required to take policy 
measures in accordance with the Precautionary Principle, which requires that the 
government should do whatever possible measures to prevent the realization of 
the Risk into real harm. 
However, it is not so easy to understand what exactly government should do 
to follow up the precautionary principle.  Because, in modern society there are so 
many different kinds of Risks around us, and it is not possible to take 
precautionary measures to all those Risks.  Actually, Risks are all around us. 
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B. The concept of the Precautionary Principle 
It is not certain what exactly does the Precautionary Principle mean or require.  
Actually, we can find more than twenty different kinds of definition of the 
Precautionary Principle which are not compatible with each other. 
We can arrange those different definitions in a continuum from a weak version 
to a strong version.2 
The most cautions and weak version of the definition might be like this one, as 
declared in 1992 Rio Declaration. 
A lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to 
regulate.” or “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
A stronger version of Precautionary Principle is like this. “The Precautionary 
Principle means that action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there 
is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already occurred.” 
In a more strong version, it is said that the Precautionary Principle mandates 
that when there is a risk of significant health or environmental damage to others or 
to future generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of 
that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to 
prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evidence 
shows that the damage will not occur.”  
C. Precaution and Paralysis 
The Precautionary Principle is generally understood as a good meaning to the 
public, because it gives the impression that the government can do exert that kind 
of superpower if required.   
However, such understanding can be quite misleading. 
In the real world, we are faced with very diverse kinds of Risks in every aspect 
of our lives. Basically, it is impossible for any super-power authority to take 
precautionary measures to all the Risks around us, because it takes some portion of 
resources we have, and the resources are finite. 
So, if the government is required to take the posture of the Precautionary 
Principle to whatever kinds of Risks, it will finally be able to do nothing. 
If a government exerts its best effort to fight against the mad cow disease to 
the level of perfect precaution(if it is possible anyhow), it will let the people be 
faced with higher level of Risks in other fields, for example, Risk to malnutrition, 
or Risk to Global Warming, etc.  
                                                     
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge University Press, 2005 
(hereinafter, ‘Laws of Fear’), 18-19. 
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The government inevitably has to make some ordering of Risks, and have to 
decide which Risk to be taken seriously than others. 
But the Precautionary Principle, especially the stronger version, itself does not 
give us any guidance on the point. 
D. Factors affecting people to have precautionary posture 
Regardless of the obvious result that strong version of the Precautionary Principle 
is unattainable, people tend to expect and require the government to take 
precautionary measures in daily life.  What is the reason? 
We can find some factors influencing people’s decision and acting in the 
perspective of behavioral economics.3 
(a) Availability Heuristic 
People tend to be more sensitive to salient Risks.  Those saliencies can be made 
through personal experiences or media exposure. 
For example, people who have the experience of traffic accident to themselves 
or to their family will generally assess the Risk from traffic accident much higher 
than those who do not have that kind of experience. 
When people are repeatedly exposed to some specific kinds of Risks through 
media, they tend to be more sensitive to the Risk, and that can lead them to press 
the government to take precautionary measures against that Risk.  The swine flu 
can be a good example. 
(b) Intuitive Toxicology 
The general people tend to be more sensitive to hazardous materials than the 
professionals on toxicology. 
Moreover, people tend to consider the food safety problem as all or nothing 
problem.  They think of food additives as totally safe or too dangerous to their 
health to be added to food.  They are not trying to understand that there are in-
betweens.  
This intuitive toxicology can lead to the precautionary demand to the 
government. 
(c) Social Cascades 
Certainly, human beings are not sheep, but in many cases, they just follow up other 
people’s decisions and behaviors. 
We can find many positive and experimental evidences of social cascades.4 
                                                     
3 The concept of those factors explained below, for example, availability heuristic, intuitive 
toxicology, social cascade, etc. are explained in detail in many social science books and papers.  
Among them, I generally referred to the explanation of Cass R. Sunstein in Why Societies Need 
Dissent(2003), Risk and Reason(2002), and Laws of Fear(2005). 
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Social Cascade can also be made in the area of food safety. 
Even under the circumstances of uncertainty about the hazardousness of food 
additives, when some major groups of people strongly argue that the food additive 
is dangerous for health, people tend to follow the other people’s opinion. 
These social cascades made as such put pressure on the government to take 
precautionary measures, even before the scientific evidence of Risk has not been 
provided. 
(d) Group Polarization 
People have the tendency to reach the more polarized conclusion when they 
deliberate in group than when they think of some issues individually. 
Many examples of group polarization can be found in real life. 
People who were just concerned about Global Warming can become an ardent 
advocate of international measures against Climate Change after coming back from 
a conference on Global Warming.  Laypersons who are in a group discussion 
about hazardous food additives organized , for example, by NGOs, tend to 
become more strict about food safety. 
This Group Polarization gets stronger when the group is composed of people 
of similar thought, and gets weaker when the group is composed of people of 
different thoughts or when professionals who have relatively correct knowledge on 
the issue are among the group. 
The Group Polarization also influences the making of statutory framework on 
food safety and it tends to lead the statutory framework in the direction of the 
Precautionary Principle. 
(e) Health-Health Tradeoffs 
All things and events in the world around us are correlated with each other.  In 
that sense, it is not easy to solve some problem by separating the specific issue 
from other things. 
The food safety issue is no exception. 
Taking precautionary measures against a specific health issue may invoke a new 
problem to other part of health. 
For example, let’s think of the case when the government forbids using a 
certain food additive, in such case, the food producers will try to find a substitute 
of the forbidden additive.  And, the new food additive might be more harmful to 
health or cause new risk. 
In the U.S., when the use of asbestos was forbidden under the consideration 
that inhaling asbestos can raise the possibility of getting cancer, the car makers 
could not use asbestos to brake system anymore, which made the performance of 
brake worse than before, and caused higher rate of traffic accident.  And, more 
                                                     
4 About the experimental evidences on cascade effect, refer to Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need 
Dissent, Harvard University Press (2003), 54-73. 
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lives than that could be saved by forbidding the use of asbestos were sacrificed by 
the traffic accident.  This example shows the tradeoffs between health and health, 
the tradeoffs between life and life. 
Laypersons who do not have professional knowledge on food safety are likely 
to do not recognize the health-health tradeoffs, and are likely to demand the 
precautionary measures against some specific kinds of risk. 
3. Cost-benefit analysis 
A. Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis has become an increasingly popular tool in modern 
administration. 
Indeed, cost-benefit analysis is often claimed as an alternative to the 
Precautionary Principle.  Instead of blindly “taking precautions,” it is argued that 
administrative agencies should assess the benefits and the costs of regulation.  
Only in the case of the benefits outnumbering the costs, is the regulation justified.5 
B. The Administrative Regulation Act Article 7 
The article 7 of Administrative Regulation Act of Korea requires the administrative 
agencies to do benefit-cost analysis in making a new regulation or enforcing a 
stricter regulation and make a report on the regulatory analysis. 
According to that clause, all administrative agencies are doing benefit-cost 
analysis in a new or stricter regulation. 
What matters is whether the mandatory benefit-cost analysis in the ARA is 
compatible with the Precautionary Principle in the FSA. 
C. Cost-benefit analysis and incommensurable value 
The most striking criticism on cost-benefit analysis is that there are cases when the 
value pursued by administrative policy is incalculable and incommensurable. 
Actually, it is not such an easy job to calculate the value of life influenced by 
food safety regulation. 
However, the problem is that we have to make policy decisions and make 
choices among incompatible alternatives even under the circumstances of 
incalculability and incommensurability. 
To solve the problem of incalculability and incommensurability, many 
researches have been done and regulatory agencies are using the calculating tools 
so made in actual cost-benefit analysis. 
Some of the examples are as follows. 
                                                     
5 Sunstein, Laws of Fear, 129. 




Table 1: Values of Life Studies 
[EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic analyses 89, 2000, recited from Laws of Fear, Sunstein, 135] 
 
 
Table 2: Agency Values of Life, 1996-2003 
[Cited from Laws of Fear, Sunstein, 133] 
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D. The Precautionary Principle vs. cost-benefit analysis 
If we take a strong version of the Precautionary Principle, then it seems that it is 
not compatible with cost-benefit analysis, because the strong version of the 
Precautionary Principle commands the regulatory agencies to take precautionary 
measures without regard to the cost of taking the measure. 
And we have seen that the strong version of the Precautionary Principle leads 
to the paralysis on public policy. 
There are many discussions on the relationship between the Precautionary 
Principle and cost-benefit analysis. 
I cannot cover up all the discussions in this paper. 
I would rather point out that both the Precautionary Principle and cost-benefit 
analysis are important in food safety regulatory system designing. 
My idea is that the policy measures prescribed in the FSA under the vein of 
Precautionary Principle should be complemented with the perspective of cost-
benefit analysis.  And, cost-benefit analysis itself needs to be refined and 
substantialized. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, I gave a brief review of the Food Safety Act of 2008 in Korea in the 
perspective of the Precautionary Principle.  The regulatory agencies are likely to be 
under the pressure from the public to take the precautionary measures in food 
safety regulations.  However, there are many things to consider in applying the 
Precautionary Principle in real world of food safety regulation. 
My suggestion is that the Precautionary Principle should be complemented by 
cost-benefit analysis in a refined and sophisticated way.  The clauses of FSA should 
be understood in that context. 
Actually, the issue of balancing between the Precautionary Principle and cost-
benefit analysis entails far more complicated and philosophical subject of how to 
understand the concept of democracy. 
I will leave it as the subject of my follow up researches. 
 
SECTION 4:   
CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY
 
 
Obscenity in a Changing Society 
Sang Won Lee 
I. Introduction 
Obscenity cases reflect the changes in the means of communication. Traditional 
obscenity cases mainly targeted physical actions and works such as books or 
pictures and then began to focus on films. Modern obscenity cases are easily found 
on the Internet, where images or videos of sexual conduct are main targets.  
The Internet is a great stage for the pornography industry. As of 2006, every 
second, $3,075.64 is being spent on pornography, 28,258 Internet users are viewing 
pornography, and 372 Internet users are typing adult search terms into search 
engines; every 39 minutes a new pornographic video is being created in the United 
States.1 
The pornography industry is larger than the revenues of the top technology 
companies combined: Microsoft, Google, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo!, Apple, Netflix 
and EarthLink. The following chart shows how lucrative the industry is. It also 
shows that Korea is the second largest country for this industry and the first in 
revenue per capita. 
 
                                                     
1 http://familysafemedia.com/pornography_statistics.html#time (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). The 
statistics mentioned in this section are taken from the same web page. 
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Table 1: Worldwide Pornography Revenues (2006) 
 
 
The internet pornography industry is in particular huge. Chart 2 demonstrates the 
size of the internet pornography market. 
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Table 2: Internet Pornography Statistics 
 
 
The United States is the biggest producer of pornography in both videos and Web 
pages, as Chart 3 and Chart 4 show. 
 
Table 3: Top Video Porn Producers           Table 4: Pornographic Web Pages 
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This easy access to pornography has revived arguments on opposing sides of the 
obscenity debate: anti-pornography groups call for increased punishment to 
prevent moral decline and addiction, while free speech activists insist that 
obscenity prosecutions abridge the freedom of speech.2 Strong enforcement of 
obscenity law might result in repression of the rights of citizens; generous 
regulation might result in moral insensibility and even sexual crimes.  
Actually, many countries ban pornography. Among them, Saudia Arabia, Iran, 
Syria, Bahrain, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Kenya, India, 
Cuba, China are top pornography banning countries. It is interesting to note that 
most of these countries are Muslim. 
Korea has several statutes stipulating that obscenity with certain requirements 
be a crime. Article 243 of the Criminal Act provides that those who distribute, sell, 
lease, exhibit in public or play in public obscene paper, picture, film and other 
materials shall be punished with an imprisonment not more than one year or a fine 
not more than five million won. Article 244 provides that those who produce, have 
in possession, import or export obscene materials with the intent of offering 
materials for the crimes described in the article 243 shall be punished with an 
imprisonment not more than one year or a fine not more than five million won. 
Article 245 provides that those who conduct an obscene act in public shall be 
punished with an imprisonment no more than one year or a fine not more than 
five million won. The Criminal Act provides only the basic forms of obscenity 
crimes. Korea has many special laws that enhance the penalty under certain 
circumstances. Among those are the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging 
Sexual trafficking, the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications 
Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc., the Employment Security 
Act, and the Act on the Regulation of Amusement Business Affecting Public 
Morals. 
Especially regarding Internet obscenity, the Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. 
provides that whoever circulates particular information on the internet, including 
to distribute, sell, lease or exhibit in public obscene signals, words, sounds, images 
or videos, circulate on the Internet shall be punished with an imprisonment not 
more than one year or a fine not more than 10 million won. 
While these statues regulate ‘the obscene’ or ‘obscenity’, the meaning of  
‘obscene’ or ‘obscenity’ is not always clear; rather it is such a vague notion that 
citizens may tremble with fear of unpredictable legal interpretations and arbitrary 
imposition of punishment. 
                                                     
2 Shannon Creasy, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age: How Google Searches Can 
Illuminate Miller’s “Contemporary Community Standards”, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1031 (2010). 
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II. Judicial Understanding 
1. Understanding in Korea 
A. Definition 
The Korean Supreme Court has a firm definition of obscenity. The Court has 
defined obscenity in many cases as “what provokes, excites or satisfies a sexual 
desire of an average person, spoils a normal sense of shame of an average person3 
and runs counter to good sexual morality.”4 
Although there has been little change in the definition itself, the Court has 
become more generous against obscenity as the Korean society has become more 
and further open to sexual expression. In the 1970s, the Court had strict concept 
of obscenity. The court found guilty of selling an obscene picture a defendant who 
copied a nude image of a woman from an art-drawing anthology and sold the 
copies in order for matchbox manufactures to insert those copies in matchboxes 
and sell them.5 The Court reasoned that, even though the original painting was a 
work of art, the defendant insulted the art and made it obscene.6 
However, the present Court might take different position about this case if it 
came to the Court now. Holding that it is not desirable for criminal law to 
intervene in moral or ethical problems, and even worse to intervene in individual 
and private sexual problems, the Court stated that obscenity is limited only those 
materials depicting or describing sexual organs or conducts without reserve to the 
extent of having a harmful influence to the society.7 
B. In Part or As a Whole? 
In the 1970s, the Court seemed to allow the lower court to focus on part of the 
material in judging whether the material was obscene. Rejecting the appellant’s (the 
prosecution’s) argument that the lower court’s judgment erred in convicting him 
because it held the novel in question was not obscene taken as a whole, the Court 
stated that the lower court’s judgment rested on the specific part of the novel 
which the prosecution brought into the court and that the lower court’s statements 
about the whole content of the novel were just dicta.8 
                                                     
3 This “spoils a normal sense of shame of an average person” might be understood as “causes an 
average person to feel shame.” 
4 KSC 2006do3119 (2009); 2008do76 (2008); 87do2331 (1987), and many others. 
5 KSC 70do1879 (1970). 
6 Id. 
7 KSC 2008do76 (2008). 
8 KSC 74do976 (1975). 
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In more recent cases, however, the Court made it clear that it is crucial 
whether the material mainly provokes prurient interest when viewed as a whole.9 
C. Who decides? 
Admitting that obscenity is a relative notion the definition of which varies 
according to society and time and at the same time an abstract notion which has 
close relation to the customs, ethics, religions, etc., the Court nevertheless held that 
it is a normative notion which a judge himself can define based on an average 
person’s feeling.10 The court decided that a judge is the final evaluator and does 
not have to engage in the empirical exercise of gathering the opinions of ordinary 
men whether the material in question provokes their sexual interest and they think 
it obscene.11 
2. Understanding in the US 
 A. Hicklin Test 
In early days of American obscenity law, between the Civil War and the 1930s, the 
US federal courts largely followed a rule from an early English case, Regina v. 
Hicklin.12 The Hicklin test allowed any material that could “deprave and corrupt 
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences” to be banned as 
obscenity.13 This  test had the unintended result of assessing materials based on the 
effect they had on the most susceptible, or sensitive, members of the community.14 
Under Hicklin, books and other materials could be judged obscene based on the 
effect an insignificant, isolated passage had on a child.15 The Hicklin test fixed a 
community standard for reading matter based on the feeblest mentality or most 
suggestible individual in the community.16 Thus, this Hicklin test focused on the 
effect certain passages would have on particularly susceptible people, not on the 
public as a whole, and was often used to proscribe contemporary literature.17 This 
test was used against literature like Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy18 and 
D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s Lover.19 
                                                     
9 KSC 2008do76 (2008); KSC 2003do2911 (2003). 
10 KSC 94do2266 (1995). 
11 Id. 
12 Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 Yale J. Int'l L. 299, 307 (2008). 
13 H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The Law of Obscenity – or Absurdity?, 15 St. Thomas L. 
Rev. 517, 523 (2003) at 523 (citing Queen v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371). 
14 Boyce, supra note 12, at 311; Robinson & Mason, supra note 13, at 523-24. 
15 Eric Handelman, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity Standard Provide Individuals with the 
Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 709, 718 (1995). 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 717-18. 
18 Commonwealth v. Friede, 171. N.E. 472, 473 (Mass. 1930); Handelman, supra note 15, at 718. 
19 Commonwealth v. Delacy, 171. N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930). Handelman, supra note 15, at 718. 
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Since the Hicklin test evaluate literature in terms of those most susceptible to 
corruption, as Judge Learned Hand correctly pointed out, the test “would ‘reduce 
our treatment of sex to the standards of a child's library in the supposed interest of 
a salacious few.”’20 
B. Roth Test 
Confronting this criticism, the Hicklin standard was abandoned with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's ruling in Roth v. United States.2122 Refusing to construe the First 
Amendment as protecting every utterance, the Court indicated that the First 
Amendment should protect only those ideas having some measure of social import 
and reaffirmed that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech or press.23 The Roth Court expressly rejected the Hicklin test as 
“unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.”24 Trying to 
find a less restrictive standard to protect legitimate material, Roth defined obscenity 
as “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest.” 25  
The Roth Court further reasoned that the sexual nature of art, literature, and/or 
scientific works was not, in and of itself, reason to deny the material constitutional 
protection.26 Roth established a new test different from the Hicklin test, which 
judges the material in question as a whole rather than each portion individually and 
applies the perspective of the “average person instead of a the most susceptible 
member of society.27 The Roth test deemed material obscene when “to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole appeals to [the] prurient interest.” 28 
The Roth test, however, has a defect that the meanings of the elements of the 
test are not clear: (i) who is “the average person?”, (ii) what are “contemporary 
community standards” and how are those standards are determined?, and (iii) what 
is the “prurient interest?”29 
C. Miller Test 
In Miller v. California, the Court established a new test.30 Miller formulated a three-
prong conjunctive test requiring the trier of fact to determine: (i)  whether ‘the 
                                                     
20 United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y.); Handelman, supra note 15, at 719. 
21 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
22 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1036; George M. Weaver, HANDBOOK ON THE PROSECUTION OF 
OBSCENITY CASES 73 (National Obscenity Law Ctr. ed., 1985); Robbins & Mason, supra note 13, at 
523-24. 
23 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85. 
24 Id. at 488-89. 
25 Id. at 487. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 488-90; Boyce, supra note 12, at 316. 
28 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89. 
29 Handelman, supra note 15, at 722. 
30 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (ii) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and (iii) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.31 If the material in question 
meets all three of the requirements of the test, that material is deemed obscene.32 
Miller provided a restrictive test understanding of obscenity as follows: (i) it 
expressly limited “obscene material” to items that deal with sex, specifically 
material depicting or describing “hard core” pornography;33 (ii) it emphasized that 
the material in question should be viewed as a whole and could not be examined 
piecemeal;34 (iii) it limited state regulation to only that sexual conduct specifically 
defined by statute, or authoritatively construed, as being illegal to depict or 
describe.35 36 This three-prong obscenity test of the Miller remains in effect today.37 
The Miller test requires that “an average person” apply “cotemporary community 
standards’ to judge whether a material is obscene.38 
However, the Miller test has been widely criticized as unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad.39 Courts have struggled to identify and define “community 
standards” since the introduction of the Miller test, 40 and a lot of debate has 
centered on how to determine the true values of a community.41 
III. Some Challenges 
1. What is “Community” 
 A. Vague notion 
Despite the difference between the two countries’ definition and despite the 
differences among the American tests, all the definitions have the “contemporary 
                                                     
31 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. 
32 Id. at 24. 
33 Id. at 27. 
34 Id. at 24. 
35 Id. at 23-24. 
36 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1038. 
37 Id. at 1033. 
38 Id. at 24. 
39 Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Handelman, supra note 15 at 731-737; Creasy, 
supra note 2, at 1038.  
40 Boyce, supra note 12, at 324-25. 
41 State v. Haltom, 653 N.W.2d 232, 239-40 (Neb. 2002); State v. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d 915, 919, 921 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001); George M. Weaver, supra note 22, at 73 (National Obscenity Law Ctr. ed., 1985); 
Creasy, supra note 2, at 1033. 
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community standards” in common. However, it is still vague and subjective what 
the relevant community is.42  
B. Scope of Community 
Does the ‘community standard’ mean a local standard or a national standard?  
Before Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a national standard in federal 
obscenity cases. In Manual Enter., Inc. v. Day, the Court stated that “the proper test 
under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose 
population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national 
standard of decency.”43 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court stated that a local definition 
of the community did not provide sufficient protection of rights deriving from the 
U.S. Constitution.44 In contrast, proponents of a local standard argued that given 
the size and diversity of the United States, a national standard would be 
unascertainable.45 
In Miller, the Court indicated that a local standard was appropriate. It stated, 
“People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not 
to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.”46 Finding no error 
where jury instructions called for a local standard, the Court stated that there is no 
constitutional requirement for application of a national standard.47 At the same 
time, in Hamling v. United States, the Court stated that the application of a national 
standard is not a constitutional violation either.48 In Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court 
stated that, while “a [s]tate may choose to define . . . the standards in more precise 
geographic terms,” it is not constitutionally required to do so.49  
Considering all the cases above, it can be said that the cases demonstrate that a 
national standard is neither required nor unconstitutional if applied, and that states 
may designate a statewide standard by statute, but they are not required to do so.50 
Korea is neither federal nor so diverse as the US. It is not such a hot issue to 
choose between a national standard and a local standard. However, it is also true 
that recent Korea is witnessing wider and wider gap between age groups, more and 
more differences between social groups, and more and more ethnic diversity. This 
compels even Korean scholars and courts to consider which scope of community 
would be best applied to the case at hand. 
                                                     
42 Jan Samoriski, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND SOCIETY ON THE 
INTERNET FRONTIER 267, 269 (Allyn & Bacon eds., 2002) (Definitions under the Miller standard … 
can vary from place to place, judge to judge, and even from time to time;  
43 Manual Enter., Inc. v. Day , 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962). 
44 Jacobellis v. Ohio , 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964). 
45 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe that there is no provable ‘national 
standard’ . . . .”). 
46 Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. 
47 Id. at 31. 
48 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-109 (1974), which was rendered one year after Miller. 
49 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). 
50 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1042. 




The emergence of the Internet has made it more complicated to identify the 
relevant community.51 Traditionally, sellers of adult material could choose which 
communities were appropriate locations for retail operations or were safe 
distribution points.52 However, sellers operating on the Internet cannot effectively 
limit access based on geographical location because the Internet defies geographic 
boundaries.53 Considering this, it would result in “individuals being prosecuted by 
the standard of the most restrictive community with access to the Internet,” if 
courts stick to the traditional community test.54  
It does not seem that both Korean and US courts are giving special attention 
to the unique characteristic of the Internet. In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, the US Supreme court held that it does not violate constitutional 
requirements for a statute aimed at Internet regulation to rely on ‘contemporary 
community standards’ in determining whether the materials are obscene.55 In 
United States v. Thomas, the defendants argued for a new definition of community 
for the Internet, such as a “cyber-community,” but the trial court declined to 
address the cyber-community issue.56 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, 
holding that “juries are properly instructed to apply the community standards of 
the geographic area where the materials are sent.”57  
The Internet defies geographical boundaries and cyberspace is the true 
community where the posted materials in question are actually located.58 
Therefore, obscenity should be determined based on the cyber-community rather 
than a geographical community. Here the relevant community is the cyber-
community. In addition, since cyber-community reaches the whole world, there is 
a strong need to find a uniform standard for the Internet.  
2. Proving  of Community Standard 
In obscenity prosecutions of both Korea and the US, neither the prosecution nor 
the defendant has the obligation to provide proof of the community standards.59 
Triers, judges or juries are presumed to already know the prevailing community 
standards. 60 Setting aside the issue of whether or not the community standard is to 
                                                     
51 Nitke v. New York, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
52 Sean Adam Shiff, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and Indecent Speech on the 
Internet, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 731, 749 (1996). 
53 Boyce, supra note 12, at 347. 
54 John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, and the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 
11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 3 (2003). 
55 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 593 (2002). 
56 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1043. 
57 Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34); Creasy, supra note 2, at 1044. 
58 Rebecca Dawn Kaplan, Cyber-Smut: Regulating Obscenity on the Internet, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 189, 
193 (1998). 
59 KSC 94do2266 (1995); Feldschneider v. State, 195 S.E.2d 184, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972). 
60 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1044. 
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be proved, both parties of an obscenity case may feel substantial or technical 
burden to prove the applicable standards. 
First, the parties can resort to expert witness testimony. There is not a 
particular field that produces “obscenity experts”, but a wide variety of individuals 
representing many fields have qualified as experts to provide insight into 
community standards, such as psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, ministers, 
and even police officers.61 Of course, expert testimony should be relevant and not 
misleading to the jury.62 
Second, surveys or opinion polls can be used for proving the community 
standards. In order to be admissible, this evidence should meet certain 
requirements: (i) the poll should touch on the specific issues at hand;63 (ii) it should 
not be too general and should properly describe the material at issue;64 (iii) survey 
questions should be carefully crafted to ensure relevancy;65 and (iv) the sample size 
and selection should be based on reliable scientific methods.66 
Third, comparable materials can be introduced. Womack v. United States 
developed a test to determine the admissibility of comparable materials.67 The 
Womack test requires that the defendant show: (i) the materials are actually 
“similar” to the material at issue in the trial, and (ii) the comparison materials enjoy 
a “reasonable degree of community acceptance.” 68 
Finally, now that the cyber-community is the relevant community regarding the 
Internet obscenity, data from the Internet would be one of the most appropriate 
evidences in the Internet obscene cases. Recently, Google search engines like 
Google Trends and Google Insights are attracting the attention of scholars as a 
tool of proving the community standards.69 According to this, Differently from 
standard Google searches to show, for example, a mere array of pornographic 
material on the Internet, Google Trends and Google Insights data illuminate the 
standard objectively by providing the actual access data of the users. 
3. Burden of proof 
To the extent that “obscene” or “obscenity” is a constituent of legal concept, it is a 
problem of judicial interpretation and evaluation whether or not the material at 
issue is obscene. For example, “property of others” as the object of the crime theft 
is determined by legal interpretation of the relevant statues by a judge. 
                                                     
61 Id. at 1046. 
62 Darlene Sordillo, Emasculating the Defense in Obscenity Cases: The Exclusion of Expert Testimony and Survey 
Evidence on Community Standards, 10 Loy. Ent. L.J. 619, 637-38 (1990). 
63 Id. at 623. 
64 State v. Midwest Pride IV, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); State v. Tee & Bee, 
Inc., 600 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Sordillo, supra note 62, at 642-43. 
65 Sordillo, supra note 62, at 642. 
66 Weaver, supra note 22, at 72. 
67 Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
68 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1050. 
69 Creasy, supra note 2, at 1054-58. 
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Interpretation is the judge’s job and the prosecution does not have to prove the 
meaning of  “property of others”. However, notions like “obscenity” are 
somewhat different. Insofar as courts hold the position that ‘obscenity’ be judged 
based on the community standards, that is, what an average person has in mind 
regarding the material at issue, it is inevitable to find what the community 
standards are. The court should declare what the community is thinking rather 
than what the judge is thinking. This is not a mere interpretation of a statutory 
provision. Therefore, the court should decide what the community standards are, 
based on objective evidence, not on subjective evaluation. 
If the community standards should be proved by evidence, who bears the 
burden? As a principle, in a criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden of 
proof for all the elements of the charges which the defendant is accused of.70 So is 
proving the community standards. The prosecution should prove the material at 
issue is obscene judged by the community standard. 
IV. Conclusion 
Whether a material is obscene is decided by the community standards. In an 
Internet era, we must modify the definition of obscenity. At least in the Internet 
obscenity cases, the community is to be understood as a cyber-community where 
common criteria could be created beyond the geographical boundaries. 
Even though obscenity is a legal notion belonging to judicial interpretation, the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving the material at issue is obscene by 
introducing evidence to prove the community standard. 
This theory may be generalized to apply to other legal notions whose meaning 
is based on the evaluation or morals of the society. 
                                                     
70 This has consistently reaffirmed by the Korean Supreme Court: KSC 2002do6110 (2003);   KSC  
2009do1151 (2010). 
 
Endanger Law: War on Risks in German Criminal 
Law   
María Laura Böhm 
I. Introduction 
The variation of criminal law, which I – critically – call endanger law1, is a criminal 
law which is seeking security – and thereafter fighting ‘risks’ and ‘dangers’2 – as its 
main objective and which is acting on the basis of risk patterns developed by this 
law itself. Individuals who fit these characteristics are being fought against as 
endangerers, that means, as high risky figures – and not as offenders. They are not 
considered ‘normal criminals’, but as homini insecuritas. In this paper I will present 
this figure which has been constructed by the criminal policies and system in 
Germany during recent years, and has been co-constructed by the Constitutional 
                                                     
1 The concept of endanger law must not be mixed with the question of offences of concrete and 
abstract endangerment, which are specific forms of offences within German criminal law 
(“Gefährdungsdelikte”). Endanger law is actually a criminological and sociological concept which is 
not related to the description of concrete forms of endangerment (through physical actions acting in 
accordance to a causal relationship between action and possible harm) but to the description of legislation 
and criminal law. When we talk of endanger law, we are talking about criminal law fighting “risky” 
situations or individual features (nor criminal actions) which are legally seen as potentially dangerous 
for general security; according to this logic these high-risk situations justify the aggressive early 
intervention of criminal law (procedure, measures, criminalization) even in cases without crime, 
without inchoate crime, and without offences of endangerment. That is why it can be called endanger 
law – law prosecuting risk and dangers – instead of criminal law. 
2 In this paper I will use simple ‘’ to refer to concepts or terms which I analyzed or put into question 
because of its undetermined meaning and openness to different ideas (‘organized crime’, ‘risk’ etc) 
and which are usually – and erroneously – taken as clear closed concepts for most theorists, 
politicians and judges. Double “” are used for the normal purpose of quotations. 
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Court3 in at least two cases: in the case of the acoustic home surveillance (akustische 
Wohnraumüberwachung) and in the case of the subsequent incapacitation order (nachträgliche 
Sicherungsverwahrung4). The aim of this article is to explain the internal logic and 
rationality, which seems to be leading the criminal law when constructing these 
mechanisms. In the first part of this paper the figure of the endangerer will be 
presented (1.). After that a sociological concept needed to understand the 
rationality of the law constructing endangerers will be explained: the ‘risk’ (2.). The 
two current constructions of the criminal system and of the Constitutional Court 
will be presented in the next part (3.). After explaining the rationale of this 
endanger law (4.), I will offer some critical remarks on it and on its constructions 
(5.). 
II. Endangerer 
The term “Islamist endangerer” (“Islamistische Gefährder”) has been applied for the 
last five years by politicians when talking about the fight against terrorism.5 With 
this term they usually mean subjects, which are seen as potentially dangerous for 
                                                     
3 Germany has a centralized system for constitutional control. Not every judge declares the 
unconstitutionality of the law; this is done only by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht). This institution is therefore crucial for the state order, since it is the only 
institution that can stop an unconstitutional law. The Constitutional Court is responsible for laws 
respecting the constitutional law and for the safeguarding of the constitutional rights of the public 
and individuals. As it will be seen in this paper, the Court has been explicitly or implicitly recognizing 
that the limits and the content of the constitutional law are no longer as clear as they were in the past. 
Furthermore, some decisions stated that politicians can and have to search for and evaluate - without 
the need of a judicial intervention - the most useful means to achieve their politically established goals 
(cfr. BVerfG, Decision of 5th February 2004 – 2 BvR 2029/01 –, in the following: BVerfGE 109, 
133). The problem is that in the last years “security” seems to be the main goal, and in order to seek 
security all means seem to be acceptable – even for the Constitutional Court. 
4 On the current situation of this legal measure see infra note 50.  
5 The concept was first used in the field of prevention of dangers (Gefahrenabwehr) and of war on 
terrorism (see von Denkowski 2007). Nevertheless in these fields the term was present only in police 
(crit. Thiede 2008, von Denkowski 2008) and political discourses, but not in law texts. The discussion 
around this term was sparked by an interview of the Home Office Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in the 
weekly journal Der Spiegel, Nr. 28 of 9th July 2007. Schäuble has been clamouring for years for radical 
changes in the form and goals of law-making policies. The defence of the public against terrorism 
and the survival of the constitutional state against the background of global non-democratic threats 
were sufficient reasons for ‘changes’. These changes included among others the expansion of police 
powers, an increased number of military interventions, the shooting down of civil airplanes 
kidnapped by terrorists, practicing targeted-killings of high-risk-suspects, etc. According to Schäuble, 
this is a necessary constitutional expansion as “The old categories do not match any more” (p. 36). 
He proposes a re-defining of the so called “red line”: “The red line is very easy: It is always defined by 
constitutional law, which of course can be modified. A proposal for the modification of constitutional law is not an 
assault upon the constitution. To me, the fortification of the preventive idea signifies the fortification of the constitution, 
because it provides confidence to the people.” (p. 36). For a detailed analysis of this interview see Böhm 2008: 
25 et seq. The proposed amendment or the reinterpretation of the Constitution proposed by Schäuble 
in order to be able to go further with the war on terror sounds very complicated. However, this is 
exactly what the Parliament has been doing and what the Constitutional Court has been accepting in 
its decisions – not only regarding the war on terror, but also many other criminal areas such as sexual 
crimes and economic crimes analyzed in this paper.  
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the national security because of their religious or national background, because of 
their relationship with suspects of terrorism activities, etc.6 It is argued, that it is 
necessary to get as much information as possible about them in order to know and 
to prevent each possible future step: Investigation measures became more flexible 
(for example surveillance, data mining, etc.), while the forms of individual 
intervention (for example detention or interrogation) became more intense.7 The 
figure of an endangerer, however, is constructed not only in the anti-terrorism 
domain. The ‘organized crime’, for example, and even sexual and violent offenders 
have been redefined – not expressively but implicitly – as endangerers through law 
amendments for at least the last ten years. They are seen as high-risk figures 
jeopardizing general security. For a better understanding of these ideas, in the 
following section the notion of risk will be explained which may conceptually 
explain how endangerers are constructed – even implicitly – in legal discourse. 
III. Risk 
A useful way to introduce the concept of risk is by talking about the risk society. 
According to Ulrich Beck the risk society is a result or further development of the 
modernisation process.8 The risks created by the risk society in the most advanced 
stage of development of the forces of production9 are systematically conditioned, 
often irreversible, for the most part invisible and based on causal interpretations, 
i.e. dependant on knowledge and therefore particularly open for social definition 
processes.10 Risks will only become such when they are socially acknowledged and 
allocated.  
                                                     
6 As was defined by the Group of the Leaders of State Bureaus of Crime and the Federal Bureau of 
Crime (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Leiter der Landeskriminalämter und des Bundeskriminalamte - AG Kripo) on 
the 21st November 2006 (in the following: BT-Drs. 16/3570), p. 6, Question 9: „An endangerer is a 
person with regard to whom some facts justify the assumption that she or he is going to commit 
politically motivated serious crimes, in particular those related to § 100a of the Procedural Code” 
(„Ein Gefährder ist eine Person, bei der bestimmte Tatsachen die Annahme rechtfertigen, dass sie 
politisch motivierte Straftaten von erheblicher Bedeutung, insbesondere solche im Sinne des § 100a 
der Strafprozessordnung (StPO), begehen wird.“)). A person can be classified as an endangerer even 
without having committed or having intended to commit a crime. According to the Secretary of 
State, for the definition of the concept legal fundaments were “not necessary” (“nicht erforderlich”) 
(BT-Drs. 16/3570, p. 6, Question 10). 
7 For instance in a new Act regulating the collection of data on high “dangerous persons” (Gesetz zur 
Errichtung gemeinsamer Dateien von Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten des Bundes und der Länder 
(Gemeinsame-Dateien-Gesetz) vom 22. Dezember 2006 (BGBl. I 66, p. 3409) it is provided that this 
information may be collected and recorded in secrecy. No crime commission or intended crime 
commission is necessary for that. Cfr. von Denkowski 2007: 325 et seq. 
8 Beck 1986. See also the actualization of his concepts in Beck 2000. 
9 Beck 1986: 26. 
10 Beck 1986: 30; see also on the diversity of possible risk definitions according to him id., p. 40 et seq. 
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As a particular way in which problems are viewed or ‘imagined’ and dealt with. 
[…] Risk is a statistical and probabilistic technique, whereby large numbers of 
events are sorted into a distribution, and the distribution in turn is used as a 
means of making probabilistic predictions.11 
From a criminal law perspective two aspects are of particular interest: Firstly, the 
need to define risk and danger more precisely or rather to delineate one from the 
other, secondly, the problem of the chronological dimension of the risk concept, as 
risks are, in respect to time, at the same time “real and unreal” 12, and thirdly the 
reformulations that these aspects bring or imply within the discourse of criminal 
law. 
1. Risk and danger 
It is to be noted at this point for a preliminary delineation that risks and 
respectively risk factors are fundamentally different from danger. That is to say 
danger can always be traced back to a causative event, capable of causing damage, 
which can be of human nature but doesn't have to be. For the dangers caused by 
humans it can be said that the subject, who has caused the danger, is just as little in 
the position to successfully shield the relevance of damage as third persons. 
Dangers, therefore, always remain unforeseeable and uncontrollable.13 Risks, on 
the other hand, don't result from causative but from probabilistic imputation, i.e. 
damage is imputed through (for example) an actuarial approach.14 A risk therefore 
is a melange situation, which is seen as potentially, partly responsible harmful 
factor – because perceived, constructed, socially 'passed on' or for whatever 
reason15 – and therefore has to be preventatively set aside.  
                                                     
11 O’Malley 2008: 57. For further reading on Risk from the governmentality perspective see Donzelot 
1979; Ewald 1986; Ewald 1991; Defert 1991; Castel 1983; Krasmann 2003: 108 et seq. 
12 Beck 1986: 44 (“wirklich und unwirklich”). 
13 Krasmann 2003: 112. 
14 Cfr. Feeley/Simon 1992, passim; Feeley/Simon 1994: 173 (“It is actuarial. It is concerned with 
techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness. It 
takes crime for granted. It accepts deviance as normal. It is sceptical that liberal interventionist crime 
control strategies do or can make a difference. Thus its aim is not to intervene in individuals’ lives for 
the purpose of ascertaining responsibility, making the guilty ‘pay for their crime’ or changing them. 
Rather it seeks to regulate groups as part of a strategy of managing danger.”). 
15 For a detailled analysis of the different sociological constructions and approaches to risk see Zinn 
2008: 8 et seq., who present the differences between authors and theories and offers following 
classification of risk ideas – starting with the most concrete view of risk and increasing in the grade of 
abstraction and social construction attributed to this concept by the theorists; risk is differentially 
defined by them as a) “real and objective”, b) as “subjectively biased”, c) as “socially mediated”, d) as 
“socially transformed”, e) as “real and socially constructed”, or f) as “socially constructed”. 
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… the notion of risk is made autonomous from that of danger. A risk does not 
arise from the presence of particular precise danger embodied in a concrete 
individual or group. It is the effect of a combination of abstract factors which 
render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour. 
[...] The presence of some, or of a certain number, of these factors of risk sets off 
an automatic alert. 16  
Risks are attributed because of a lack of physical, causative reason and aim to 
prevent future – potential – damage. Risks are thus conceptionally calculable and 
controllable. 17   
2. The chronological dimension of risk 
The damage, which illustrates the concretion of risks, stands in an uncertain future, 
their causes, however, are being determined at present. Everywhere, “whereupon 
the 'guilt-seeking' spotlight falls”18 existing actions become the cause of future 
damage, i.e. they become ‘risks’. However, those causes are immediately – and 
causatively seen – neither as such nor under any circumstances damaging; this 
makes their penal recordal in view of attribution and legally protected interests of 
criminal law fundamentally problematic. Furthermore, those causes are something 
constructed by interpretation which in turn implicates a problem when looking at 
it from the aspect of action and their causation within the meaning of criminal law. 
“Risk discourse is future oriented. Risk rationalities and the technologies in which 
they are embedded bring imagined futures to the present.”19 Risk factors are not as 
closely linked with consequences of damage as certain (illicit) dangerous actions. 
Instead, they are defined objectively based on the deliberation of probability.20  
Even if one does not want to go so far to say that risk factors are socially 
constructed, one can nonetheless not overlook the fact that preventive orientated 
politics “de-construct the concrete subject of intervention, and reconstruct a 
combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their primary aim is not to confront 
a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption 
of danger”.21 Hereby, “to be suspected, it is no longer necessary to manifest 
symptoms of dangerousness or abnormality, it is enough to display whatever 
characteristics the specialists responsible for the definition of preventive policy 
have constituted as risk factors”.22 Here, governmental thinking overlaps with the 
perspective of actuarial justice. The importance of attribution processes also clearly 
                                                     
16 Castel 1983: 59. 
17 Cfr. Luhmann 1991, passim; Zinn 2008: 7; Krasmann 2003: 112 et seq. 
18 Beck 1986: 44. 
19 Ericson/Haggerty 2001: 87. 
20 In this respect the opinion of theorists of the “risk society” is deeply divided. See supra note 15. 
21 Castel 1983: 61 
22 Castel 1983: 59 
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stands out, if one understands the concept of risk as system-theoretical in the sense 
of Niklas Luhmann, and risks as a result of the process of decision-making and 
attribution of responsibility for those decisions. The development of risks, 
therefore, depends directly on whether damage is assumed to be the primary or 
secondary effect of certain decisions and who they are attributed to; or whether 
they are seen as concretised dangers without being able to be attributed to anyone: 
Accordingly, making a decision and attributing its uncertain consequences to this 
decision implies risk. In contrast, negative effects regarded as caused by external 
events are mere dangers. In other words, the distinction between risk and danger 
does not refer to differences in certainty, but to a difference in attribution. […] 
Instead of assuming a (possible increasing) number of objectively given 
risks/dangers […], [this careful separation of the terms ‘risk’ and ‘danger’] makes 
clear that whether we regard something as a risk is a matter of attribution.23 
If something or somebody is seen as a risk this classification implies that this 
subject was able to choose between an action or situation with a possible damaging 
outcome and a completely harmless action or situation. On the other side, to say 
that something or somebody is dangerous stresses the responsibility of actions and 
situations with possible damaging consequences outside the choices of this subject. 
Even though in these cases where there are not damaging results, the possibility of 
these results is enough reason to attribute responsibility to the risky subject in the 
first case – but not in the second. 
3. Reformulations in criminal law 
If one realises, that criminal justice normally operates in view of individual 
imputable damage or rather risk causation, it is clear that the opening up of 
criminal law and criminal justice to the needs of risk management would entail a 
significant modification of the well known framework of criminal law principles 
and logic:  
First of all, the person as the addressee of the criminal law would be perceived in 
an entirely different way by the criminal law. If we think that in a new risk-
approach “there is no longer a subject”,24 former personal categories were lost. 
“The confrontation of the delinquent with a concept of a person which 
accentuates the individual responsibility and excludes all other circumstances and 
conditions, admittedly risks passing into nothingness”25 and likewise the creation 
of a liberal modern criminal law and its addressees, its doctrine of culpability, its 
categories of crime and its legally protected interests. The criminal law oriented by 
risk categories and inspired by the risk logic would be an “extensive de-
                                                     
23 Japp/Kusche 2008: 88. 
24 Castel 1983: 61 
25 Günther 2002: 135. On the „delinquent“ as a „fading category of knowledge“ see also Scheerer 1998. 
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personalised law”26 and its objects would be risk groups of persons. This 
perception would be deferred by a combat of risks by the criminal law, for persons 
(“de-personalised”) would thus be considered a risk because of certain traits of 
their character, because of nationality or religion, because of type of friendships or 
rareness, or even because of a certain way to be (“their being that way”), which 
would ultimately abolish the distinction between the offender and the offence. 
Secondly, the traditional concept of a human act in criminal law would have to be 
replaced by a focus on risk factors which are not per se determined by acts. Either 
because in a risk society criminal law would (in the sense of actuarial justice) operate 
against – objectively assessed – risk factors (and not against actions) or because 
risk structures (independent of actions) would be defined and prosecuted by criminal law. 
Both cases are about the prevention of future damage through the prohibition of 
risks, which have been determined by actuarial assessment and political definition, 
respectively. 
Thirdly, criminal law would with regard to its temporal application turn around, 
because it would intervene with a view into the future and not regarding the past – 
because of a committed or attempted act. This would happen through the 
punishment of pseudo-“causes”, which could potentially cause future damage – 
probabilistic and not causatively viewed – i.e. through the logic of future-orientated 
intervention, which has no actual proof, but – still – unreal future scenarios as a 
basis.27 Because these risk definitions are contingent and variable, this would even 
be a matter of law limited in time. 
Fourthly, the imputation in criminal law, which rests on causality and personal 
responsibility, would be reformulated by probabilistic objective risk logic, because 
there would be no directly identifiable causality, but rather an objective diagnosis-
like attribution of potential future damage, mediated by probabilistic calculations. 
This would in particular entail the punishment of unintended side-effects. 
All these possible changes in the logic and functioning of the criminal law are 
not only speculations about future scenarios. In the current discourse of the 
criminal law in Germany all these reformulations are taking place. Addresses are 
constructed as risks. Even furthermore, they are not being constructed and 
managed as risks but rather constructed as risks and fought against as enemies.  
The conceptual relationship between the war on an enemy and the punishment 
of a criminal is an old topic in criminal law and criminology, so it is not necessary 
to further discuss this issue.28 Nevertheless, regarding the understanding of the 
current endanger law, it is necessary to stress that since about ten years discussions 
                                                     
26 Wolf 1987: 390 („weitgehendes entpersonalisiertes Recht“). See also Krasmann 2003: 120, 237 et seq.; 
Feeley/Simon 1992 and 1994. 
27 See on the technique of “horror scenaries” Opitz/Tellmann 2009, passim, who explain its functioning 
in preventive and precautionary systems. 
28 For an historical overview of the relationship between war and crime see Jamieson 1998; on 
criminalization as a useful instrument for political and legal power enforcement see Christie 1986, who 
criticizes that criminals are “suitable enemies” for the State; for a critical analysis of the similar 
features of war and criminal law in “law and order” policies see Steinert 1998 (in particular p. 418). 
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concerning the relationship between war and criminal law have become frequent. 
It has been even explicitly formulated, theorized and proposed by the German 
scholar Günther Jakobs, who is in favor of an “enemy criminal law” or an “enemy 
penalty” (“Feindstrafrecht”).29 According to this approach there are some 
individuals who cannot be seen as “persons”,30 they are not citizens anymore and 
must be excluded from society because they represent a social menace.31 The 
criminal law has to apply different rules to these enemies such as the forward 
displacement of punishability without reducing punishment in spite of this 
displacement, rights and guarantees are reduced or even denied, and the criminal 
legislation becomes war legislation.32 These individuals do not have to be punished 
by the criminal system, but to be fought against as enemies.33 The proposal of 
Jakobs is, according to him, a real – and not ideal – way to deal with the limits of 
law.34 This reality can be observed within the government and the legislation, 
which are currently acting according to these ideas. Furthermore, I contend that 
these ideas are being combined with the logic of risk. Thus, criminal law becomes 
broader because of the diversity of risk constructions, and more aggressive because 
of the war logic. Risky figures being fought against as enemies is a current logic in 
the discourse and practice of criminal law in Germany. 
IV. Current constructions legitimated by the Constitutional 
Court of Germany 
Taking the explained risk concept as a theoretical framework and having shortly 
presented the idea of an enemy penalty introduced within German criminal law, it 
is now relevant to refer the endangerer in Germany’s criminal law constructions, 
who shows the reality of criminal law when the discourses of risk and of war 
merge. It has been claimed by politicians, parliamentarians and judges that it is 
necessary to deprive risky figures of their rights (privacy, freedom) even before their 
potentially harmful risky status turns into concrete damaging situations. As a 
consequence, the idea of an endangerer is present in a non-written form in the 
parliamentary discourse as well as in the discourse of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(the Constitutional Court of Germany). The two constructed measures of the 
criminal system which will be presented in the following section are the acoustic 
home surveillance and the supplementary preventive detention. 
                                                     
29 Jakobs 2000: passim. 
30 Jakobs 2000: 53, 2004: 90 et seq. 
31 Jakobs 2000: 51. 
32 Jakobs 2000: 51 et seq. 
33 Jakobs 2004: 90. 
34 Jakobs 2006: 289. 
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1. Acoustic Home Surveillance 
The acoustic home surveillance – akustische Wohnraumüberwachung – is an (alleged 
exceptional) procedural measure consisting of the secret hearing of conversations 
held by a suspect, by his relatives or by anybody staying in his private premises. 
The objective is to obtain evidence in criminal pre-trials related to ‘organized 
crime’ and, above all, to get information about the “network structures”.35 
Interestingly, Germany does not have a codified offence for ‘organized crime’ in its 
Criminal Code. Hence, parliamentarians had to introduce a long list of offences, 
which may be related to ‘organized crime’.36 The list contains more than one 
hundred offences for which it is possible to carry out the acoustic home 
surveillance. The asserted exceptionality of the measure, therefore, is not really an 
exception. 
This amendment was introduced into the Code of Criminal Procedure in 
1998.37 An amendment to Article 13 of the Federal Constitution was also essential, 
since this article establishes the inviolability of home space.38 In 2004 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht declared the constitutional amendment as according to 
the Constitution since it did not violate the “eternity clausel” established in Article 
79 (para. 3) of the Constitution in order to avoid amendments which could abolish 
                                                     
35 Amendment Draft, BT-Drs. 15/4533, p. 27. Cfr. also Bundestag, Plenary Session of 21st January 
2005 (in the following: BT-Session 15/152), p. 14291.  
36 The quasi-official definition of “organized crime” adopted in Germany is not a legal definition, but 
an instrumental concept for criminal policy. According to this definition “Organised crime 
constitutes the planned commission of criminal offences driven by the question of acquiring profits 
or powers. Such criminal offences have to involve the cooperation of more than two participants 
acting for a longer or indefinite period of time on a distributed-task basis by utilization of commercial 
or business-like structures, or by application of violence of other methods suitable for achieving 
intimidation, or by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administrations, justice systems, 
or commerce” („Eine von Gewinnstreben bestimmte planmäßige Begehung von Straftaten durch 
mehrere Beteiligte zu verstehen, die auf längere oder unbestimmte Dauer arbeitsteilig – unter 
Verwendung gewerblicher oder geschäftsähnlicher Strukturen, - unter Anwendung von Gewalt oder 
anderer zur Einschüchterung geeigneter Mittel, oder – unter dem Bemühen auf Politik, Medien, 
öffentliche Verwaltung, Justiz oder Wirtschaft Einfluß zu nehmen, zusammenwirken.“), see Gesetz zur 
Bekämpfung der Organisierten Kriminalität, Bundesgesetzblatt I 1302, 15.07.1992 – BT-Drs. 12/989 –, p. 
24). See for further critical views of the imprecision of this definition Mozek 2001: 61; Lisken 1994: 
264; see also for a critical analysis of this definition as a political instrument Fernández Steinko 2008: 61 
et seq. 
37 Gesetz zur Änderung des Arts. 13 GG of 26th March 1998 (BGBl I 98, 610) 
38 See the current version of Article 13 of the German Constitution. After establishing the 
inviolability of home space (para. 1) the article explains the exception for example for acoustic home 
surveillance (para. 3): “(1) The home is inviolable. (…) (3) If particular facts justify the suspicion that 
any person has committed an especially serious crime specifically defined by a law, technical means of 
acoustical surveillance of any home in which the suspect is supposedly staying may be employed 
pursuant to judicial order for the purpose of prosecuting the offence, provided that alternative 
methods of investigating the matter would be disproportionately difficult or unproductive. The 
authorisation shall be for a limited time. The order shall be issued by a panel composed of three 
judges. When time is of the essence, it may also be issued by a single judge.” (http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#GGengl_000P13, last visited on 24th January 2011). 
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some of the fundamental constitutional rights.39 The Constitutional Court 
understood that the acoustic home surveillance is not unconstitutional if it does 
not violate the intimity sphere of the surveilled individuals.40 Thus, the Court reached 
satisfaction by demanding more restrictive rules for the effective implementation 
of the measure. The parameters provided by the Court, however, were found 
unrealistic by scholars and practitioners: If the rules are followed, the surveillance 
becomes impossible; if any surveillance is done, these rules are instantaneously 
broken and the surveillance becomes automatically unconstitutional.41  
However, it is more important to point out that within the Bundestag42 and 
the Constitutional Court the question of what exactly ‘organized crime’ is remained 
open.43 Nevertheless, both institutions affirmed that this procedural measure was 
utterly necessary in order to investigate and to avoid the danger that the ‘organized 
crime’ represents for the national and general security. The national security, it was 
argued, is at stake and must be defended through the flexibilization and the more 
intense intervention of the criminal procedure. ‘Organized crime’ would not be a 
usual criminal figure, but an invisible shapeless high-risk phenomenon challenging 
the traditional criminal system and the Rechtsstaat.44  
2. Subsequent incapacitation order 
The subsequent incapacitation order (nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung) is an ensuring 
measure addressed to those who were convicted to prison because of sexual or 
high violent crimes. This measure was originally designed by the States of Bavaria 
and Saxony-Anhalt.45 The Bundesverfassungsgericht found these concrete 
exceptional laws unconstitutional because of a lack of jurisdiction to release these 
acts, but announced the constitutionality of the idea. The Court proposed this 
measure to the Bundestag in 2004 in order to legally solve the exceptional situation 
of some specific detainees who had served their sentences, but whom the 
respective States did not consider appropriate to release because of their forecasted 
“dangerousness”.46 Thus, following the “order”47 of the Constitutional Court, the 
                                                     
39 BVerfG, Decision of 3rd March 2004 – 1 BvR 2378/98, 1084/99 – (in the following: BVerfGE 
109, 279). 
40 On the “spheres theory” (in time sphere which cannot be violated by the state, private sphere 
where the state can intervene in some cases, and social sphere which is open to state and public 
intervention) and its application to this case see Warntjen 2007: 48 et seq. 
41 Bundestag, Plenary Session 12.05.2005 (in the following: BT-Session 15/175), p. 16456. See also 
Haas 2004: 3083.  
42 Cfr. Bundestag, Plenary Session 9.10.1997 (in the following: BT-Session 13/197), p. 17692; 
Bundestag, Plenary Session 16.01.1998 (in the following: BT-Session 13/214).  
43 BVerfG 109, 279, p. 338 et seq. 
44 BT-Session 13/197, pp. 17699, 17704; BT-Session 13/214, pp. 19524, 19536. 
45 See the drafts and discussions of these states as well as on the nature these states recognized to this 
measure (police emergency measures) Bender 2007, p. 26 et seq.  
46 BVerfG, Decision of 10th February 2004 – 2 BvR 834, 1588/02 (in the following: BVerfGE 109, 
190). 
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Bundestag discussed and amended the federal Criminal Code in 200448 and made it 
legally possible to prove shortly before the prisoner is going to be released 
(probably after years of imprisonment) if he represents a “high risk” for the 
general security49 – if he does, he has to stay in jail for an undetermined amount of 
time –.50 
Many factors could lead to the order of this measure: the behavior in prison, 
the relationship to prison officers, the seriousness of the original crime (which 
probably occurred many years ago), the willingness of the prisoner to participate in 
therapy programs, etc.51 That means that there is not a direct relation between a 
crime and the order of the subsequent incapacitation order nor between the 
manifested personality of the offender in occasion of the crime and the subsequent 
order of the measure.52 Therefore, the prognosis or forecast is based exclusively on 
                                                     
47 Bundestag, Plenary Session 25.03.2004 (BT-Session 15/100), p. 8995; Bundestag, Plenary Session 
18.06.2004 (in the following: BT-Session 15/115), pp. 10553, 10558 et seq. Also critical with the 
attitude of the Court Laubenthal 2004: 744; Kinzig 2008: 48; Mushoff 2008: 40 
48 Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung of 23rd July 2004 (BGBl. I, p. 
1838). 
49 See § (Section) 66b Subsequent incapacitation order introduced to the Criminal Code (StGB): “(1) If 
prior to the end of a term of imprisonment imposed on conviction for a felony against life and limb, 
personal freedom or sexual self-determination, or a felony pursuant to section 250 and section 251, 
also in conjunction with section 252 or section 255, or for one of the misdemeanours in section 66 
(3) 1st sentence, evidence comes to light which indicates that the convicted person presents a 
significant danger to the general public, the court may subsequently make an incapacitation order if a 
comprehensive evaluation of the convicted person, his offences and his development in custody 
indicate a high likelihood of his committing serious offences resulting in seriously emotional trauma 
or physical injury to the victim and if the remaining conditions in section 66 are fulfilled. If making 
the order at the time of conviction was impossible under law, the court shall, for the purpose of the 
1st sentence of this subsection, also take into account any facts that were already evident at that 
time.” (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGBengl_000P66b, 
last visited on 24th January 2011) 
50 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has condemned Germany because of the 
retroactive application of an amendment which cancelled the 10 year limit of incapacitation (ECHR, 
M. v. Germany, Decision 17.12.2009, Nr. 19359/04, in the following: ECHR, M. v. Germany). In this 
sense, the subsequent incapacitation order may also violate Art. 5 (1)(a) (restriction of liberty 
according to the decision of a responsible tribunal) and Art. 7 (principle of non retroactivity) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In the case of the subsequent incapacitation order the 
individual is being (further) incarcerated on the basis of facts not related to his former crime and this 
decision is being applied – in the case of the individuals who were already in prison before the law 
was amended – violating the prohibition of retroactivity of criminal law (nr. 88, 105, 120, 132 et seq. of 
the decision). See comments on this decision in H.E. Müller 2010, passim; Grabenwarter 2010, passim; 
Laue 2010, passim; Merkel 2010: 1060 et seq.; Kinzig 2010: 238 et seq. Following the decision of the 
ECHR, Germany amended last December the Criminal Code and suppressed the general disposition 
for the subsequent incapacitation order (Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung und zu 
begleitenden Regelungen vom 22. 12. 2010 (BGBl. I S. 2300)); since 1st January 2011 it is only possible to 
order this subsequently incapacitation in cases of internment in psychiatrical institutions and in 
relation to very serious crimes. This last amendment was forced by a decision of the ECHR; meaning 
that the internal logic of the measure was not revisited because of criminal principles or because of 
principles of the Rechtsstaat, but only as a consequence of the intervention of human rights parameters 
imposed by the European Court. For this reason, this paper’s analysis still concentrates in the 
criminal discourse of the subsequent incapacitation order, which is actually not really overcame yet. 
51 BVerfGE 109, 133, p. 161 et seq., see also Ullenbruch 2007: 62 et seq. 
52 See also ECHR, M. v. Germany, nr. 88. See crit. also Böllinger/Pollähne (2010: 2154 – Rn. 7 – 
“decoupling” („Entkoppelung“)), Schneider 2006: 99 (the incapacitation was “decoupled” 
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the conduct of the prisoner in jail and not directly related to a crime – and this fact 
represents the main difference between the common incapacitation and the 
subsequent incapacitation. 
Some sexual offenders are even seen and classified by the Constitutional Court 
as “bundles of risks”,53 who are unable to come back to society. Their subject-
quality is put aside and only the sum of attributed risk factors is justifying the 
incapacitation – without direct bound to a new crime or new criminal 
circumstances –.54 The offered argument is that these individuals would endanger 
the general security. That is, it is argued by politicians and judges, many risk factors 
as possible should be taken into account and security measures as strong as 
possible have to be adopted in order to avoid any possible future damage.55  
V. ‘Endanger’ 
With these dispositives the criminal law becomes endanger law, which is broader 
and more aggressive in terms of its intervention strategies. Its function is no longer 
prosecuting and punishing crime and criminals, but dealing with the projection of 
high-risks and, subsequently, stopping subjects and phenomena as the ‘organized 
crime’ which endanger the security. The logic of the risk management explained in 
the first part of the paper and its combination with the idea of war on crime – as 
well as the idea of the criminal as an enemy –, can be seen in the mentioned 
examples, in which neither solely management of risk nor just war on enemies, but 
actually a complex war on risks is being carried out.  
The criminal law acting in this war on risks is what is here called endanger law 
whose working process can be summarized as follows:  
Firstly, the forecast of each possible future damage for the general security is represented – 
such as corruption, parallel economy, gangs fighting provoked by the ‘organized 
crime”, violent and/or sexual crimes to be committed by already convicted 
subjects etc.  
Secondly, relevant risk patterns for each area are designed (constructed) – for example in 
the case of the ‘organized crime’ the risk factors are nationality, religion, spoken 
language, circle of friends, occupation among other; in the case of sexual and high 
violent criminality patterns are constructed taking into account the quality of the 
committed crimes, the everyday behavior of inmates in prison, their relationship 
with custody personal, etc. 
Thirdly, there is legal intervention (by means of an alleged exceptional law) in order to 
neutralize these risks and in this way the right to home privacy and the right to 
                                                     
(„abgekoppelt“) from the original offence); Laubenthal 2004 („deviation of the […] character of the 
incapacitation as a direct legal consequence of the original offence“ („Abkehr von dem […] 
Charakter der Sicherungsverwahrung als einer unmittelbaren Rechtsfolge der Anlasstat“), p. 741). 
53 BVerfGE 109, 133, p. 158. The Tribunal refers itself to the fundaments of the legislator. 
54 See supra note 52. 
55 Cfr. Draft CDU/CSU (BT-Drs. 15/2576), p. 7; BVerfGE 109, 133, pp. 159, 174. 
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freedom were repealed in order to enable the criminal system to proceed in cases 
without crime in which the only aim is to avoid that damages occur. Here, the idea of 
Minority Report offers an extraordinary illustration: In the film future crimes are 
forecasted by rare creatures and a special police unit intervenes immediately after 
these creatures feel the crime coming and give their alert. The preventive 
intervention consists in neutralizing, arresting and punishing people who did not 
commit any crime. In this way, predictions and interventions are immediately 
related. Causal chains are not relevant – there is no action, no crime, and no 
damaging or endangering conduct! They are irrelevant because risk is not cause, but 
the adscription of the responsibility for future possibilities.56  
Fourthly, “endangering” factors and subjects are excluded. The exercise of procedural 
rights and the validity of legal principles are denied to them (principle of non 
retroactivity of criminal law,57 principle of certainty of criminal law58), they are also 
excluded from the society discursively (‘organized crime’) and physically 
(incapacitation) as well as excluded from the general common legal apparatus 
which usually protects citizens and inhabitants of a country. ‘Endangerers’ as 
‘organized crime’ or ‘high risky sexual offenders’ are not seen as law-subjects 
anymore. They are perceived neither as common citizens nor as usual criminals, 
but as homo insecuritas – that means, constructed as the opposite of the general 
security. 
VI. Critical remarks 
I would like to point out shortly that many aspects of the endanger law are not 
really new. If we look at the work of Walter Benjamin,59 we will find the violent and 
police-like (without distance) character of law, which we also see in the immediate 
intervention and decision of home acoustic surveillance60 and of supplementary 
preventive detention.61 The impossibility of justice in the “law enforcement” was 
also sufficiently analyzed by Jacques Derrida, who – critically – recalled that is is 
                                                     
56 See supra note 17 et seq. and main text. 
57 Crit. also Kinzig 2006: 155, Böllinger/Pollähne (2010: 2154 – Rn. 7 –); see the very important decision 
of ECHR, M. v. Germany, nr. 120, 132 et seq. 
58 See crit. also Böllinger/Pollähne (2010: 2154 – Rn. 7 –), Finger (2008: 173 et seq.), Mushoff 2008: 446 et 
seq. 
59 Benjamin 1965. 
60 The decision to hear the conversation or not, and whether to record it or not, must be done at the 
moment that the police suppose people at home are talking about crimes, not before that, and not 
after. For this reason it is necessary to carry out surveillance live. This immediate method was required 
by the Constitutional Court and found impossible by practitioners (BT-Session 15/152, p. 14291). 
See also supra note 41 and main text. 
61 The “alert” about the risk-factors that the prisoner represents is given by the prison officers, which 
are locally and temporarily immediate to him and cannot be neutral to his situation. In the same 
sense, the law itself was decided for immediate situations and to avoid the release of eight concrete 
prisoners. The law, as seen, was rapidly written to solve these concrete cases (BT-Session 15/115, p. 
10555). 
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necessary for the law to apply force if it is to be truly valid.62 The indetermination 
and vagueness of the law that does not exactly deal with particular acts but with no 
clear defined limits between normality and anormality was largely discussed by Michel 
Foucault.63 Moreover, he situated this question in the wider framework of the 
relations of power and convincingly explained the role of the law as an instrument 
within the field of strategic power struggles. The legal legitimization of violence by 
claiming an exceptional situation seems to be part of this law rationality. 
Nowadays, says Giorgio Agamben, these exceptions seem to have become the rule64 
and other also point out that „exceptions are nothing but extensions of the 
norm.“65 In the cases analyzed here the exception was the initial argument which 
later flowed through very legal and very common ways into the normal rule: the 
emergency incapacitation laws designed to avoid the release of eight prisoners 
became part of the federal law of the Bundestag changing the Criminal Code, while 
the exceptional surveillance measure of the secret services became a common 
procedural measure able to be applied in all cases related to ‘organized crime’, that 
means, in the investigation of around one hundred different crime forms. Taking 
all these critical thinkers into consideration, the endanger law seems to not be so 
innovative after all.  
Today the functioning and internal logic of the law, however, is even more 
visible and less principled than a couple of decades ago. The modern German law 
is being reformulated.66  
This modern law is being reedited according to the current rationality of risk: law 
as an instrument of volatile risk management is aimed at the forecast of each 
possible future damage for the general security. At the same time, this modern law 
is being reedited according to the current rationality of war: law as a means for 
aggressive fighting and for neutralizing faceless enemies of the general security 
while arguing the exceptionality of the measure.  
Risk management and war fighting merge. Not just risk management, but 
fighting; not just war to the enemy, but multiple constructions of possible 
‘endangerers’ by means of risk calculation. 
Older law logics are being brought up today: As seen, the immediacy, the 
violence, the vagueness and the exceptionality of law are immanent to the internal 
                                                     
62 Derrida 1991:12 et seq., and passim. 
63 Foucault 1977: 157, Foucault 2005: 237. 
64 Agamben 2002: 130; Agamben 2004: 9, 41. („Die unmittelbar biopolitische Bedeutung des 
Ausnahmezustands als einer ursprünglichen Struktur, in der das Recht durch seine eigene 
Suspendierung das Lebendige in sich schließt, kommt in aller Klarheit durch die military order zum 
Vorschein, die der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten am 13. November 2001 erlassen hat. Danach ist 
bei Nicht-Staatsbürgern, die terroristischer Taten verdächtigt werden, »unbeschränkte Haft« (indefinite 
detention) und ein Prozeß vor »military commissions« erlaubt (die nicht mit Militärgerichten zu 
verwechseln sind, wie sie das Kriegsrecht vorsieht, 2004: 9). 
65 Ojakangas 2005: 16.  
66 That is the criminal law inspired by illustrated ideals and applied in the German Rechtsstaat in 
particular after 1945, including the more pragmatic streams of preventive criminal law. For a short 
review of illustrated and modern criminal law see Arnold 2006. 
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logic of modern law. The endanger law, therefore, is neither a pre-modern nor an 
anti-modern law. It is rather a manifestation of modern law reformulated to fit the 
challenges of the XXI century and its security obsession: endanger law is the 
instrumental law of the securitized times, in which there are again and again social 
issues which become of political relevance and after that are even declared as 
existential questions for the national security.67 In the cases of the subsequent 
incapacitation order and of the acoustic home surveillance the securitization of the 
questions ‘organized crime’ and ‘sexual criminality’ have even reached high levels 
of normalization in the criminal law: they were written in the Federal Constitution 
following the rule of law and were even promoted by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Limiting the endanger law, I suggest, will only be possible after starting to 
recognize the internal components of law and to rethink the function of criminal 
law entirely. The war on risks may sound very innovative, but it is not a valid legal 
solution to the insecurity. The means-end bound between criminal law as a means 
and security as an end must be definitively eradicated. This eradication, however, 
should not be expected from the side of the constitutional and legal principles and 
actors. These constitutional and legal principles and actors, as seen, have been 
infiltrated and performed by securitization-streams as well.  
References 
Agamben, Giorgio 2002: Homo Sacer. Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 
Agamben, Giorgio 2004: Ausnahmezustand, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp  
Beck, Ulrich 1986: Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp  
Beck, Ulrich 2000: Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research 
Programmes, in: Adam, Barbara/Beck, Ulrich/Van Loon, Joost (Ed.): The Risk 
Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory, London [u.a.]: Sage, 2000, 211-
229 
Arnold, Jörg 2006: Entwicklungslinien des Feindstrafrechts in 5 Thesen, in: 
Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung Strafrecht -HHRS- Aug./Sept. 2006, 303-315 
Bender, Soledad 2007: Die nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter 
Lang. 
Benjamin, Walter 1965: Zur Kritik der Gewalt, in: id., Zur Kritik der Gewalt und 
andere Aufsätze, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 29-65 
                                                     
67 See Buzan/Waever/de Wilde 1998; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006. 
 María Laura Böhm 
 
160 
Böllinger, Lorenz/Pollähne, Helmut 2010: Nachträgliche Anordnung der 
Unterbringung in der Sicherungsverwahrung - § 66 b, in: StGB – Nomos 
Kommentar, Band 1, 3. Aufl., 2151-2160 
Böhm, María Laura 2008: Transformaciones en el Estado de(l) Derecho, in: 
Cuadernos de Doctrina y Jurisprudencia Penal. Colección Criminología, teoría y praxis, vol. 
5/6, 15-33 
Buzan, Barry/Waever, Ole/de Wilde, Jaap 1998: Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener 
C. A. S. E. Collective 2006: Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A 
Networked Manifesto, in: Security Dialogue vol. 37(4), 443-487 
Castel, Robert 1983: Von der Gefährlichkeit zum Risiko, in: Wambach, Manfred 
M. (Ed.): Der Mensch als Risiko, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 51-74  
Christie, Nils 1986: Suitable Enemy, in: Bianchi, Herman/van Swaaningen, René 
(Ed.): Abolitionism: Towards a Non-reppresive Approach to Crime, Amsterdam: Free 
University Press, 42-54 
Defert, Daniel 1991: Popular life and insurance technology, in: Burchell, 
Graham/Gordon, Colin/Miller, Peter (Ed.): The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Chicago: CUP, 211-234 
Derrida, Jacques 1991: Gesetzeskraft. Der ‚mystische Grund der Autorität’, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 
Donzelot, Jacques 1979: The poverty of political culture, in: Ideology and 
Consciousness 5, 71-86  
Ericson, Richard/Haggerty, Kevin 2001: Policing the Risk Society, Oxford: OUP 
Ewald, François 1986: L’Etat providence, Paris: Grasset, 1986 
Ewald, François 1991: Insurance and Risks, in: Burchell, Graham/Gordon, 
Colin/Miller, Peter (Ed.): The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: 
CUP, 197-210  
Feeley, Malcolm/Simon, Jonathan 1992: The New Penology: Notes on the 
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, in: Criminology 30, 449-
474 
Feeley, Malcolm/Simon, Jonathan 1994: Actuarial Justice. The Emerging New 
Criminal Law, in: Nelken, David (Ed.): The Futures of Criminology, London [u.a.]: 
Thousand Oaks, 173-201 
Fernández Steinko, Armando 2008: Las pistas falsas del crimen organizado. Finanzas 
paralelas y orden internacional, Madrid: Catarata 
Endanger Law: War on Risks in German Criminal Law 
 
161 
Finger, Catrin 2008: Vorbehaltene und Nachträgliche Sicherheitsverwahrung. Zur 
Rechtsmäßigkeit von § 66a und 66b StGB. Zugleich eine Darstellung des Umgangs mit 
gefährlichen Rückfalltätern in den Niederlanden, Baden-Baden: Nomos  
Foucault, Michel 1977: Sexualität und Wahrheit. Der Wille zum Wissen, Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp 
Foucault, Michel 2005: Die Maschen der Macht, in: id.: Analytik der Macht, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 220-239 
Grabenwarter, Christoph 2010: Wirkungen eines Urteils des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte – am Beispiel des Falls M. gegen 
Deutschland, in: Juristen Zeitung 18, 857-869 
Günther, Klaus 2002: Zwischen Ermächtigung und Disziplinierung. 
Verantwortung im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, in: Honneth, Axel (Ed.): 
Befreiung aus der Mündigkeit. Paradoxien des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, 
Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 117-139  
Haas, Günter 2004: Der  ‚Große Lauschangriff’ – klein geschrieben, in: Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 43, 3082-3084 
Jakobs, Günther 1985: Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutsverletzung, in: 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 97, 751-785 
Jakobs, Günther 2000: Das Selbstverständnis der Strafrechtswissenschaft vor den 
Herausforderungen der Gegenwart, in: Eser, Albin/Hassemer, 
Winfried/Burkhardt, Björn (Ed.): Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der 
Jahrtausendwende – Rückbesinnung und Ausblick, München: Beck, 47-56 
Jakobs, Günther 2004: Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht, in: Höchstrichterliche 
Rechtsprechung Strafrecht -HHRS-, März, 88-95 
Jakobs, Günther 2006: Feindstrafrecht? Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen 
von Rechtlichkeit, in: Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung Strafrecht –HHRS-, 
Aug./Sept., Heft 8/9, 289- 297  
Jamieson, Ruth 1998: Towards a Criminology of War in Europe, in: Ruggiero, 
Vincenzo/South, Nigel/Taylor, Ian (Ed.): The New European Criminology. Crime 
and Social Order in Europe, London: Routledge, 480-506 
Japp, Klaus P./Kusche, Isabel 2008: Systems Theory and Risk, in: Zinn, Jens O. 
(Ed.): Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty - An Introduction, Oxford – Malden 
(MA): Blackwell, 76-105 
Kinzig, Jörg 2006: Die Sicherungsverwahrung – von einer vergessenen zu einer 
boomenden Maßregel, in: Barton, Stephan (Ed.): „…weil er für die Allgemeinheit 
gefährlich ist!“ Prognosegutachten, Neurobiologie, Sicherungsverwahrung, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 143-173 
 María Laura Böhm 
 
162 
Kinzig, Jörg 2008: Die Legalbewährung gefährlicher Rückfalltäter – Zugleich ein Beitrag zur 
Entwicklung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 
Kinzig, Jörg 2010: Das Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung nach dem Urteil des 
EGMR in Sachen M. gegen Deutschland, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 233-
239 
Krasmann, Susanne 2003: Die Kriminalität der Gesellschaft. Zur Gouvernementalität der 
Gegenwart., Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. 
Krasmann, Susanne 2007: The Enemy On the Border. Critique of a programme in 
favour of a preventive state, in: Punishment & Society 9(3), 301-318 
Laubenthal, Klaus 2004: Die Renaissance der Sicherungsverwahrung, in: Zeitschrift 
für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 116, 703-750 
Laue, Christian 2010: Die Sicherungsverwahrung auf dem europäischen Prüfstand 
– zugleich eine Anmerkung zu EGMR, M. vs. Deutschland v. 17.12.2009 – 
19359/04, in: Juristische Rundschau 5, 198-204 
Lisken, Hans 1994: Vorfeldeingriffe im Bereich der ‚Organisierten Kriminalität‘ – 
Gemeinsame Aufgabe von Verfassungsschutz und Polizei?, in: Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik, 264-270 
Luhmann, Niklas 1991: Soziologie des Risikos, Berlin [u.a.]: de Gruyter 
Merkel, Grischa 2010: Incompatible Contrasts? – Preventive Detention in 
Germany and the European Convention on Human Rights, in: German Law 
Journal 11(9), 1046-1066 
Mozek, Martin 2001: Der große Lauschangriff – Die Regelung des §100c I Nr.3 StPO im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Verbrechensbekämpfung und Verfassungswirklichkeit, Aachen: 
Shaker 
Müller, Henning Ernst 2010: Die Sicherungsverwahrung, das Grundgesetz und die 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, in: Strafverteidiger 4, 207-212 
Mushoff, Tobias 2008: Strafe – Maßregel – Sicherungsverwahrung. Eine kritische 
Untersuchung über das Verhältnis von Schuld und Prävention, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter 
Lang 
Ojakangas, Mika 2005: Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power. Agamben und 
Foucault, in: Foucault Studies 2, Mai 2005, 5-28 
O’Malley, Pat 2008: Governmentality and Risk, in: Zinn, Jens O. (Ed.): Social 
Theories of Risk and Uncertainty - An Introduction, Oxford – Malden (MA): 
Blackwell, 52-75 
Opitz, Sven/Tellmann, Ute 2009: Katastrophale Szenarien: Gegenwärtige Zukunft 
im Recht und Ökonomie?, in: Leviathan, Sonderheft 25 (Sichbarkeitsregime. 
Endanger Law: War on Risks in German Criminal Law 
 
163 
Überwachung. Sicherheit und Privatheit im 21. Jahrhundert, herausgegeben 
von U. Bröckling, L. Hempel und S. Krasmann) 
Scheerer, Sebastian 1998: The Delinquent as a Fading Category of Knowledge, in: 
Ruggiero, Vincenzo/South, Nigel/Taylor, Ian (Ed.): The New European 
Criminology. Crime and Social Order in Europe, London: Routledge, 425-442 
Schneider, Hendrik 2006: Die Kriminalprognose bei der nachträglichen 
Sicherungsverwahrung – An den Grenzen der klinischen Kriminologie, in: 
Strafverteidiger, 99-104  
Steinert, Heinz 1998: ‘Ideology with Human Victims’: The institution of ‘crime and 
punishment’ between social control and social exclusion: historical and 
theoretical issues, in: Ruggiero, Vincenzo/South, Nigel/Taylor, Ian (Ed.): The 
New European Criminology. Crime and Social Order in Europe, London: Routledge, 
405-424 
Thiede, Frank 2008: Entwurf des BKA-Gesetzes, in: Kriminalistik 10/2008, 539-
542 
Ullenbruch, Thomas 2007: Nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung – ein legislativer 
‚Spuk’ im judikativen ‚Fegefeuer’?, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 62-71 
von Denkowski, Charles 2007: Einstufung als (islamistische) Gefährder und 
(heimliche) Folgeeingriffe, in: Kriminalistik 5/2007, 325-332 
von Denkowski, Charles 2008: Das BKA im Wandel: Einst Zentralstelle, bald 
Bundeskriminalpolizei im Vorfeld terroristischer Gefahren – die Große 
Koalition leitet einen Paradigmenwechsel ein, in: Neue Kriminalpolitik 3/2008, 
82-87  
Warntjen, Maximilian (2007): Heimliche Zwangsmaßnahmen und der Kernbereich privater 
Lebensgestaltung, Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Wolf, Rainer 1987: Zur Antiquertheit des Rechts in der Risikogesellschaft, in: 
Leviathan, 357-391 
Zinn, Jens 2008: Introduction: The Contribution of Sociology to the Discourse on 
Risk and Uncertainty, in: id. (Ed.): Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty - An 
Introduction, Oxford – Malden (MA): Blackwell, 1-17
 
 
List of Contributors 
 
Böhm, María Laura, Dr. phil. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law (Department of International 
and Foreign Criminal Law). Main research fields: Security Policy and Criminal 
Policy, Postmodern Sociology of Law, criminological aspects of International 
Criminal Law. 
 
Cho, Hong Sik, Professor, LL.B. (SNU) LL.M. & J.S.D. (U.C. Berkeley) 
Seoul National University, School of Law. Main research fields: Environmental 
Law. 
 
Deutsch, Erwin, Professor em., Dr. iur. Dr. iur. h.c. mult, Dr. med. h.c. 
mult. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law. Main research fields: 
Medical Law, Insurance Law, Law of Torts, Liability Law. 
 
Duttge, Gunnar, Professor, Dr. iur. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law (Department of Criminal 
Medical and Biological Law). Main research fields: Criminal Law, Criminal 
Procedural Law, Philosophy of Law, Medical Law (vice managing director of the 
Centre of Medical Law of the University of Göttingen). 
 
Heo, Seong Wook, Associate Professor, Dr. iur., B.A. in Economics (SNU), 
LL.M. & Ph.D. in Law (SNU) 
Seoul National University, School of Law. Main research fields: Public Law, Law 
and Economics. 
 
Heun, Werner, Professor, Dr. iur. Dr. h.c. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law (Institute for General Theory 
of State and Political Sciences). Main research fields: Public Law, Constitutional 
History, Political Science, Ecclesiastical Law, American Constitutional Law. 
 
Krause, Rüdiger, Professor, Dr. iur. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law (Institute for Labour Law). 
Main research fields: Labour Law, Civil Law. 
 
Kwon, Youngjoon, Associate Professor, LL.M (Harvard Law School), LL.M 
& Ph.D. in Law (SNU) 
Seoul National University, School of Law. Main research field: Civil Law. 
 List of Contributors 
 
166 
Lee, Sang Won, Associate Professor, LL.B., LL.M. & Ph.D. in Law (SNU), 
LL.M. (U.C. Berkeley) 
Seoul National University, School of Law. Main research fields: Criminal Law and 
Procedure. 
 
Leitner, John M., Professor, Dr. iur. 
Seoul National University, School of Law. Main research fields: Internet Law, 
Environmental Law, Comparative Law. 
 
Schorkopf, Frank, Professor, Dr. iur. 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Law (Institute of International 
Law and European Union Law). Main research fields: Constitutional Law, 




Gunnar Duttge, Sang Won Lee (Hg.)
The Law in the Information and  
Risk Society 



















   


































The information and risk society poses a new challenge for the law in all its frag-
ments. Modern media communication and technologies increase people’s prospe-
rity while stating new risks with not uncommonly devastating crisis-potential: The 
banking crisis, the safety net for the euro zone and the nuclear incident in Fukus-
hima are only the latest forms of those specific modern common dangers which the 
law is facing – in many cases due to it’s domestically limited validity - not or not 
sufficiently prepared. In order to promote the international dialog within the juris-
prudence there was a conference in October 2010 held by the faculty of law of the 
Georg-August-Universität, supported by the chair of GAU, together with the faculty 
of Seoul National University School of Law discussing main issues of law in a modern 
information and risk society. With this volume the results of this convention shall be 
made accessible to everybody interested. Thereby it illustrates not only the variety of 
new issues and aspects, but also reveals that this can only be the beginning on the 
way to a deeper understanding of the complex correlations.
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